2000 Case Summaries

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On December 6, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not cross the line of impartiality by engaging a respondent in a dialogue during disposition proceedings.

On December 20, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that when an officer viewed three young men on the streets at 3 am carrying electronic equipment he had reasonable suspicion to stop the youths to investigate for a possible burglary. Handcuffing the suspects did not convert the stop into an arrest. While the San Antonio curfew ordinance prohibits an arrest for the first offense, the stop here was made independently of that ordinance.

On December 28, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that a delay of 6 hours in notifying the juvenile's parents of his arrest invalidated his murder confession that the juvenile gave to police. This procedure did not comply with the Family Code's requirement of prompt notice to parents.

On December 28, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication and commitment to the TYC because the juvenile law master did not adequately inform the juvenile of his right to a hearing before the judge of the juvenile court.

On December 14, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court was justified in committing the respondent to TYC because the probation department would not pay for local sex offender treatment for the 17 year old respondent.

On December 7, 2000, the Texas Supreme Court denied review in a case raising the question whether Chapter 55 applies to a person 18 or older who is the subject of a release/transfer hearing under the determinate sentence act. According to a concurrence, the court denied review because the issue had not been preserved in the trial court.

On December 7, 2000, the First District Court of Appeals held that a juvenile adjudicated CINS for disruption of class did not preserve by trial objection the claim that the statute was void for vagueness.

On November 30, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in refusing to permit the respondent to cross-examine the child complainant in a sexual assault case that about the divorce proceedings and custody fights between her parents. The court also held that statements made two years after the event to a nurse about the event were admissible under the medical interview exception to the hearsay rule because sought in part to provide information for diagnosis and treatment.

On November 22, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held on motion for rehearing that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the respondent for murder committed during a gang initiation ceremony, but that the respondent was entitled to receive on his adult sentence credit for time served in juvenile detention.

On November 14, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a confession that was signed in a juvenile processing office is admissible even though the questioning occurred elsewhere. The court also held that a custodial statement made to a psychiatrist is admissible to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony.

On November 14, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated robbery with a 20 year determinate sentence because the State failed to prove the identity of the complainant. The sole evidence in the case consisted of statements made by the respondent in an inquiry from the trial judge following respondent’s entry of a plea of not true.

On November 9, 2000, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a juvenile’s confession which was given to the Chicago police concerning a capital murder in Texas is not admissible in a Texas juvenile proceedings because not taken in compliance with the Texas Family Code.

On November 6, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld a transfer from TYC to TDCJ under the determinate sentence act based on the juvenile’s misconduct while at TYC and his unwillingness to assume responsibility for the sexual assault for which he was committed or any of the instances of misconduct.

On November 2, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held it did not have to decide about the admissibility of psychological and psychiatric reports at the TDCJ transfer hearing because the juvenile’s conduct while in TYC justified the transfer.

On November 2, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that because a minor to whom a controlled substance had been delivered had an affirmative defense to a charge of delivery of a controlled subtonic to a minor, that person was not an accomplice witness in a criminal trial of the adult for delivering the controlled substance.

On November 2, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that it is not required that a determinate sentence petition must be filed in juvenile court before it is approved by a grand jury. It can be approved and then filed.

On November 12, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that a school law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a student in the halls whom he saw carrying ladies jewelry; accomplice corroboration in burglary adjudication hearing was sufficient.

On October 31, 2000 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that postponing a transfer hearing corrected a failure to serve the summons on respondent more than two days before the scheduled hearing.

On October 31, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a certified juvenile cannot appeal from a plea bargained criminal conviction to challenge the certification for a jurisdictional defect without filing the special notice of appeal required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On October 27, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that if the law requires corroboration of a plea of true, which it did not decide, the respondent’s judicial confession was sufficient corroboration; the court also held there was sufficient evidence to support a restitution order of $3000 for damages to stolen automobile.

On October 27, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in modifying probation to provide for placement in a secure facility on a plea of true to probation violation; no showing of material change in circumstances is required.

On October 25, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court certification for murder in a gang initiation ritual. It held the adult defendant was entitled to receive credit on his sentence for 113 days spent in juvenile detention before certification.

On October 26, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated sexual assault against a claim that the juvenile court should not have admitted evidence of a prior assault on a female. The court of appeals also held a threat of serious bodily injury was proved even though the respondent lacked the means to carry out exactly the threat made at the time he made it.

On October 19, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals, on motion for rehearing, adhered to its previous decision in this case. It held that when appellant gave an inadmissible written statement (because warned by the peace officer instead of a magistrate) and later after release telephoned the officer to make corrections in the written statement, the telephoned statements were not admissible because they were fruits of the inadmissible written statement. There is a dissenting opinion.

On October 5, 2000 the Austin Court of Appeals considered the pro se appeal of a juvenile. It held the juvenile pro se appellant to the standard of an attorney in prosecuting the appeal and, finding no abuse of discretion in commitment to the TYC, affirmed the revocations.

On October 5, 2000, the First District Court of Appeals held that a dialogue on the record with the master in which the respondent and his attorney both agreed to have the master hear the case satisfied the wavier requirements of the Family Code.

On October 4, 2000, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed revocation of juvenile probation because it was based on a motion to modify that had been filed after probation had expired. A motion had been filed before probation expired, but it had not been served on the respondent.

On September 28, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that by supplemental record it was shown that respondent was served with a summons and petition prior to his adjudication hearing. Therefore, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the case and its subsequent revocation of probation was valid.

On September 20, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to order appellant transferred from TYC to TDCJ because the Court of Appeals had set aside a previous transfer order and the case had not yet been remanded to the juvenile court.

On September 14, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that admission of a written confession that the Court of Criminal Appeals had determined was unlawfully obtained under Section 52.02 of the Family Code was harmless in light of the other evidence introduced in the trial.

On September 14, 2000, the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld a revocation of probation over a claim that the juvenile court had improperly delegated authority to an external program to set the conditions of probation.

On September 14, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not err in failing to make a finding of necessity to permit a witness coordinator to stand next to a child complainant while testifying. Also, the Court of Appeals held without discussion that CCP article 38.071, the child victim videotaping statute, applies in juvenile proceedings.

On September 13, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a transfer to TDCJ under the determinate sentence against a claim that the juvenile was entitled to a fitness hearing prior to the transfer hearing. The juvenile court appointed a psychiatrist, which satisfied any constitutional claim that might exist.

On September 12, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile respondent was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel because the lawyer failed to investigate a potential alibi defense.

On September 8, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the hearing was factually and legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s adjudications for assault and criminal mischief by the juvenile against his mother.

On August 31, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the record failed to show that a summons had been served on the juvenile. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the case. Accordingly, it vacated the adjudication and TYC commitment and remanded the case to the juvenile court.

On August 31, 2000, the Texarkana Court of Appeals, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, approved of the use of hearsay to prove unadjudicated juvenile offenses at the penalty stage of a criminal trial.

On August 25, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence through proof of disciplinary infractions that respondent violated probation by failing to complete his placement and being unsatisfactorily discharged from placement.

On August 10, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that when a police officer investigating a report of a runaway juvenile pressed the remote control device on a key taken from a male juvenile companion in a frisk, that action was not a search. The officer found cocaine in the car that beeped in response to his action.

On July 24, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s motion to dismiss his appeal was deficient so rejected it but then dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.

On August 3, 2000, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court was acting within its discretion when it rejected a claim of self-defense in a probation revocation hearing.

On July 27, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated sexual assault because the juvenile court permitted a psychologist to testify that in her professional opinion the complaining witness was telling the truth.

On July 26, 2000, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant is not entitled under Davis v. Alaska to place before the jury a closed juvenile case involving a co-actor who testified against the defendant. Such impeachment is prohibited by the Texas Rules of Evidence.

On July 26, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court’s order placing the juvenile on probation outside her home. The Court of Appeals recited the mother’s denial of the juvenile’s responsibility for the assault, resulting in her removing the child from school for home schooling. The Court also recited numerous school infractions and a psychological report asserting a need for structured supervision.

On July 19, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a plea form signed by the juvenile and his attorney can be given effect under Section 51.09 as a waiver of the juvenile’s right to receive an explanation of the charges from the judge.

On July 18, 2000, the Texas Attorney General stated that because adult probation department employees are state employees a county cannot include them in the county’s civil service system despite a provision in the Local Government Code that appears to authorize their inclusion.

On July 20, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that in a criminal trial defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to a confession of a certified juvenile on the ground it was not obtained in a juvenile processing office when the confession contained evidence of coercion, which was the sole defense in the case.

On July 18, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that it was not a denial of a criminal defendant's right to confrontation to refuse to permit him to cross-examine the complaining witness in a sexual assault of a child case about the witness' juvenile record.

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent for carrying a loaded handgun to elementary student while a student at the age of 10. He was also adjudicated for terroristic threat and aggravated assault. In the adjudication hearing, the judge rejected the defense of lack of responsibility because of mental illness. The Court of Appeals upheld that decision.

On July 13, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court's removal from home findings were supported by the evidence and that commitment to TYC was lawful.

On July 12, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the required removal from home findings in Section 54.04 apply only to disposition decisions, not to modification of disposition decisions.

On July 13, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that failure of the defendant to object to being proceeded against in criminal court for an offense committed while a juvenile without a juvenile court certification waived that claim under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 4.18. The court also held that adult probation can be revoked for an offense committed by the probationer while a juvenile.

On July 11, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant's right of confrontation was not violated by the trial court's ruling that the jury would be told that a State's witness had legal trouble as a juvenile rather than that she had been adjudicated for burglary.

On July 5, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that stolen bicycle parts were admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) to show intent to deprive the owner of his property in a trial for bicycle robbery.

On June 29, 2000, the Texas Attorney General stated the opinion that unlike in criminal cases, in juvenile proceedings the State has no right to trial by jury. Therefore, the State cannot "veto" a juvenile’s waiver of trial by jury.

On June 28, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that even if the Family Code imposes a plea substantiation requirement similar to that required in criminal cases by Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.15, it was fully met by appellant’s acknowledgement in response to a question from the judge that he was pleading guilty because the allegations in the petition are true.

On June 22, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a transferred juvenile may in criminal court be charged with and convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under a transfer order that certified assault on a peace officer for the same conduct.

On June 7, 2000, the Texas Attorney General stated the opinion that under Chapter 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a law enforcement officer must take possession (and may use reasonable force to do so) of an unemancipated 17-year-old person who has been reported by a parent as being missing. The officer must deliver possession of person to a parent or to DPRS.

On February 9, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the juvenile court’s removal from home findings and commitment to the TYC for two offenses of aggravated sexual assault. It also held that the judge’s remarks to the juvenile at disposition did not constitute a comment on the juvenile’s failure to testify in the trial.

On February 9, 2000 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a juvenile murder suspect was not in custody when questioned by the police at the stationhouse. His statement was therefore admissible against him in his criminal trial after certification.

On June 22, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a certification report was not deficient merely because it failed to address the four factors the juvenile court is required to consider when certifying a juvenile to criminal court.

On June 21, 2000, the Texas Supreme Court held that under Section 56.02 of the Family Code the requirement of Rules of Appellate Procedure 20.1 that an affidavit of indigency must be filed is excused when the juvenile court conducts a hearing on indigency.

On June 15, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the 1999 enactment restricting TYC commitments to cases with multiple prior misdemeanor adjudications does not apply probation violations that occur before the effective date of the legislation—9/1/99.

On June 15, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a back seat passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation could be arrested for possession of a firearm under the front passenger’s seat. However, the passenger lacked standing to challenge the lawfulness of either the stop or the search of the vehicle.

On June 15, 2000, the Houston 14th District Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor in a criminal trial is permitted to question potential jurors about their feelings concerning certification of juveniles to criminal court despite the fact that the certification process does not present any issues for a jury to decide.

On June 15, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that under the 1995 amendment to the Family Code a juvenile cannot directly appeal a certification order but must await criminal conviction to take a consolidated appeal. Therefore, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for appellant’s juvenile court lawyer not to take a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals overruled its opinion in Melendez v. State, which had erroneously held such an appeal could be taken.

On June 8, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals decided an important case in which it said that a juvenile has a privilege against self-incrimination in a post-adjudication interview by a probation officer for a social history report to be used in disposition proceedings. Because the officer did not warn the juvenile of his constitutional rights, the statements he made to the probation officer should not have been included in the social history report.

On June 8, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing appellant to the Texas Youth Commission.

On June 1, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that when a juvenile falsely claimed to police to be 17 years of age and his physical appearance corroborated that claim, he waived the protections of the Family Code for the interrogation of juveniles.

On May 25, 2000, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that testimony about the community's access to a middle school during non-class hours was proof that the school also was a community center under the punishment provisions of the graffiti statute.

On May 23, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the 1995 amendment to the Family Code and Code of Criminal Procedure postponing certification appeals until after a criminal conviction did not authorize an appeal raising certification issues when the criminal case terminated with deferred adjudication, which is not a conviction.

On May 18, 2000, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer failed to seek the appointment of a mental health expert in a release/transfer hearing in which the juvenile’s brain injury may have been an important factor in the commission of the offense.

On May 10, 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as improvidently granted a petition for discretionary review that challenged the Fifth Amendment violation holding of the Court of Appeals but not the Sixth Amendment holding in a case in which a psychologist was permitted to testify about appellant’s lack of remorse during a certification examination.

On May 9, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not err in permitting a juvenile probation officer and the victim of the aggravated robbery to testify at the disposition hearing that the juvenile should be committed to TYC. Neither witness recommended a particular term of years for the determinate sentence.

On May 2, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support factually the finding that appellant committed the offenses of auto theft and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (00-2-21)

On April 27, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the failure of the juvenile court to appoint a guardian ad litem when the respondent’s parents did not appear at the adjudication hearng was harmless error in view of the appearance and friendly support of his aunt and uncle.

On April 20, 2000, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the Texas sex offender registration program, as applied to juveniles, does not violate due process of law or equal protection of the laws.

On April 19, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in commiting a 13-year-old child with an extensive juvenile history to the TYC for the offense of resisting arrest.

On April 19, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the juvenile court erred in submitting only the question of whether respondent violated his determinate sentence probation to the jury at the revocation hearing. Respondent had not waived jury punishment and was entitled to have the jury assess punishment as well as find whether he had violated probation.

On April 12, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a photo array shown to the victim of a carjacking was not impermissibly suggestive because respondent was pictured wearing the shirt he wore when arrested.

On April 12, 2000, the Texas Attorney General stated that the juvenile board of Potter County may pay attorney fees it incurred in defending a lawsuit brought against it by Potter County in a dispute over county salary supplementation for member of the juvenile board. The fees may be paid from the probation department budget without approval by the commissioners court.

On April 6, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a search of a probationer in school by residential officers on a tip from another student was lawful, given the diminished privacy rights of probationers.

On April 5, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s youthful appearance justified a stop for investigation of a curfew violation. The officer was justified in frisking the juvenile for his own protection. During the first he felt baggie, which he was justified in removing, leading to the discovery of marijuana.

On April 5, 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the judgment of the Austin Court of Appeals, which had held that the juvenile was not personally served with a summons to a discretionary transfer hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider an argument that the juvenile admitted in court that he had been served with summons.

On March 30, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the evidence in a robbery case was legally and factually sufficient despite a one-on-one show-up shortly after the offense.

On March 30, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a prompt, crime scene one person show up of the juvenile to a robbery victim was not unduly suggestive. The Court of Appeals also held that failure at trial to object to evidence of the show-up on the grounds the officer did not comply with section 52.02 of the Family Code waived any error there may have been.

On March 30, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that once a delinquency petition was served on respondent, the failure to serve an amended version of that petition that had been approved by the grand jury under the determinate sentence act was not a jurisdictional defect.

On March 23, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting the request of TYC to transfer appellant to TDCJ under the new law for chronically disruptive behavior.

On March 15, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeal dismissed the juvenile’s appeal from a criminal conviction in which he had attempted to appeal certification issues in an appeal from the resulting criminal conviction, as required by the 1995 amendment to the Family Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Assuming the offense was committed January 1, 1996 or later, as seems likely from the facts stated, this decision was in error.

On March 9, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring respondent who had been adjudicated for murder from TYC to TDCJ.

On March 9, 2000, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that an inadvertent failure to file the juvenile court’s transfer order with the district clerk did not preclude the district court from having jurisdiction over the transferred case. The order was found and filed after the appeal was filed and abated.

On March 9, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary that the juvenile court record show that the respondent had been given notice of the release/transfer hearing under the determinate sentence act, at least in the absence of a claim that timely notice had not been provided.

On March 9, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held in a case of first impression that the mental illness provisions of Chapter 55 do not apply to a hearing to transfer a person from TYC to TDCJ under the determinate sentence act when the person to be transferred is 18 or older at the time of the hearing.

On March 2, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals joined other Courts of Appeals in holding that the removal from home requirements of Family Code Section 54.04(i) do not apply in modification of disposition proceedings.

On March 2, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld the removal from home findings required for commitment to the TYC in a possession of cocaine case. It also held that under the 1997 statute, a trial objection is required to preserve for appellate review a claim that there was a defect in the admonitions.

On February 23, 2000, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a juvenile is entitled to credit and good conduct credit on his criminal sentence for time spent in a juvenile detention facility pending certification to criminal court.

On January 27, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the appellant’s case supported the findings required to be made to remove appellant from his home and to commit him to the TYC.

Facts: The issue presented by this case is whether our abolition of the juvenile exception to the accomplice witness rule, announced by Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), applies retroactively to cases currently pending on direct review or not yet final. We hold that our holding in Blake is retroactive and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

On January 21, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that failure of the juvenile respondent to participate in a treatment program ordered as a condition of probation was a ground for revoking probation.

On December 2, 1999, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that TYC officials who not liable for statements that made concerning misconduct allegations being investigated in their official capacities. They had official immunity, which they acted within and therefore could not be held liable.

On October 21, 1999, the Amarillo Court of Appeals ordered the district court to re-consider the question of appointment of counsel for a transferred juvenile who wished to appeal a decision refusing to reduce bond. The issue apparently was whether to take into account the financial ability of the parents to pay for counsel.

On January 14, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that under the rule of idem sonans there was no fatal variance between the complainant’s name as alleged in the petition and as proved at the adjudication hearing.

On January 13, 2000, the Houston First District Court of Appeals granted the State's motion for rehearing. It held that the respondent's oral statement given while in police custody was not in response to interrogation and was therefore admissible in evidence. It also held that the officer taking the respondent to where the respondent had concealed stolen property instead of taking him to a juvenile processing office did not require the exclusion of the statement from evidence.

On January 5, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the juvenile court's findings to justify commitment to the TYC.

On January 5, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held there was insufficient corroboration of the trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest to admit it into evidence under the Rules of Evidence.