2006 Case Summaries
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2006 Summaries 2005 Summaries 2004 Summaries 2003 Summaries
2002 Summaries 2001 Summaries 2000 Summaries 1999 Summaries
On October 25, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the inclusion of the offense and its surrounding circumstances in an order consisting of mainly statutory language was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 54.05(i) of the Family Code for a commitment to TYC.
On October 19, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that since a determinate sentence transfer hearing was not considered a stage of a criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Washington did not apply.
On September 26, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals held that conduct by arson investigators was not so coercive to have caused respondent’s statements to be derived from "official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."
On September 26, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals held that although respondent was the focus of the investigation and his freedom of movement was restricted, he was not in custody when he spoke to arson investigators, rendering his statement admissible.
On October 12, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that because respondent failed to file a motion for new trial, he failed to preserve the issue of factual sufficiency for review.
Evidence was sufficient to establish knife as a deadly weapon. [In the Matter of R.S.](06-4-5)
On September 6, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that to establish a knife as deadly weapon, State is required to show some evidence of the knife's size, sharpness, brandishing motion by the accused, or testimony regarding the victim's fear of serious bodily injury or death.
On June 20, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing appellant to TYC on violations of probation.
Four year old competent to testify in sexual assault allegation.[In the Matter of M.M.L.](06-4-3)
On July 31, 2006, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling four year old complainant competent, in that potential that she would testify falsely was an issue of the weight to be afforded the testimony at trial rather than evidence of her incompetence as a witness.
On August 4, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that appellant did not show that the errors complained of were either "waivable only" or "absolute systemic requirements," as a result, failure to raise at trial waived them.
On August 4, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that, in assault on public servant, teacher was considered to be lawfully discharging "an official duty" when physically restraining student whose behavior was unruly and potentially threatening.
On August 4, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to determine that student had assaulted public servant, where student caused bodily injury when attempting to break free from disciplinary restraint.
On July 26, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to determine if child is indigent in allowing retained appellate counsel to withdraw. If indigent, appoint counsel, if not advise appellate of options.
On July 28, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court's order denying a motion to appoint counsel to assist in filing a motion for DNA testing under chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is not appealable.
On July 28, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the requirements for secure placement of a status offender under T.F.C. Section 54.04(n) applies to the disposition of a status offender adjudicated for violating a preexisting court order not a Motion to Modify of a status offenders probation.
On July 28, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the State's evidence of guilt was not so weak and the evidence of self defense was not so strong that a rational jury would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant's use of deadly force was justified.
Trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying respondent’s attorney. [In re T.E.D.](06-3-16)
On July 31, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying respondent’s attorney where attorney represented state’s witness’s daughter in unrelated matters.
On July 13, 2006, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that there was an unjustifiable delay in notifying juvenile’s parents two days after arrest, even though child’s information about parent’s whereabouts were not specific.
On July 13, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals, held that since various items of property were stolen at the same time, the recent, unexplained, personal possession of any one item was sufficient to support the conviction for theft of all the stolen items.
On June 27, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a discretionary transfer to criminal court does not in itself involve any increase in penalty, and as a result, the decision that is made by the juvenile court to transfer to criminal court does not violate the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi.
On June 27, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.], held that respondent failed to preserve error by failing to obtain a timely ruling on his motion to suppress or to properly and timely object to the admission of the evidence made the subject of the motion.
On June 29, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, held that the burden imposed by due diligence requires the State to attempt to move ahead, or to be able to reasonably explain delays.
On June 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court held that in hearings to modify a disposition, absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not disturb trial court's findings in determining the suitable disposition of children.
On June 15, 2006, the Houston (1st Dist.) Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant would not receive the quality of care and level of support and supervision in his home that he would need to meet the conditions of his probation.
On June 15, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a modification order was sufficient, where the statutory language was supplemented by additional reasons (for the modification) given by the court and supported by the record.
On June 8, 2006, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of Appeals found that, in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the length of argument, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that the abuse was not harmless.
On June 12, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that, although officer testified that child was not free to leave, a reasonable sixteen-year-old in these circumstances would have felt able to end the questioning, particularly since the officers did nothing to restrain or restrict appellant's movement.
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although the complainant communicated to his father that he had been sexually abused, he did not describe the details of the alleged abuse until interviewed by the CPS worker, who then became the outcry witness.
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that Miranda warnings were not required where a statement was taken by a CPS investigator because the CPS investigator was not acting in tandem with police to investigate and gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.
On May 18, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that when deciding the issue of venue, the trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from the evidence, including taking judicial notice that the location of a particular town or city is the county seat of such county.
On May 1, 2006, the Attorney General opined that the State or its political subdivisions may not regulate international border crossings by persons under 18, however, it may restrict them from being in Texas areas near the Texas-Mexico border by creating a narrowly tailored law that furthers a compelling governmental interest.
On May 15, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant may not appeal an order certifying him to stand trial as an adult and transfer him to criminal court, until the appeal of the conviction or the order of deferred adjudication for the offense for which the defendant was transferred to criminal court.
On May 5, 2006, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an excited utterance is an independent exception to the hearsay rule, so the outcry statute--whether the juvenile version or the adult version--is not needed for its admission.
On April 27, 2006, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that lab reports from drug tests were non-testimonial evidence and did not implicate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
On February 2, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals found that evidence that defendant took price tags off items, threw the tags away, concealed the items in her pocket, and left the store, was attempt to take items by trickery, justifying fraud adjudication.
On March 1, 2006, the California Court of Appeals (6th Dist.), in a juvenile case, interpreted "testimonial" (under Crawford) as "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial," and as a result were inadmissable through third party.
On March 3, 2006 the Florida Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that a child has the right to be represented by counsel and, to have effective counsel, counsel must be allowed to participate in all essential stages of the case, including closing argument.
On April 13, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that although the Family Code says that the petition must state "the penal law or standard of conduct allegedly violated by the acts," if the petition alleges all of the elements of an offense, omission of an express reference to the Penal Code section is not fatal.
If a complaint or referral for a child’s failure to attend school is dismissed for failure to timely file (within 7 day of last absence), any subsequent refiling may be filed within seven school days of the latest absence and may list the latest absence as well as some or all of the absences listed in the original complaint.
On April 4, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals concluded that an Order of Restitution after the trial court had committed the child to TYC completed the child’s disposition with respect to the unresolved issue of restitution.
On April 5, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that evidence was sufficient to support a commitment to the TYC pursuant to Family Code section 54.05(f) and (k), the court was authorized and within its discretion to modify its previous disposition order and commit appellant to the TYC.
On April 5, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, while evidence may have been improperly excluded on one violation of probation, it had no barring on the other violation, and any one violation of a condition of probation is sufficient to support an order modifying a juvenile's disposition.
On March 30. 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the burden of proof is on the parents to establish good faith efforts to prevent delinquent behavior as a defense to liability regarding restitution orders against them.
On March 23, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that while none of the evidence was directly conclusive, when taken together it was sufficient to determine that respondent was either an individual actor or assisted in the commission of the offense of Possession of Marijuana.
On March 8, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a determinate sentence transfer hearings is not considered a stage of "criminal prosecution," and as such, the holdings in Crawford v. Washington and the Sixth Amendment does not apply to them.
On March 9, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a request by a law enforcement officer that a juvenile remove items from his pockets was considered consensual and not an acquiescence to official authority.
On February 29, 2006, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that because any alleged promises of leniency by law enforcement did not induce the minor’s confession, the confession was freely and voluntarily made.
On March2, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that fair market value can be proven by evidence of the retail price or sale price, by testimony of an owner's opinion of value, or by an expert opinion of value.
On February 22, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by believing the testimony of the magistrate and the detective with respect to the time the warnings were given and the time the statement was taken, as they differed from the times on the statement itself.
On November 22, 2005, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court will look at events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding of the criminal acts that occurred.
On February 16, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the hearsay rule applies to a juvenile certification hearing.
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that DPRS investigator did not act in tandem with police to investigate and gather evidence and as a result no custodial interrogation occurred.
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that service of a later amended petition is not required for the trial court to have jurisdiction when a juvenile has been properly served with the original petition.
On February 8, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals held that when an exhibit contains both admissible and inadmissible evidence, the party objecting must apprise the trial court which material or documents contained within each exhibit is objectionable.
On February 13, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that while the adjudication order conflicted with the oral pronouncement, the disposition order accurately reflects the trial court's pronouncement of commitment to TYC and upheld commitment.
On February 13, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that a theft was complete once the actor had exercised control over the property and that there is no requirement that the property actually be removed from the premises or kept for a specific length of time.
On February 1, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that in aggravated sexual assault, with two eye-witness accounts, expert testimony, and the victim's outcry statement, the evidence was factually sufficient to support adjudication.
On January 31, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals concluded that neither article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure nor section 54.03(e) of the Texas Family Code applies to the modification hearing of a juvenile's disposition, and as a result, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness is sufficient to authorize a modification of a juvenile's disposition.
On January 24, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on remand for harm analysis, held that error could not be deemed harmless, and the court was correct to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial. See original opinion Juvenile Law Reporter Vol. 19, No. 2, ¶ 05-2-13.
On January 26, 2006, the Houston 1st Court of Appeals held that evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the finding of guilt and affirmed the judgment of the trial court for indecency with a child.
Trial court did not abuse it’s discretion in committing child to TYC where child left his residence without permission in violation of his probation and child had left because he was concerned about his and his family’s safety, due to threats on his life.
On January 12, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that testimony from probation officer along with his report describing respondent’s previous involvement with the juvenile justice system satisfied the statutory criteria for prior misdemeanor adjudications.
On August 25, 2005, the Houston (1st Dist.) Court of Appeals held that jeopardy attaching when a jury is empaneled and sworn, concerning adult criminal defendants, applies equally to a juvenile proceedings.
On January 12, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that as a prerequisite to raising a factual sufficiency challenge on appeal from a juvenile adjudication hearing, an appellant must first file a motion for new trial challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence.
On July 6, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Respondent’s motion for mistrial where the trial court admonished jury to disregard question and answer regarding prior juvenile adjudication.
On December 8, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed denial of Motion to Suppress because the record did not demonstrate a causal connection between a section 52.02(a) violation and respondent’s statement nor did the respondent show a causal connection between the complained of unnecessary delay and evidence sought to be suppress.
On December 9, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not error in finding that the State established probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of respondent’s home.
On November 30, 2005, the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to show respondent’s mental culpability and as a result, that she engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of capital murder in causing the death of her new born baby.
On November 23, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dist.), held that evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child, and respondent did receive effective assistance of a counsel.
On November 23, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dist.) held that trial court's refusal to submit requested instruction to the jury on eligibility of probation, was not error, where appellant properly filed a sworn motion that he had not previously been convicted of a felony (juvenile adjudication only), but did not offer any evidence at trial in support of this motion.
On November 23, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that considering the totality of the circumstances, evidence was legally and factually sufficient to establish the aggravating element of the offense of aggravated sexual assault.
On November 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, on rehearing, affirmed prior holding suppressing confession, and held that a juvenile’s request to call his mother was an unambiguous request for an attorney when request was followed by the statement that he wanted his mother to get an attorney, and subsequent confession and evidence found as a result of said confession must be suppressed.
On November 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's order transferring respondent to TDCJ.
On November 16, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that in an ineffective assistance claim where counsel failed to properly file a motion for probation, applicant's allegations of prejudice did not establish that there was a reasonable probability that the applicant's sentencing jury would have recommended probation had the issue been submitted to it. (Dissent included)
On November 16, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Texas Family Code § 51.13(d) provides, in relevant part, that a juvenile adjudication for delinquent conduct that constitutes a felony offense is a final felony conviction only for habitual offender sentencing purposes.