2007 Case Summaries
2010 Summaries 2009 Summaries 2008 Summaries 2007 Summaries
2006 Summaries 2005 Summaries 2004 Summaries 2003 Summaries
2002 Summaries 2001 Summaries 2000 Summaries 1999 Summaries
Vicarious-consent part of consent exception to Texas wiretap law.[Alameda v. State](07-4-19)
On June 27, 2007, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a parent may give vicarious-consent to record a child's telephone conversations if the parent has a good-faith basis for believing that recording is in the best interest of the child.
On October 25, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that alien residence status does not effect a TYC commitment when the juvenile court finds that it is in appellant's best interest that he be removed from the home and that his home did not provide him the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of probation.
On October 11, 2207, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce a determinate sentence term and that the plenary power of the court had expired thirteen years earlier.
On October 2, 2007, the Attorney General opined that a school district may file a new failure to attend school complaint, listing some of the same absences as well as a subsequent tenth unexcused absence, as long as it is filed within ten school days of the tenth absence listed in the complaint or referral.
On October 11, 2007, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the a trial court is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives before sending a juvenile to the TYC and that the Family Code permits a trial court to decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second chance.
A juvenile referee’s order takes effect when he or she signs it.[In the Matter of S.G.](07-4-14)
On September 27, 2007, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the orders of referees are effective immediately if they recommend that the juvenile be released and are otherwise enforceable until the juvenile court judge adopts, modifies, or rejects them or until they are altered by operation of law.
On September 28, 2007, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that if a juvenile's parents are capable of retaining an attorney on appeal, but elect not to do so, the trial court can order them to pay for the juvenile’s counsel on appeal.
On October 4, 2007, the Houston (1st Dist) Court of Appeals held that one probation violation (even a "technical" condition) will support a juvenile court’s order to revoke probation.
Trial judge mandamused to rule on writ of habeas corpus.[In re Altschul](07-4-11)
On September 26, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief because given relator's predicament, i.e., that his juvenile record is affecting his ability to re-open his federal sentences, and the fact that he can file his application only in the court of his juvenile adjudication, he has no other available legal remedy, technically or otherwise.
On September 19, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that while TYC juvenile felony convictions cannot be considered for enhancement purposes in adult court if the offense was committed prior to January 1, 1996, here, the trial court’s error did not cause "egregious harm."
On September 6, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the commitment order satisfied the statutory requirements because in addition to reciting the necessary statutory language provided for in section 54.05(m), the order complied with section 54.05(i) by specifically stating the reasons for modifying the disposition.
On May 23, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals held that, while the pen packet affirmatively showed on its face that defendant was sixteen, once the State establishes a prima facie showing of his prior conviction, it was defendant’s burden to make an affirmative showing of any defect in the judgment, whether that is to show no waiver of indictment or no transfer order.
On June 18, 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that when police make a traffic stop, a passenger in the car, like the driver, is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and as a result may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.
No expectation of privacy is a juvenile processing office.[Cortez v. State](07-4-6B)
On August 21, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals found that appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the juvenile processing office, and the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by listening to the statements appellant made to his mother during their telephone conversation in the JPO.
On August 21, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that appellant was not denied the right to have his parents with him while he was being held in the juvenile processing office, moreover, there was no showing of a causal connection between the alleged violations and the spontaneous statements made, and finally, any error in the admission of these statements were harmless.
On August 22, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a trial court's plenary power ended thirty days after the first filed motion for new trial was overruled, and any motions filed after that date were of no effect.
On August 16, 2007, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that because Respondent did not object to the conditions of probation when they were imposed, he waived his complaint that they were "so defective, deficient and uncertain" that the they failed to put him on notice of what his obligations were
On August 9, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that inadmissable testimony by a therapist regarding previous sexual assaults (admitted by respondent to therapist) was considered harmless were the juvenile probation department’s predisposition investigation report contained the same admissions.
On August 9, 2007, the Corpus Christi – Edinburg, Court of Appeals held that teen arrest was proper where teen had not only violated the city's curfew, but was engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision -- running away from home.
On August 9, 2007, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a statement taken in Illinois, in violation of the Texas Family Code, was admissible because both parties were assured a fair hearing and while not precise, the process was impartial, honest, and free from prejudice, undue favoritism, and self-interest.
On July 31, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that if the fair market value cannot be ascertained, the replacement cost of stolen property is the appropriate measure of it’s value, not necessarily what the complainant actually paid to replace it.
On February 2, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals found that because appellant failed to preserve the issue of whether the determinate sentence transfer statute was unconstitutional at trial, he waived the issue.
On July 24, 2007, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that a restitution amount, which exceeded the "blue book" value for a damaged car, was (based on the evidence) not arbitrary nor unjustly enriching the recipients.
On July 18, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that when the child’s confession is combined with the cumulative force of all the circumstantial and corroborative evidence, it is both legally and factually sufficient to support the child’s adjudication for burglary.
On July 19, 2007, the Corpus Christi - Edinburg Court of Appeals held that, in an attempted burglary, the missing element of specific intent in the court’s findings of fact were presumed to be inadvertently omitted, where no request of a finding or of a clarification on the element was made.
On July 19, 2007, the Corpus Christi - Edinburg Court of Appeals held that, in attempted burglary, evidence was sufficient to establish intent to commit felony, theft, or assault, where child was seen attempting to enter the habitation, without permission, by wiggling a knife against the deadbolt lock, and not leaving the premises on his own.
On July 5, 2007, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that in Assault on a Public Servant, evidence that complainant was a teacher’s aid was sufficient to establish the element of public servant, even where petition alleged complainant was "a teacher."
Once probation terminated, appeal of disposition becomes moot.[In the Matter of G.E.](07-3-12)
On June 14, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that when a judgment of an Appellate Court can have no effect on an existing controversy any appeal on that disposition becomes moot.
On February 2, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that recitations in judgments regarding notice may be presumed regular where the record is absent any controverting material.
In making a determination regarding transfer of a juvenile offender to TDCJ, a trial court may assign different weights to the factors it considers, and it may consider other unlisted but relevant factors.
When a juvenile court order fails to list findings required by the Family Code, the appellate court will abate the appeal and remand with instructions for the trial court to render a proper disposition order specifically stating the reasons for such disposition.
The Tex.Fam.Cod Ann. §§53.045, 56.03(b) expressly authorizes the State to appeal an order of a court in a juvenile case that grants a motion to suppress evidence in cases involving violent or habitual juvenile offenders only.
On March 20, 2007, the Dallas [5th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that although the record shows appellant was behaviorally compliant while in TYC, testimony about appellant's conduct while on parole and about his high risk for reoffending, supported the trial court's decision to transfer child to TDJC.
On May 23, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus compelling a trial court to follow plea agreement which it had accepted, but then rescinded days later.
On May 24, 2007, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that where the record does not show that the juvenile himself waived his right to jury on disposition, and understood his right, waiver by the child's attorney alone is insufficient.
On May 16, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that except for discovery and evidentiary matters, the trial of a juvenile case is governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and neither the Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Family Code require a plea to be entered in a juvenile modification hearing.
On February 16, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the lack of guidance from an interested adult was a major factor, especially if the juvenile suffers from diminished mental capacity, in concluding that a child’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly made.
On May 10, 2007, the Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals reiterated that the Texas Family Code, did not permit a juvenile defendant to appeal from certification proceedings prior to being finally convicted as an adult.
The 9th U.S. Circuit held that Title 18 U.S.C. § 5033 of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, prescribes that an arresting officer must advise the parents of their child's Miranda rights contemporaneously with advising them of their child's custody, advise the parents that they are permitted to speak with their child before the child is interrogated, and an arresting officer may not unreasonably refuse a request by either the juvenile or the parent to communicate with one another before the juvenile is interrogated.
On May 3, 2007, the Houston Court of Appeals held that an appeal from the disposition order placing appellant on probation is rendered moot by the termination of appellant's probation.
On March 30, 2007, the Illinois Appellate Court (2nd Dist.) held that a confession was not voluntary, where police officers made no attempt to locate defendant's parents and denied his two requests to speak to his mother, even though defendant was not a juvenile under the statute.
On September 13, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the IDEA applies only to state or local school authorities and has no application to state court proceedings involving a juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent.
On September 13, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the prior consistent statement by complainant was not hearsay because it was consistent with her testimony and was offered to rebut an express or implied charge against her of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
On September 27, 2007 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a violation of probation which occurred in 2004, occurred after September 1, 2003, which is the effective date of the new statute, even though the child was placed on probation for an offense which occurred prior to September 1, 2003.
On March 30, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that once a child is transferred to the institutional division, she is no longer restrained by the juvenile court order returning her to TYC, and the Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
On March 22, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that an appeal from an order modifying a disposition can become moot, if the probation has been terminated.
On March 14, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that because respondent violated a condition of her probation in trying to escape, the trial court did not abused its discretion in committing her to TYC and was justified in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Code.
On March 7, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing respondent to TYC even though the court based its decision to commit, at least in part, on a lack of available county funds.
On March 8, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly concluding that Respondent failed to show he had a particularized need for an expert at the transfer hearing.
On February 28, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that in appeal by the state of Respondent’s Motion to Reduce Determinate Sentence thirteen years after transfer to TDCJ, was not affected by the fact that the grand jury certification was not included in the clerk's record.
On March 21, 2006, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a generalized suspicion that [juvenile] engaged in criminal activity was inadequate to create reasonable suspicion to justify stop and was therefore an unreasonable intrusion upon the juvenile's Fourth Amendment right to privacy.
On February 21, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that failure to properly admonish a child on how the adjudication would effect him in adult court, was harmless, absence a showing of how he was harmed by the error.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that in a modification order, a trial court can provide for a commitment to TYC if (1) the original disposition was for conduct constituting a felony or multiple misdemeanors, and (2) the court finds the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court.
On January 3, 2007, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that notice to a parent, guardian, or custodian and a child's opportunity to confer with such persons are significant factors in evaluating the voluntariness of a statement or confession under the totality of the circumstances.
On February 16, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court found that, in a juvenile confession, the lack of guidance from a parent or interested adult is a factor in determining whether waiver of Miranda was knowing.
On July 12, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the record evidence in this case did not raise the possibility that the offense committed was the lesser included offense of robbery by threats rather than robbery with a deadly weapon.
On July 12, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a TYC commitment were the trial court found that the child’s eighteenth birthday was just over two months from the disposition hearing, and that this was not enough time for rehabilitation to occur and that it was too short a probation period for a felony conviction.
On February 2, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400 et seq., did not limit the juvenile court's authority to modify the juvenile's disposition.
On February 13, 2007, the Houston [14th] Court of Appeals held that the jury’s answer of “We do not” to the question, “Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Juvenile Respondent, [T.A.W.], in the Juvenile Respondent's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the Juvenile Respondent needs to meet the conditions of probation?”
On February 7, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals concluded that a juvenile has no Sixth Amendment or Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution right of confrontation during the disposition phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding, however, he does have a limited right of confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires a balancing test.
On January 3, 2007, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that juvenile was acting in concert with the others in a vehicle and that the individuals in the vehicle were acting together to intentionally and knowingly caused the death of someone, or that they intended serious bodily injury and caused death by an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely shooting into a crowd of people
On January 3, 2006, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that if the option to take a child to the juvenile processing office is exercised, the child need not also be taken to an official designated by the juvenile board.
On January 10, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that in a determinate sentence transfer hearing, the trial court may assign different weights to the factors listed in TFC §54.11(k), and it may consider other unlisted but relevant factors as well.
On December 27, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict and reverse the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial.
On December 13, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals dismissed original habeas corpus petition for a child confined pursuant to an adjudication and disposition in juvenile court because Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction for such action.
On December 14, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate appellant's right to due process by failing to continue the transfer hearing, because the trial court gave Respondent more time and opportunity to prepare for the hearing than the family code requires.
On November 29, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals corrected a prior opinion (in rehearing) holding that failure to file a motion for new trial does not waive factual sufficiency challenges in a bench trial, only in a jury trial.
Chain of custody goes to weight not admissibility.[In the Matter of J.M.A.B.](07-1-7)
On November 30, 2006, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that when the proponent of evidence shows the beginning and the end of the chain of custody, any gaps in between go to the weight and credibility of the evidence rather than the admissibility of the evidence.
On November 15, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that in terroristic threats charge, State was not required to prove that respondent had the capability or the intention to actually carry out his threat, only that he acted with the specific intent to "threaten" imminent harm.
On November 16, 2006, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that 54.03(e) of the Family Code does not apply to the modification of a juvenile's disposition, and as a result, testimony of an accomplice witness does not require corroboration.
On July 12, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that in a Motion to Modify, the Code does not require the trial court to do anything in particular and certainly does not require it to order that reports be generated in order to consider them.
On November 7, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that an investigative detention continued and an arrest did not occur even after officer handcuffed respondent.
On November 7, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the existence of possible innocent explanations of a person’s actions, does not necessarily deprive a police officer of the ability to also possess reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.
On November 8, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals found that, as an intermediate court of appeals, they have no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases and no original jurisdiction to address a collateral attach on a juvenile adjudication.
On November 9, 2006, the Houston (1st. Dist.) Court of Appeals held that to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.
On November 9, 2006, the Houston (1st. Dist.) Court of Appeals held that because third person provoked the use of force by others, Appellant was not justified in using force against them, as a defense of that third person