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By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
On December 30, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals approved of a juvenile court modification of its
probation disposition to a TYC commitment despite the absence of a formal
motion to revoke. The violation occurred while the respondent was awaiting
placement in a residential treatment facility.
On December 23, 1999, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that a claim of confession
involuntariness in a motion to suppress evidence did not preserve for appeal a
claim that the confession was inadmissible because police failed to take the
respondent to a juvenile processing office.
On December 23, 1999, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that the fact that a different
date was recited in the certification order than was alleged in the indictment
did not preclude criminal proceedings for the transferred offense.
On December 23, 1999, the
Austin Court of Appeals held that in the absence of a motion from a party or
evidence requiring the juvenile court to act on its own, there was no legal
requirement that the juvenile court order a study of the respondent's fitness
to stand trial. The Court of Appeals also held that there was sufficient
evidence to support the juvenile courtís findings made to justify commitment
of the respondent to the TYC.
On December 22, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a jury argument that may have referred to
pre-arrest silence and to post-arrest silence because it did not unambiguously
refer to post-arrest silence.
On December 22, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the rule that notice of appeal must be
filed not later than 30 days after disposition was not changed by the 1997
amendment to section 56.01(b) of the Family Code.
On December 22, 1999, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court probation revocation
was authorized because it occurred before the effective date of the 1999
amendment restricting TYC commitments. However, it ordered the juvenile court
to report the guidelines deviation to its juvenile board.
On December 8, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support
the findings required to be made by the juvenile court when removing a child
from home.
On November 24, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a revocation of probation and rendered
judgment denying the motion to modify because the evidence failed to show that
the place where the probationer discharged a firearm was a public place as
required by law and there was therefore insufficient evidence that respondent
violated his probation by committing a criminal offense.
On December 1, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that prior probation efforts, involving regular,
intensive and placement probation, supported the juvenile court’s order of
commitment to the TYC.
On June 2, 1999, in an opinion
the publication of which was for some reason delayed for six months, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the 1995 amendments to the Family Code
changing the standard of proof for probation revocation from beyond a
reasonable doubt to preponderance apply to a case in which the respondent was
placed on probation before January 1, 1996 but who violated probation after
that date. The date of violation, not the date of the offense resulting in
placing the child on probation, controls.
On December 2, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals upheld a finding that efforts had been made to prevent the
need for removal of respondent from his home when the efforts took the form of
treatment measures taken incident to conditional pre-adjudication release from
detention.
On November 24, 1999, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that a motion for new trial cannot challenge the
lawfulness of the original adjudicaton when the motion is not filed until
after the transfer/release hearing under the determinate sentence act.
On November 17, 1999, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a recitation in a service return of
service of "citation" is proof that the petition and summons were
served.
On May 10, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals upheld a conviction under the harboring a runaway statute,
rejecting a claim that the juvenile-victim could not be a runaway when absent
from home for less than 24 hours.
On November 18, 1999, the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the certified juvenile
voluntarily confessed to capital murder despite low IQ.
On November 17, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals, applying criminal ineffective assistance of counsel
standards, held that the juvenile respondent did not receive ineffective
assistance in his jury trial for criminal mischief.
On November 25, 1998, in an
opinion almost one year old, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that despite a
photo identification by the witness of another person as the perpetrator, the
evidence was factually sufficient to support the finding that the juvenile on
trial committed criminal mischief.
On November 10, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that an oral statement made by the juvenile
while in custody was admissible in evidence because it was volunteered and not
made in response to earlier questioning by the police.
On November 4, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the record failed to show age discrimination in the
selection of the Chief Juvenile Probation Officer for Travis County.
On November 4, 1999, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held on rehearing that the failure of
police to notify the appellant’s parents he had been taken into custody
invalidated a subsequent murder confession.
On November 3, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile respondent was denied his
right to confront witnesses by the refusal of the juvenile court to grant a
requested continuance in the release/transfer hearing to enable counsel to
subpoena persons who had contributed information to the TYC written report.
On October 28, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that more than simply an assertion that the petition was
not attached to the summons is required to show that it was not attached.
There is no requrement, contrary to appellant’s argument, that the petition
be attached to the return of service.
On October 22, 1999, the
Attorney General stated that a local law enforcement agency is not required by
law to register as a sex offender a person required to register as a condition
of parole for a non-reportable offense, but that the law enforcement authority
has discretion to register and would be unlikely to incur civil liability in
doing so.
On October 28, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the standard of review of a juvenile court decision
revoking probation is abuse of discretion. It found no abuse of discretion in
this case.
On October 28, 1999, the El
Paso Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court judge has no duty to admonish
a juvenile as to the deportation consequences of a juvenile adjudication. And
on the facts of this case, the juvenile failed to show that her plea and
stipulation were involuntary as a result of misunderstanding the immigration
consquences of her plea.
On October 28, 1999, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that the transferred juvenile was
not provided with ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer failed
to object to a juvenile adjudication recited in an adult presentence
investigation report.
On October 21, 1999, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals rejected the argument that failure to
notify El Salvadorian consular officials that an El Salvadorian national was
taken into custody, as required by treaty, is fatal to a certification of that
national to criminal court.
On October 20, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeal reversed an adjudication for delinquent conduct when the
judgement recited that it was based on conduct constituting truancy. Truancy
is CINS, not delinquent conduct.
On April 12, 1999, the Attorney
General stated in an Open Records Decision that law enforcement juvenile
records pertaining to conduct occurring on or after September 1, 1997 are
confidential under a 1997 amendment to the Family Code. However, local law
enforcement records pertaining to conduct occurring between January 1, 1996
and September 1, 1997 are not confidential and their disclosure may be
required under the Open Records Act.
On October 6, 1999, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a juvenile being detained pre-trial has no
federal or state right to have bail set. The court said that the because the
state is proceeding in a benevolent fashion in dealing with juveniles, there
is no right to bail. The court might have added that the statutory detention
hearing provided for in the Family Code is a fully effective substitute for
bail.
On October 5, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that evidence of past sexual experience and statements
about sex by a complainant were inadmissible to show that she was not retarded
as alleged in the petition for sexual assault.
On October 4, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals considered the question whether criminal or civil standards
of review apply to claims of insufficiency of evidence to support factual
findings in certification proceedings. The court, without deciding that
question, applied criminal standards in this case because of the 1995
amendments requiring that certification appeals must accompany a criminal
appeal. The court also decided that the defense attorney, without the
participation of his client, waived the 10 days provided by statute for
preparation by failing to object to proceeding with the hearing in only 8
days.
On September 30, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that an investigatory detention of appellant was
justified by reasonable suspicion that he was in violation of the juvenile
nocturnal curfew and was part of a group of young men who had been using
marijuana.
On November 9, 1998, in an
opinion the publication of which was delayed for almost a year, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that when the juvenile court orally sustained a
challenge to the appellate transcript indigency affidavit of appellant but
failed, contrary to the requirement of the Rules, to enter a written order
within 10 days, the effect of that omission was to overrule the challenge.
Therefore, appellant is entitled to a free transcript. Further, appellate
review of such a trial court decision is now by appeal rather than writ of
mandamus.
On September 21, 1999, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a pen packet from Arkansas was admissible
as evidence of an extraneous offense or bad act even though it could not be
determined whether the adjudication was in juvenile or criminal court.
On September 16, 1999, the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that in the manner of its
use a baseball bat was a deadly weapon that would sustain an adjudiction for
aggravated assautl with a deadly weapon.
On August 30, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that an oral statement and the evidence it led to should
not have been admitted in appellant’s capital murder trial, but that doing
so was harmless in view of the other evidence in the case.
On July 7, 1999, the Waco Court
of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting the State to re-open its case to present testimony identifying the
respondent as the perpetrator of the offense alleged in the petition.
On August 26, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that when the juvenile court placed the respondent on
probation and scheduled a further hearing to consider the imposition of
special conditions and the child violated probation before the hearing date,
that the court could commit the child to the TYC without a motion to modify
disposition having been filed.
On September 9, 1999, the
Attorney General stated that section 54.021 of the Family Code, which
authorizes a court presiding over a truancy or failure to attend school case
to compel a parent, guardian or custodian to attend the case in court controls
over section 54.022, which in any other juvenile case before a JP or Municipal
Court authorizes the court to compel only the parent or guardian to attend
court.
On September 8, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that it would follow the El Paso Court of
Appeals, not the Austin court, and that it would apply a civil standard to
assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support the required removal from
home findings in Section 54.04.
On September 8, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the defendant was not in custody at the
time he gave his written statement and therefore that defense counsel could
not have been ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress the
statement.
On September 8, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that restitution may be ordered only for an
offense plead and proved; even if other related offenses are properly proved
as extraneous offenses in the adjudication proceeding, restitution may not be
ordered for the loss they caused.
On September 1, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that an acquittal must be ordered when the State
in a criminal mischief case failed to offer evidence of the amount of damage
to the property in question.
On September 1, 1999, the
Attorney General said that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over truancy
committed by a person while between the ages of 17 and 18 even though the
compulsory school attendance law extends to age 18. A justice or municipal
court does have jurisdiction over such a case as a Class C misdemeanor under
the Education Code but may not transfer such a case to juvenile court for
enforcement of its order.
On August 26, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that when a juvenile signed a written statement that was
custodial and inadmissible (because juvenile was not taken before a
magistrate) and later, while not in custody, attempted to amend the written
statement to take sole responsibility for the offense, the oral requests,
although non-custodial, were inadmissible because they were a fruit of the
prior, inadmissible written statement.
On August 19, 1999, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a juvenile witness was not an
accomplice although she plead true to a robbery charge which was part of the
murder transaction about which she testified. In addition, the court held that
failure to instruct the jury about the accomplice witness requirement of
corroboration was not egregiously harmful because there was sufficient
evidence of corroboration admitted.
On August 9, 1999, the Texas
Attorney General opined that county commissioners courts have no authority
over juvenile boards other than to determine the amount of county funds to
appropriate to the board’s use for juvenile justice.
On July 30, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that evidence of juvenile adjudications was admissible
in criminal penalty proceedings under Art. 37.07 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure despite the fact that under the law in effect at the time of the
juvenile adjudications they would not have been admissible.
On June 2, 1999, the Texarkana
Court of Appeal refused to consider the appeal of a juvenile claiming errors
in the certification proceeding on the erroneous ground that Article 4.18 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure precludes such review.
On April 8, 1999, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that retroactive application of the statute that
abolished the 5 year limitation on the use of juvenile adjudications in adult
penalty proceedings to an adjudication that would have been barred under the
law in effect at the time of the adjudication was not prohibited by the ex
post facto clause of the constitution because it is a procedural provision.
The Court of Appeals also held that admission of victim impact testimony
concerning the juvenile adjudication was error, but harmless and not preserved
for appeal.
On May 26, 1999, the Texas
Attorney General opined that a constable, when ordered by a Justice of the
Peace, is required to serve process in a failure to appear for a truancy
hearing case even in a county in which the applicable independent school
district has selected an attendance officer. The attendance officer may also
serve process in such cases, but his or her power to do so is not exclusive of
the constable.
On August 12, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the 1997 amendment restricting juvenile
adjudications that can be used for criminal enhancement to those offenses
committed on or after 1/1/96 applied only to a primary offense committed on or
after 9/1/97. Accordingly, there is no remoteness prohibition for a juvenile
adjudication alleged as enhancement for an ofense committed before 9/1/97.
On August 12, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that evidence was sufficient to link affirmatively the
juvenile to crack cocaine found in the bathroom of a motel.
On August 12, 1999, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that police are not required to give
Miranda warnings to a juvenile who is being transported to the police station
but who is not in police custody.
On August 12, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the admissibility in a Texas court of an oral
confession made to a Texas peace officer in an automobile in Oklahoma on the
way back to Texas was governed by Oklahoma law, which requires the presence of
a friendly adult during interrogation. The juvenile later gave a proper
written statement in Texas. The Court of Appeals held the written statement
was admissible because there was no showing it was a product of the
inadmissible oral statement.
On August 4, 1999, the Waco
Court of Appeals held the juvenile court erred in not granting the
juvenile’s motion to sever two charges of unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle because in separate trials of those two charges evidence of one would
not have been admissible in the trial of the other. However, the error was
harmless.
On July 30, 1999, the Tyler
Court of Appeals upheld an adjudication for the offense of retaliation against
a public servant for a threat the juvenile made against a school official who
had removed an apparent gang cloth from his clothing. The Court of Appeals
also upheld the juvenile court’s dispositional findings made to enable the
placement of the juvenile in a boot camp as a condition of probation.
On July 29, 1999, the Tyler
Court of Appeals held that misdemeanor possession of marijuana does not
authorize the juvenile court to order a driver’s license denial until age 19
because that offense is covered by the automatic license suspension provisions
that require an indefinite suspension until the required course is completed.
On June 10, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that a claim by a criminal defendant that
his juvenile confession was illegally obtained could not be raised on appeal
because he entered a non-plea bargained plea of guilty before the jury in the
trial court. The juvenile confession claim was a non-jurisdictional defect
that is waived by the entry of an unnegotiated plea of guilty.
On June 30, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that having the prosecutor read the petition to
the juvenile in the presence of the court was not harmful error although it
failed to comply with the statutory requirement that the court must personally
admonish the juvenile.
On July 29, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to link the juvenile
to marijuana found on the ground near where he and only he had been standing.
On July 28, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a juvenile's trial did not begin in his
absence even though the court talked with the jury panel that eventually heard
the case because at the time of the talk the panel had not been assigned to
the juvenile's case.
On July 6, 1999, the Texas
Attorney General stated that a licensed polygraph examiner is required by the
Family Code to report to appropriate law enforcement authorities any
information about child abuse obtained during the course of a polygraph
examination ordered as part of sex offender treatment as a condition of
probation. The probationer does not have a right to counsel during the
polygraph examination because he is not in custody, but does have a privilege
against self-incrimination.
On July 23, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to show that his attorney
rendered in criminal proceedings ineffective assistance in advising him as to
the ability of the State to enhance punishment with a juvenile adjudication.
On July 21, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that service of the transfer petition and
summons on the defense attorney’s secretary was not personal service on the
juvenile. Thus, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case to
criminal court and the criminal court lacked jurisdiction to convict appellant
of murder.
On July 19, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that witnesses at a dispositional hearing may recommend
a disposition to the jury. The court also held that the juvenile court may
instruct the jury as to the post-commitment procedures at TYC following a
determinate sentence.
On July 15, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s written statement was admissible
in evidence because he was taken before a magistrate after interrogation began
but as soon as it was determined he was 16 years old. The prior interrogation
did not taint the written statement.
On July 8, 1999, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the evidence of lack of supervision in the
juvenile’s home supported factually the juvenile court’s findings required
to remove the juvenile from his home and commitment him to the TYC.
On July 8, 1999, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that there was no violation of equal protection of the
laws to commit the juvenile to the TYC because supervision for him was lacking
in his Mexican home. Commitment did not rest on alienage, which would have
been a suspect class under the equal protection clause, but on residence in
Mexico which made probation supervision more difficult.
On July 8, 1999, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile failed to prove that the statements
made by the juvenile court at the modification of disposition hearing were
intended to and did discourage him from testifying at that hearing.
On July 8, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that the criminal defendant failed, on
contradicted evidence, to prove that he was only 16 when the offense was
committed in a case without prior juvenile transfer proceedings.
On July 5, 1999, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals on motion for rehearing held that a 50 minute delay in
bringing a child in custody to the proper juvenile authorities made her
confession inadmissible. Under the circumstances, admitting it into evidence
was harmful error requiring reversal of the criminal conviction.
On July 1, 1999, the Texas
Supreme Court held that a juvenile court loses its jurisdiction to adjudicate
a child if the child becomes 18 years of age before the adjudication hearing
begins.
On June 30, 1999, the Waco
Court of Appeals held that the requirements in 54.04 of the Family Code
relating to need for removal of a child from his or her home do not apply to
modification of disposition proceedings. There, the standard is whether a
violation of probation was shown by a preponderance of the evidence and
whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in revoking probation and
committing the child to the TYC.
On July 1, 1999, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile could not raise
non-jurisdictional errors in discretionary transfer proceedings in an appeal
from his criminal conviction even though his case was governed by the law that
abolished the right to direct appeal from transfer proceedings.
On June 30, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that when a juvenile did not appear for the
second day of his trial and there were unobjected to statements from an
attorney that he had been told that the juvenile had fled, the court was
justified in proceeding with trial without a hearing and without considering
whether delay in trial might be preferable to proceeding with it.
On June 24, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that a belief of the juvenile that he
would be released from the TYC in 6 to 9 months (in a case with a 24 month
minimum length of stay) did not make the plea involuntary. No evidence any
trial official told that to juvenile.
On June 23, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a stipulation made by a juvenile in the
erroneous belief, shared by all trial participants, that he could appeal
denial of a motion to suppress evidence, was involuntary. The adjudication was
set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
On June 23, 1999, the Waco
Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury
that the witness was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration.
There was amble corroboration in the record. Defense counsel did not object
the failure to charge, so the harm must be judged by whether it was egregious,
which it was not.
On June 17, 1999, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that filing the transfer order from
one case in the criminal court jacket for the other and vice versa did not
invalidate the certification. The Court of Appeals took judicial notice of
both of the jackets.
On June 16, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that observing two youths passing a rolled-up
baggie back and forth gave reasonable suspicion for a stop to investigate.
Upon seeing the officers, one of the boys made a gesture toward his shoe,
which the officer thought might be the act of concealing a weapon. Therefore,
the officer was justified in frisking the shoe, which uncovered marijuana.
On June 10, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that when an officer stopped juveniles to investigate a
possible curfew violation, she was authorized to search their persons for
evidence of crime. When she found marijuana on one, she was authorized to take
him to the station. Issuing a citation for curfew violation to the two
companions did not invalidate the prior searches because all three were in
custody when the searches were being conducted.
On June 3, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that for offenses committed January 1,
1996 or later a juvenile transferred to criminal court has no right to a
district court determination whether there is good cause for an examining
trial. Although an examining trial was set in this case, it was not held
because the State obtained an indictment prior to the setting date.
On June 3, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held there is no legal requirement that the
State prove it gave notice of a release/transfer hearing under the determinate
sentence act to the juvenile involved.
On May 27, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in transferring the juvenile to TDCJ for service of the balance of
his sentence despite the recommendation of a TYC psychologist to the contrary.
On April 1, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that even through a confession was
lawlfully obtained from a juvenile because he was not then in custody, that
stolen property found later was not admissible because the police had not
taken the juvenile without unnecessary delay to a juvenile processing office
or other authorized place.
On May 27, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that failure of police to notify the juvenile's parent
that he had been taken into custody and why he was in custody invalidated a
confession that was given while in custody. The Court of Appeals held that the
criminal harmless error rule applies because criminal evidence rules apply; it
reversed an adjudication and 30 year determinate sentence.
On May 19, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the admissibility of a juvenile's statement
although it was taken in a San Antonio Police Department homicide office even
though it had not been designated as a juvenile processing office because no
adult prisoners were also present at the relevant times.
On May 19, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the three factual findings that must be
made before a child can be removed from his home and committed to the TYC
under 54.04 do not apply to a TYC commitment based upon revocation of
probation under 54.05.
On April 1, 1999, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor reading the petition did not explain
the allegations to the child as required by the Family Code but because the
petition was clear and detailed, the error was harmless. Also, the juvenile
court failed adequately to explain the consequences of a juvenile proceeding
on the child's criminal record, but that error was also harmless because there
is no showing the child would have handled the juvenile case any differently
with the correct information.
On March 4, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that failure of the criminal defendant to
object in a timely fashion in criminal court to the use of a pre-1996 juvenile
adjudication to enhance criminal punishment waived any objection to that use,
including a claim as to retroactivity of the 1995 amendment to Family Code
section 51.13(d).
On May 4, 1999, the Texas
Attorney General opined that the Human Resources Code prohibits one serving as
a peace officer from also serving as a juvenile probation officer. However, a
person who is a TCLEOSE licensee, but not a peace officer, may serve as a
juvenile probation officer.
On May 19, 1999, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a criminal conviction for capital murder
because a confession had been obtained in violation of the Family Code. The
juvenile was taken into custody and magistrated in a juvenile processing
office. He was then taken to the homicide office, which was not designated as
a juvenile processing office or as an office to which juveniles in custody
could be taken. A statement was obtained from questioning in the homicide
office. The Family Code was violated when police did not take the juvenile
from the processing office to one of the places approved by statute--juvenile
detention facility, release to parents, office approved by the juvenile court,
medical facility--and instead took him to the homicide office.
On May 19, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that on the facts the respondent was not entitled to a
charge on self-defense in an adjudication hearing for an assault on a school
teacher. The evidence also supported an adjudication for retaliation against a
police officer investigating an unrelated theft.
On April 15, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a failure to serve a certification petition and
summons personally on the child (the father was served instead) deprived the
juvenile court of jurisdiction to certify and the criminal court of
jurisidiction to convict and sentence the appellant to prison. No harmless
error analysis is feasible so none is required.
On May 6, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that testimony of a psychiatrist who examined the
juvenile for purposes of certification could not under Estelle v. Smith
testify against the juvenile in a criminal penalty hearing after
certification.
Adminssion
of imperfectly redacted co-actor's statement was error but harmless (99-2-33)
On May 5, 1999, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that it was error to admit into evidence at a joint
trial the confession of a co-defendant that made reference to the defendant
but on all the evidence the error was harmless.
On May 5, 1999, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that Miranda warnings were not required because the
juvenile was not in custody when being questioned at the police station about
a drive-by capital murder.
Agreement
not to oppose probation does not require court to admonish as to non-binding
nature of plea bargaining (99-2-31)
On May 5, 1999, the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held that when the juvenile and the State agreed that the
State would not speak on the question of probation that was not an agreement
as to disposition that required the court to admonish as to its non-binding
nature or to permit plea withdrawal upon a refusal to follow the agreement.
TYC
commitment an abuse of discretion in sexual assault case (99-2-30)
On April 30, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
commiting a juvenile to the Texas Youth Commission for a four year determinate
sentence in an aggravated sexual assault case. The juvenile's family had shown
its ability to control the child while living at home to such an extent that
it was an abuse of discretion not to leave the child at home.
On April 28, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile's claim that he believed he
would receive probation for a plea of true did not invalidate the plea in view
of the juvenile court's admonishment that he could be committed to the TYC
upon adjudication.
Scope
of the determinate sentence act is not void for vagueness (99-2-28)
On April 21, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the scope of the determinate sentence act
is not void for vagueness. A person of ordinary intelligence can determine
what conduct is prohibited.
On April 21, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that giving the juvenile and his mother
admonishments the day before trial began was sufficient, distinguishing cases
in which admonishments had been given months before trial began.
50
minute delay in taking child in custody to proper facility invalidates
confession (99-2-26)
On April 6, 1999, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals held that a delay of 50 minutes, during which the child was
in custody in a police car, in bringing her to the proper facility invalidated
a subsequent confession. However, in light of her earlier admissible
statement, admission of her written statement was harmless error.
Burden
is on the juvenile to show that the court conducting transfer hearing had not
been designated as a juvenile court (99-2-25)
On April 6, 1999, the Amarillo
Court of Appeals held that the burden is upon the juvenile to show that the
court conducting a transfer hearing had not been designated by the juvenile
board of the county to exercise juvenile jurisdiction. The State is not
requred to plead and prove that the court in which the petition is being heard
has been designated.
No
error in refusing to order disclosure of juvenile records of witnesses (99-2-24)
On January 27, 1999, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a criminal court judge's refusal to order
disclosure of the juvenile records of two prospective State's witnesses in the
absence of a showing of their relevancy to any purpose except impermissible
impeachment of the witnesses.
On January 27, 1999, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld the affirmative defense that the actor was
not more than three years older than the victim of sexual assault of a child
on the ground it is reasonable to distinguish between sex with someone of
approximately the same age and sex with a much younger person.
On April 22, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that failure of police to notify parents
they had taken their child into custody until five hours had elapsed and he
had signed a written confession to murder did not require suppression of the
confession.
Disclosure
of discretionary transfer report to attorney on day of hearing not harmful to
juvenile (99-2-21)
On April 20, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that disclosure of the report required for discretionary
transfer proceedings on the day of the hearing, instead of the day before as
required by the Family Code, was not harmful to the juvenile in this case.
On April 15, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that an 11 year old child who was in the custody of DPRS
was in police custody when being questioned about the death of a young child
in her care. She should have been taken before a magistrate for warning of her
rights.
Capital
murder and injury to a child, as charged, are same offense for jeopardy purposes
(99-2-19)
On April 15, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that as charged in this case capital murder and injury
to a child are the same offense for jeopardy purposes, but because the jury
that acquitted the juvenile in an earlier trial of capital murder also
adjudicated her for injury to a child, double jeopardy did not preclude a
subsequent trial and adjudication for injury to a child.
Juvenile's
privilege against self-incrimination or right to counsel not violated by
certification study interview (99-2-18)
On April 15, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that neither the juvenile's right against
self-incrimination nor his right to counsel was violated by the certification
study interview conducted in his case.
Court
of Appeal sets conditions for bond on appeal (99-2-17)
On April 7, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals ordered a juvenile released from the TYC on appeal
bond in a case in which it had granted habeas corpus relief several months
earlier. It had previously ordered an evidentiary hearing by the juvenile
court on the bond question and, following its recommendation, ordered bond.
The Court of Appeals in its opinion set out the conditions under which the
juvenile would be permitted to remain free on bond.
On April 7, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals that the juvenile and his attorney by agreeing to an
early trial setting implicitly waived the statutory 10 days to prepare for
trial.
Juvenile
court did not abuse discretion in overruling continuance motion (99-2-15)
On April 7, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a motion for continuance in a modification of
disposition proceedings. The denial was made after the modification hearing
had been re-set several times at the request of defense counsel. The
requirements for a continuance for the absence of a witness were not met in
this case.
Texas
Supremes hold admonition defects subject to harm analysis; error in probation
eligibility explanation reversible (99-2-14).
On April 1, 1999, the Texas
Supreme Court held that defects in admonitions to juveniles at the outset of
adjudication hearings are subject to harm analysis on appeal. The Court also
held that misstating the law by saying that only a jury could grant probation
to the defendant in a murder case was reversible error when harm was shown in
the form of the defendant electing trial by jury in light of the
misinformation provided by the court.
Texas
Supremes say objection not required in pre-1997 admonition claim but error
harmless on facts (99-2-13)
On April 1, 1999, the Texas
Supreme Court held that prior to the 1997 amendment in section 54.03 of the
Family Code, a claim of defect in an admonition was preserved for appellate
review even if the defendant did not object in the trial court. The Court also
rejected the claim that a failure to admonish as to juvenile record was
automatically harmless when the defendant plead not true and had a trial;
however, it held on these facts the error was harmless. Finally, it held that
a claim of failure to abmonish as to confrontation rights was rendered
harmless when the defendant's case was disposed of by trial.
On April 1, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a juvenile's claim that the court revoked his
probation without giving him a chance to be heard was not preserved because
the juvenile had not made a trial objection to the procedure employed by the
trial court in revoking probation.
Removal
from home findings of 54.04 do not apply to probation revocation (99-2-11).
On March 31, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the removal from home findings of section
54.04 of the Family Code do not apply to revocation of probation under section
54.05. Thus, there is no need for the juvenile court to make the three
findings required by section 54.04 to remove a child from home when the TYC
commitment is under 54.05.
No
discretion abuse in giving 3 year determinate sentence instead of probation for
child indecency (99-2-10).
On March 31, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
giving a 3 year determinate sentence, instead of probation, to the 17 year old
juvenile it had adjudicated for child indecency. The court was not required to
accept the testimony of witnesses that the juvenile could be rehabilitated in
a sex offender treatment program as part of a probation disposition.
Criminal
defendant failed to prove he was not represented when adjudicated in a prior
juvenile case (99-2-09).
On March 31, 1999, the Dallas
Court of Appeal held that vague testimony by a criminal defendant that he had
been unrepresented in juvenile court during some hearing was not sufficient to
rebut the judgment recital that he was represented at his juvenile
adjudication and disposition proceedings. Accordingly, the prior adjudication
was properly admitted into evidence at the penalty phase of the later criminal
proceedings.
Parole
contract requiring releasee to comply with sex offender registration law does
not require law enforcement agency to accept registration (99-2-08).
On March 5, 1999, the Texas
Attorney General was asked whether a parole contract requiring a TDCJ parolee
to comply with sex offender registration programs requires a local law
enforcement agency to accept the registration. Because there was no showing
that the parolee had a reportable conviction or adjudication, the local law
enforcement agency was not required to accept registration. The Attorney
General left unanswered the question whether the agency could accept
registration if it chose to do so.
Failure
to warn of range of punishment and meaning of certification does not invalidate
confession (99-2-07).
On March 18, 1999, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that failure of the magistrate to inform
appellant of the range of punishment for his offense or to explain what it
means to be certified to adult court did not invalidate the confession. The
evidence indicated that appellant undrstood his rights and the confession he
made.
Sufficient
circumstantial evidence of entry to support adjuidcation for burglary (99-2-06)
On March 18, 1999, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to
support the inference that the juvneile personally entered the home that was
burglarized.
Failure
to disclose state's witnesses' addresses authorized by protective order
(99-2-05)
On March 10, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld the failure of the State in response to a
discovery request to disclose to the defense the addresses of its witnesses.
This was justified by the protective order entered by the juvenile court in
this case.
Delay
in trial of case was caused by juvenile and not a speedy trial violation
(99-2-04)
On March 10, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile's constitutional right to a
speedy trial was not violated because his conduct and lack of cooperation with
juvenile justice officials was the cause of the delay in trying his case.
Evidence
factually sufficient to support removal from home dispositional findings
(99-2-03)
On March 4, 1999, the Beaumont
Court of Appeals held that evidence introduced at disposition factually
supported the juvenile court's findings that commitment to TYC was in the
interest of the juvenile and that a reasonable effort had been made to keep
the juvenile in his home. Details of the juvenile court's prior rehabilitation
efforts and the juvenile's responses to them supported the findings.
Evidence
insufficient to show juvenile lacked consent of grandfather to drive car
(99-2-02)
On December 31, 1998, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the testimony of the juvenile's
grandfather, the record owner of the car the juvenile was accused of operating
without permission of the owner, that everyone in the family, including the
juvenile, had permission to drive it established as a matter of law that the
State had not proved that the juvenile operated the vehicle without the
consent of the owner. The court also explained the relationship between title
owners and possessory owners under the Penal Code definitions of owner.
Probation
officer's testimony from probation file admissible under business records
exception to hearsay rule (99-2-01).
On March 3, 1999, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a probation officer could testify at
disposition about the offense that resulted in deferred prosecution without
violating the hearsay rule because she was testifying from the probation file,
which was a business record.
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