By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Modification of disposition upheld, but
juvenile court ordered to report guidelines deviation to juvenile board
(00-1-06)
On December 22, 1999, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the juvenile
court probation revocation was authorized because it occurred before the
effective date of the 1999 amendment restricting TYC commitments. However, it
ordered the juvenile court to report the guidelines deviation to its juvenile
board.
00-1-06. In the Interest of B.A.J., UNPUBLISHED, No. 06-99-00023-CV, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.óTexarkana 12/22/99)[Texas Juvenile Law 212 (4th
Edition 1996)].
Facts: Appellant, B.A.J., a juvenile, appeals from an order of the juvenile
court committing him to the Texas Youth Commission. Appellant admittedly engaged
in delinquent conduct on two prior occasions that resulted in adjudication
disposition hearings in the juvenile court. On October 28, 1998, the State moved
to modify the latest disposition based on allegations that appellant had
committed a misdemeanor by fleeing from a peace officer and on numerous
occasions had failed to attend school and had failed to report to his probation
officer as required by his disposition order. The State abandoned the failure to
attend school counts and the court found that the misdemeanor charge was not
true, but the court found the counts alleging that appellant failed to report to
the probation officer to be true. The court then committed appellant to the
Texas Youth Commission. Appellant was at a Level 4 progressive sanction at the
time of the modification, and he contends on appeal that the court abused its
discretion by committing him to the Texas Youth Commission instead of placing
him on progressive sanctions at either Level 5 or Level 6.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Appellant contends that under Section 54.05(f) of the Texas Family
Code, the court could commit him to the Texas Youth Commission only if he had
committed a penal offense. However, appellant relies on the amended version of
Section 54.05(f) that became effective September 1, 1999, well after the date of
the modification hearing in this case. The version of Section 54.05(f) effective
at the time the court committed appellant to the Texas Youth Commission provided
that the court could commit the child to the Texas Youth Commission if it found
that the child had violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. The
court here found that appellant had violated the order of the court that he
report to his probation officer.
Additionally, Tex. Fam.Code Ann. ß 59.003(e) (Vernon Supp.2000) provides that
the court may deviate from the progressive sanctions guidelines, but that the
court must state in writing its reasons for doing so and submit that statement
to the juvenile board. The court here apparently did not make such a statement.
The failure to submit such a written statement, however, does not render the
court's disposition order void; it only subjects the court to an order to
prepare and submit the written statement. Cf. K.W.H. v. State, 596 S.W.2d 248,
250 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1980, no pet.); A_Y_ v. State, 554 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.Civ.App.-San
Antonio 1977, no pet.).
Because we cannot determine from the record whether the trial court committed
appellant to the Texas Youth Commission pursuant to Section 54.05(f) or pursuant
to the exception contained in Section 59.003(e), we order the trial court to
prepare and submit to the juvenile board a written statement of his reasons for
committing appellant to the Texas Youth Commission rather than imposing
sanctions at a lower level. The written statement shall be submitted to the
juvenile board within thirty days from the date of our judgment.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
[Editor's Comment: The second to last paragraph is misleading. A revocation of
probation commitment must be made pursuant to and in compliance with section
54.05. The guidelines in Chapter 59 are just guidelines and neither empower nor
restrict the juvenile courtís decision-making authority.]