By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Erroneous belif as to time that must be served
on TYC commitment does not make plea involuntary (99-3-10).
On June 24, 1999, the Houston First
District Court of Appeals held that a belief of the juvenile that he would be
released from the TYC in 6 to 9 months (in a case with a 24 month minimum length
of stay) did not make the plea involuntary. No evidence any trial official told
that to juvenile.
99-3-10. In the Matter of R.S., No. 01-98-00939-CV, 1999 WL 417347, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 6/24/99)[Texas Juvenile Law
(4th Ed. 1996)].
Facts: Appellant, a minor, pleaded guilty to violating conditions of his
probation and was committed to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC) until the age of
21. In two points of error, appellant contends (1) his plea was involuntary and
(2) the trial court erred in conducting a motion for new trial hearing on the
issue of the voluntariness of his plea in his absence.
Background The trial court found that appellant had engaged in delinquent
conduct and placed him on juvenile probation for one year. As a condition of
probation, appellant was to voluntarily admit himself to placement at Esperanza
Treatment Center. Appellant's stay was unsuccessful and, as a result, he was
discharged from his placement at Esperanza and transferred to the Fort Bend
County Juvenile Detention Center. The State filed a motion to revoke probation.
Appellant appeared with his attorney and guardian ad litem at the adjudication
hearing. Appellant stipulated to the evidence and pleaded guilty to the
allegations contained in the petition. Appellant's rights were explained to him,
and he waived the ten days preparation time and the right to a contested
hearing. The trial court found appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct as
alleged in the petition. At the disposition hearing, appellant was committed to
TYC.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial, contending his plea was involuntary
because he was told he would be transferred to Mississippi in six to nine
months, when, in fact, he would not be eligible to transfer for at least two
years because of the offense level. A hearing was held on the motion for new
trial, and the motion was overruled.
Appellant's counsel filed a formal bill of exception, contending he was denied
the opportunity to have appellant present at the motion for new trial hearing.
The trial court did not approve or modify the bill of exception. Two letters
from appellant to his attorney were admitted into evidence.
In appellant's first point of error, he contends the trial court erred by
overruling his motion for new trial because his plea was not voluntary.
Appellant asserts that his plea was involuntary because he was misled about the
amount of time he would be spending in TYC. Although juvenile delinquency
proceedings are considered civil proceedings, they are quasi-criminal in nature.
Smith v. Rankin, 661 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no
pet.). A juvenile is guaranteed the constitutional rights an adult would have in
a criminal proceeding because the juvenile delinquency proceedings seek to
deprive the juvenile of his liberty. In re R.S.C., 940 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tex.App.--El
Paso 1997, no pet.).
A guilty plea must be freely, voluntarily, and knowingly made on the part of the
defendant. TEX.CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon 1989); Ex parte Evans,
690 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). A plea of guilty is invalid if it is
induced by defense counsel's direct misrepresentation about the consequences of
a plea of guilty. Ex parte Griffin, 679 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex.Crim.App.1984);
Fimberg v. State, 922 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet.
ref'd). However, a plea is not involuntary simply because the sentence exceeded
what the defendant expected, even if that expectation was raised by defendant's
attorney. West v. State, 702 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Russell v.
State, 711 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet ref'd). If
defense counsel's representation was merely an opinion regarding sentencing,
such fact would form no grounds for relief, even if defense counsel and
defendant were "utterly convinced in their own minds" that the same
would hold true. Russell, 711 S.W.2d at 116 (quoting McAleney v. United States,
539 F.2d 282 (1st Cir.1976)).
The record reflects that appellant's father, his probation officer, his guardian
ad litem, and his defense attorney were present at the motion for new trial.
Although appellant's father testified he believed appellant would be transferred
in six to nine months to Mississippi where appellant's family resided, there is
no indication in the record that this information was ever relayed to appellant.
Appellant's probation officer testified she never discussed any options other
than commitment to TYC with appellant, which was the recommendation of the
probation department. In her opinion, appellant understood and was aware of the
proceedings and the recommendation of the probation department. She never
specified any length of time appellant would stay in TYC during her discussions
with appellant.
Appellant's guardian ad litem testified she informed appellant that the length
of his stay in TYC was at the discretion of TYC, and she never led him to
believe he would only be required to stay six to nine months. She was aware the
recommendation of the probation department was that appellant be sent to TYC. In
fact, she told appellant that when someone goes to TYC for the type of offense
he committed, he is usually there for two years. She testified the trial court
and appellant's trial counsel specifically went over the admonitions with
appellant.
Appellant's relies on In re E.Q., 839 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, no
pet.), to support his contention that his plea was involuntary. In E.Q., the
defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State. Id. at 145. E.Q. pleaded
true to the allegations in the State's petition in exchange for the State making
a recommendation for a five-year sentence. Id. The trial court refused to follow
the sentencing recommendation and imposed a greater sentence. Id. At the motion
for new trial, E.Q.'s attorney testified she and the prosecutor had discussed
E.Q's right to withdraw his plea if the trial court assessed a greater penalty
than the one recommended. Id. Both E.Q.'s attorney and the prosecutor saw no
reason the trial court would not allow E.Q. to withdraw his plea if the trial
court did not follow the sentencing recommendation. Id. E.Q.'s attorney told him
that he would be able to withdraw his plea if the court assessed a sentence
greater than five years. Id. The trial court denied E.Q.'s motion to withdraw
his pleas. Id.
We conclude E.Q. is distinguishable because in that case there was a plea
agreement and trial counsel made a direct representation to the defendant on
which the defendant relied. Here, appellant's trial counsel testified
appellant's impression was that he would be transferred to Mississippi in six to
nine months. However, nothing in the record indicates that this impression was
anything more than wishful thinking on appellant's part. There is no indication
in the record that appellant was ever told he would be transferred to
Mississippi in six to nine months. Rather, the record reflects that appellant
was advised that the length of his stay was at the discretion of TYC and that
the probation department's recommendation was that he be sent to TYC.
Further, there was no plea agreement between appellant and the State regarding
the length of his sentence. In fact, appellant's trial counsel admitted during
cross-examination that the prosecutor told him she would not agree to a transfer
to Mississippi under the Interstate Compact Act.
The decision as to whether to allow an accused to withdraw his plea is within
the discretion of the trial court. Jackson v. State, 590 S.W.2d 514, 515
(Tex.Crim.App.1979); Russell, 711 S.W.2d at 117. In considering a motion for new
trial, the trial judge possesses broad discretion in assessing the credibility
of witnesses and in weighing the evidence to determine whether a different
result would occur upon retrial. Messer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988, pet ref'd). Appellant, his trial counsel, and his guardian ad
litem signed documents setting forth the required admonitions. The trial court
asked appellant at the adjudication hearing whether he had been promised
anything in exchange for his plea, and appellant answered in the negative. We
hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing appellant to
withdraw his plea.