By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
No equal protetction violation to commit
Mexican resident to TYC because probation alternatives are limited (99-3-18)
On July 8, 1999, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that there was no
violation of equal protection of the laws to commit the juvenile to the TYC
because supervision for him was lacking in his Mexican home. Commitment did not
rest on alienage, which would have been a suspect class under the equal
protection clause, but on residence in Mexico which made probation supervision
more difficult.
99-3-18. In the Matter of M.A.C., ___ S.W.2d ___, No. 08-98-00132-CV, 1999 WL
486649, 1999 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-El Paso 7/8/99)[Texas Juvenile Law (4th
Ed. 1996)]
Facts: M.A.C., a juvenile, appeals from a disposition order committing him to
the Texas Youth Commission following an adjudication that he engaged in
delinquent conduct by possessing more than 50 but less 2,000 pounds of
marihuana. We affirm.
On March 19, 1998, sixteen-year-old M.A.C., a Mexican citizen and resident of
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, attempted to enter the United States by
driving a Dodge Caravan into the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry. Because M.A.C.
appeared extremely nervous, a customs inspector detained him at a secondary
inspection area and a canine alerted to the gas tank of the vehicle. A search
revealed a compartment in the gas tank where several bundles of marihuana,
totaling 96.7 pounds, were concealed.
The State filed a petition alleging that M.A.C. engaged in delinquent conduct by
committing the felony offense of possessing more than 50 but less than 2,000
pounds of marihuana. At the adjudication hearing, M.A.C. stipulated to the
evidence and the juvenile court found that he had engaged in delinquent conduct
as alleged in the petition. A juvenile probation officer, Manuel Barrera,
prepared a pre-disposition report and recommended that Appellant be committed to
the care, custody, and control of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). This report
was admitted into evidence without objection at the disposition hearing and
Barrera testified on behalf of the State.
M.A.C. resides in Ciudad Juarez with his mother, O.G., who had been separated
from M.A.C.'s father, M.R.C., for about a year and a half at the time of the
disposition hearing. Barrera recommended that M.A.C. be placed in TYC because he
is in need of rehabilitation. He could not recommend that M.A.C. be placed in
the Mexican National Children's Program, a type of supervised probation for
Mexican juvenile offenders, because that program requires the existence of some
supervision and control over the child which did not exist in O.G.'s home since
M.A.C. does not obey her rules and leaves the home entirely on weekends. Barrera
believed it was questionable whether M.A.C.'s father has control over the child.
Due to the juvenile department's policy, there are only two alternatives for
juvenile offenders from Mexico: placement in the Mexican National Children's
Program under supervised probation or commitment to TYC. Barrera did not testify
that he would recommend probation for M.A.C. if he were a United States citizen,
but he admitted "there would be more alternatives." Neither party
elicited from Barrera the nature of those alternatives. Barrera was aware of
juvenile offenders in the same circumstances who had been given probation.
Based upon the evidence, the juvenile court found that M.A.C. is in need of
rehabilitation, and the protection of both the public and the juvenile required
that disposition be made. The court further concluded that it is in M.A.C.'s
best interest that he be placed outside of his home because his parents are
unable to supervise, control, or discipline him, and efforts could not be made
to prevent or eliminate M.A.C.'s removal from his home because he is an illegal
alien and there are no programs or alternatives available that would prevent his
removal. Accordingly, the juvenile court committed Appellant to TYC.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In Point of Error No. One, M.A.C. asserts that his commitment to
TYC violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution because a similarly-situated U.S. citizen would have
been placed on probation. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Aliens, even aliens whose
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as
"persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2391, 72 L.Ed.2d
786 (1982); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212, 73 S.Ct. 625, 629, 97 L.Ed.
956 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L.Ed.
220 (1886). Until a person leaves the jurisdiction--either voluntarily or
involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United
States--he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may
choose to establish. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. at 2394.
The Equal Protection Clause directs that all persons similarly situated should
be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3253-54, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985); Plyler, 457 U.S.
at 216, 102 S.Ct. at 2394. In examining the validity of state action that is
challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the general rule is that
state action is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the state action is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. However, if the
classification is based on race, alienage, or national origin, or if it serves
to deny an affected group a fundamental right, the statutory scheme must survive
strict scrutiny. Id. at 439-40, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. In such a case, the
classification will be sustained only if it is suitably tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. Id.
When presented with an equal protection claim, a reviewing court's first task is
to determine the level of scrutiny to be applied to the challenged
classification. M.A.C. asserts that strict scrutiny is appropriate since the
basis of the classification is alienage. We disagree. M.A.C. is ineligible for
ordinary juvenile probation, not because he is a Mexican citizen nor because he
is an illegal alien, but because he is domiciled in Mexico, and consequently, he
cannot be placed on probation in his parents' homes. As noted by the State,
M.A.C. would have been treated the same had he been a United States citizen
residing with his family outside of the country. Persons living outside of this
country, regardless of their citizenship status, do not comprise a suspect
class. Furthermore, the classification does not burden or impair the ability of
a class to exercise a fundamental right. While the Juvenile Justice Code
requires that certain findings be made before a juvenile is removed from his
home, juveniles do not have a fundamental right to probation. See Tex.Fam.Code
Ann. § 54.04(c) & (d)(Vernon 1996 and Vernon Supp.1999). Cf. Flores v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(holding that criminal defendants
do not have right to probation and that sentencing of defendant to incarceration
rather than probation due to defendant's inability to speak English was
rationally related to government interest in sentencing individual convicted of
second DWI offense). A juvenile court is vested with broad discretion to
determine a suitable disposition of a child adjudicated delinquent. In the
Matter of A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no writ); In the
Matter of J.R., 907 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, no writ); see
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(c) & (d). A juvenile court's decision is guided
by the Progressive Sanction Guidelines found in Chapter 59 of the Juvenile
Justice Code, but the court may deviate from the guidelines so long as it
imposes appropriate sanctions. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §§ 59.003(a)(4) and
59.003(e)(Vernon Supp.1999).
As no suspect class is involved and no fundamental right is implicated, the
appropriate standard of review is whether the difference in treatment between
those juveniles residing in the United States and those residing outside of its
boundaries rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. Nordlinger v. Hahn,
505 U.S. 1, 11, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992); Flores, 904 S.W.2d
at 131. In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is
a plausible policy reason for the classification. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 11,
112 S.Ct. at 2332. Juvenile probation is not available to M.A.C. because the
juvenile probation department lacks jurisdiction to supervise him in Mexico.
Other than the Mexican National Children's Program for which M.A.C. did not
qualify, there are no alternative programs available. Because the State has a
legitimate interest in taking steps to rehabilitate M.A.C. and protect the
public, and because M.A.C. did not qualify for the Mexican National Children's
Program, commitment to TYC is an appropriate sanction that is rationally related
to these interests. See Flores, 904 S.W.2d at 131. Point of Error No. One is
overruled.