By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Written statement admissible when juvenile
taken to magistrate after his age was determined (99-3-20)
On July 15, 1999, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s
written statement was admissible in evidence because he was taken before a
magistrate after interrogation began but as soon as it was determined he was 16
years old. The prior interrogation did not taint the written statement.
99-3-20. Marquez v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-96-01370, 1999 WL 497211,
1999 Tex.App.Lexis ____ (Tex.App.- Dallas 7-15-99)[Texas Juvenile Law (4th
Ed. 1996)].
Facts: A jury convicted Nathan Marquez of murder and sentenced him to twenty
years in prison. In three points of error, appellant complains about the factual
sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's evidentiary rulings. For the
reasons set forth below, we overrule all points of error and affirm the trial
court's judgment.
On the night of June 24, 1995, Hidalgo Martinez and four friends, including
Rubin Martinez, decided to go to a party in Oak Cliff. Hidalgo was in the front
passenger seat, and Rubin was in the middle of the back seat. As they approached
Davis and Hampton streets shortly before midnight, the group noticed a car with
girls in front of them. Hidalgo said the vehicle he was riding in accelerated
until they caught up with the other car. Hidalgo's group realized the other
vehicle was also occupied by males. The two cars pulled even with each other at
the next red light. Hidalgo identified appellant as a passenger in the other car
and noted appellant was seated behind the driver. The occupants of the car
"eyeballed" Hidalgo's group, made obscene gestures, and flashed gang
signs. Hidalgo, who was a member of the Love Field Players, recognized the signs
as that of a rival gang. When the other car was about two-and-a-half car lengths
back, Hidalgo said he heard about five gunshots. One bullet penetrated the back
windshield and hit Rubin in the head. Rubin died the next day. Hidalgo testified
the shots were fired from the other car, but he did not see who fired the gun.
Detective Kevin Navarro was the lead investigator in the case. Almost
immediately, he began receiving anonymous telephone calls identifying an Oak
Cliff gang, Vagos 18, as the group responsible for the shooting, and, in
particular, appellant. On October 30, 1995, Navarro said he took appellant and
two other Vagos gang members, Eddie Lopez and Jaime Rojas, to the police station
for questioning. According to Navarro, appellant ultimately admitted he shot
Rubin but claimed it was in self-defense. Navarro also stated he learned
appellant was only sixteen years old following appellant's admission. Navarro
said he immediately stopped the interview and took appellant to appear before
Magistrate Darrell L. Clements.
Clements testified that appellant was originally brought to him so that he could
inform him of his rights as a juvenile. Clements warned appellant of his rights
and said appellant appeared to understand the warnings and was "very
calm." Afterwards, Navarro left with appellant for about an hour and
returned to again appear before Clements. This time, appellant made a written
statement. Clements stated he again went over appellant's rights with him to
ensure he understood the consequences of waiving those rights by making a
statement. When Clements asked if the statement was appellant's, appellant
initially appeared hesitant. Upon further questioning from Clements, appellant
replied the statement did not say he was acting in self-defense. Clements added
a sentence about self-defense and then asked appellant if the statement was full
and complete. Appellant said yes.
In the statement, appellant said in the days before the shooting, Love Field
Players gang members had been threatening to kill him because he dated a female
member of their gang. On the night Rubin was shot, appellant indicated he was
initially at a friend's house. At approximately midnight, appellant asked two
people he did not know to take him home. A car pulled up next to them while they
were stopped at a light at Clarendon and Hampton streets. The car was occupied
by Love Field Players gang members. One recognized appellant and shot at him
three or four times. Appellant said he pulled a "thirty-eight" and
fired one shot. He learned the next day that someone had been killed. He said he
believed he was acting in self-defense.
At trial, appellant testified he did not read the statement before signing it
and denied ever telling Navarro he shot Rubin. According to appellant, Navarro
never read him his rights but cursed him, threatened him, and ultimately
suggested appellant should confess to shooting Rubin in self-defense. Appellant
testified he only signed the statement because Navarro promised he would let him
go home. Appellant stated he did not read the statement until he was locked up
at juvenile detention facility. According to appellant, he then learned the
statement written by Navarro did not agree with the oral statement he gave. In
particular, appellant said he told Navarro he was with several friends--Adrian,
Sabrina, Ruben, and Eddie--on the night of the of the shooting and was not
involved in Rubin's death. According to appellant, he said one thing and Navarro
wrote something else.
On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that many of the facts in the
written statement were true and were provided by him; however, he denied telling
Navarro anything about the actual shooting. Appellant testified he was taken to
a magistrate before he made the written statement and knew he had a right to
remain silent. Further, appellant stated he did not sign the statement until he
was again in the presence of the magistrate. Appellant denied telling the
magistrate that he acted in self-defense; rather, he said he told the magistrate
that Navarro believed he was acting in self-defense. He denied being a member of
Vagos 18.
Several of appellant's friends supported appellant's story that he was somewhere
else when the shooting occurred. Eddie Lopez, Adrian Velasquez, Sabrina Mejorado,
and Ruben Jimenez all testified appellant was with them at the time Rubin was
shot and was not involved in the incident. At about 11:00 p.m. on the night of
the shooting, the group went to Williams Chicken in Oak Cliff and then decided
to go to a party. The group was riding in Adrian's 1994 green Honda Accord. It
was after 11:30 p.m. when they arrived at the party, and they stayed only a few
minutes. The group then went to the house of another friend, Fernando Reyna, and
arrived there at about 11:45 p.m. They stayed at Fernando's for about thirty
minutes. The group rode around, stopped and got gasoline, talked with friends,
and dropped appellant off at home at about 2:00 a.m. Appellant's friends were
able to provide details of the roads they drove on in Oak Cliff on the night in
question as well as the pertinent times, yet they could not remember the names
of the friends they talked to. Although they acknowledged being in the area of
the shooting, they denied driving through the intersection of Hampton and
Clarendon.
Maria Marquez, appellant's mother, testified her son called her twice on the
night of the shooting to tell her he would be late coming home. She testified he
called at 11:20 p.m. from Eddie's house and again thirty minutes later from
Fernando's house. She said her son got home at about 2:10 a.m. She denied he was
a member of a gang.
In rebuttal, the State called Michael McKinney, a peace officer assigned to
Sunset High School where appellant attended school. McKinney said he had daily
contact with the various gangs at Sunset, one of which was Vagos 18. McKinney
said appellant was a member of the gang, and three photographs of appellant were
admitted into evidence. In one of the photographs, appellant was flashing the
Vagos sign; in another photograph, appellant appeared to have been beaten up
and, according to McKinney, appellant said it was part of his gang initiation.
McKinney testified he had several "run-ins" with appellant and
indicated appellant was not "intimidated by a uniform." On
cross-examination, he denied ordering appellant, or any other Sunset student, to
"flash a [gang] sign" or be expelled from school.
Navarro also testified in rebuttal. He said he gave appellant his Miranda
warnings before he started talking to him. After he took appellant's statement,
he read it to him and gave him the opportunity to make changes. Appellant did
not want to make any changes. After hearing the evidence, the jury convicted
appellant of murder.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his second point of error, appellant complains the trial court
erred in admitting his written statement because it was not voluntarily given
and appellant had not voluntarily waived his rights. Before the trial in this
cause, the trial court held a hearing on the admissibility of the statement.
Detective Navarro testified he went to talk to Jaime Rojas on October 30, 1995.
Rojas was a possible witness or suspect in the shooting. When he arrived at
Rojas's home, appellant and Eddie Lopez were standing in the front yard. Both
were also potential suspects. Navarro called for a backup unit and told the
three youths he needed to talk to them. The three voluntarily agreed to go with
him to the police station. Lopez and appellant rode with Navarro, and Rojas rode
in a separate unit.
Once they reached the police station, appellant, Rojas, and Lopez were put in
separate rooms. Navarro first talked to Lopez and Rojas. About an hour later, he
went to talk to appellant. Navarro said he began the interview by reading
appellant his Miranda warnings. Over the course of the next hour, Navarro said
appellant admitting shooting Rubin Martinez but insisted it was in self-
defense. After appellant made the oral confession, Navarro learned for the first
time that appellant was only sixteen years old. He immediately ended the
interview and took appellant to appear before Magistrate Clements so that he
could receive his warnings as a juvenile. Navarro and appellant then returned to
the police station, where Navarro wrote down appellant's statement. After
writing down the statement, Navarro read it back to appellant, and appellant did
not request any changes. Navarro then took appellant back before Magistrate
Clements so appellant could sign the statement. Navarro testified he made no
promises of leniency or probation to entice appellant into making a statement,
nor did he threaten or coerce him. He said appellant was calm and insisted that
he acted in self-defense.
On cross-examination, Navarro testified appellant was not under arrest when he
took him to the police station and was free to go at anytime. However, he never
told appellant he was free to go nor did he tell appellant he could call his
parents. He denied playing appellant, Lopez, and Rojas against each other by,
for instance, telling appellant that "his homeys have said you did it so
you might as well confess."
As he did at trial, Magistrate Clements testified he gave appellant his juvenile
warnings and later witnessed appellant sign the written statement. Clements
stated, at appellant's request, he added the language about self- defense.
Clements said appellant was quiet but appeared to be "bright and
intelligent and [to] understand what was going on." Clements further
testified it was his impression appellant understood his rights and had
willingly given the statement to the police.
In contrast to the State's evidence, Lopez, Rojas, and appellant each testified
they were standing outside Rojas's home when Navarro drove up, told them
"not to move," and called for backup assistance. Each said Navarro
ordered they come to the police station. On arrival, the three were put in
separate rooms. Lopez testified Navarro threatened to put him in jail if he did
not tell him what happened and then promised to let him go that night if he
admitted he shot Martinez in self-defense. Similarly, Rojas testified Navarro
initially told him he had enough evidence to put him away for thirty years.
Navarro then offered to let Rojas go home if Rojas would confess to shooting
Martinez in self-defense.
Appellant testified he was in a room at the police station for one hour before
Navarro reappeared. Navarro asked if appellant committed the shooting, and
appellant said no. After about thirty minutes, Navarro left. When he returned,
Navarro told appellant Lopez and Rojas had said he shot Martinez. Appellant was
"scared" and asked Navarro to call his mother. Navarro refused. Over
the next forty minutes, appellant denied committing the shooting but eventually
agreed to give a statement because Navarro promised he could go home. When
Navarro began writing a statement, he asked appellant his age. After that,
Navarro took appellant to appear before a magistrate.
According to appellant, Magistrate Clements was the only person to read him his
rights. When he returned to the police station with Navarro, Navarro wrote out a
statement. Appellant denied providing the information in the statement and said
he did not read the statement before signing it. Appellant testified he did not
know he had confessed to murder until his lawyer read the statement to him at
the juvenile detention center. On cross-examination, he acknowledged the
accuracy of most of the statement; he denied, however, providing any information
about the shooting. His mother testified she first learned her son had been
taken in for questioning after 10:00 p.m. on October 30, 1995. After hearing the
evidence, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress.
On appeal, appellant contends his statement was not voluntary because Navarro
did not read him his rights and "intimidated and threatened" him into
giving a statement. Appellant contends the coercion was corroborated by the
testimony of Lopez and Rojas. In addition, appellant complains he had given an
oral confession before he was ever taken to appear before a magistrate and
argues that fact also weighs against voluntariness. We disagree.
Determining whether a juvenile confession is voluntary must be based on the
totality of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Darden v. State, 629
S.W.2d 46, 51 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982). If the circumstances indicate
the juvenile was threatened, coerced, promised something in exchange for his
confession, or incapable of understanding his rights and warnings, the trial
court must conclude the confession is involuntary. See id. Section 51.09 of the
Texas Family Code sets forth the warnings applicable to a juvenile confession.
See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.09(b)(1)(A)-(F) (Vernon 1996). Moreover, the
statute requires a magistrate certify the juvenile "knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily" waived his rights prior to accepting the
juvenile's confession. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.09(b)(1)(G) (Vernon 1996). The
State bears the burden of proof to show the statement was voluntary. Garcia v.
State, 829 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
The standard of review set forth in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89
(Tex.Crim.App.1997), applies to claims concerning the voluntariness of oral and
written statements. See Hernandez v. State, 957 S.W.2d 851, 852
(Tex.Crim.App.1998) (per curiam). When, as here, there is conflicting evidence
before the trial court on the motion to suppress, we give almost total deference
to a trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record.
Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89.
Contrary to appellant's contention, Navarro testified he read appellant his
rights before he began talking to him. Further, Navarro testified he did not
intimidate, threaten, or otherwise coerce appellant into giving a statement, nor
did he threaten Rojas or Lopez. Although Navarro did not immediately ascertain
appellant's age, once he determined appellant was a juvenile, he took him to
Clements. Clements warned appellant of his rights and said appellant appeared to
understand them. After being so warned, appellant returned to the police station
with Navarro and made a written statement. He signed the written statement in
Clements's presence, and his only concern was that the statement indicate he
shot Rubin in self-defense. Clements said appellant appeared "bright and
intelligent and [to] understand what was going on." Under these
circumstances, we conclude appellant voluntarily waived his rights and made the
statement. To the extent he argues the oral statement, given prior to receiving
his warnings, tainted his written confession, there is no presumption the
earlier confession compelled him to again confess despite a resolve to remain
silent. See Rodriguez v. State, 968 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th
Dist.] 1998, no pet.). We overrule the second point of error.