By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
No requirement of warnings because juvenile
not in custody (99-3-33)
On August 12, 1999, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held
that police are not required to give Miranda warnings to a juvenile who is being
transported to the police station but who is not in police custody.
99-3-33. Vasquez v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 14-97-00376-CR, 1999 WL 604877, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 8/12/99)[Texas Juvenile Law
(4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: Appellant, Juan A. Vasquez, was charged by indictment with capital
murder. He entered a plea of not guilty, and the parties proceeded to trial. The
jury found him guilty as charged, and because appellant was a juvenile at the
time he committed the offense, the trial court automatically assessed punishment
at confinement for life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division. Appellant challenges his conviction with eight points of
error.
At 1:30 a.m. on May 26, 1995, Able Zamudio was using a pay phone located a
hundred yards from the corner of Canal and 67 th Streets, in Harris County. He
saw a red Camaro decelerate near a bus stop at the intersection, and then heard
a loud pop. He immediately left the scene.
Houston Police Officer Ricardo Baez was dispatched to 7600 Canal Street
regarding a shooting. He arrived on the scene at 1:43 a.m. and found that
paramedics had already placed Juan Tax in the back of an ambulance. Upon
returning to the scene, Zamudio met Officer Baez and told him what he had seen.
Officer Baez and Zamudio drove together through the neighborhood and,
approximately one-half mile form the scene, Zamudio identified the red Camaro he
had seen earlier at the bus stop. Officer Baez approached Jose Saldana, Clemente
Mesa, and appellant who were standing near the Camaro. He interviewed all three
of them but made no arrest.
On June 5, 1995, Sergeant C.T. Mosqueda went to appellant's house and told him
he was conducting an investigation regarding an injured person. He asked
appellant if he was willing to go to the police station and talk to the police,
and appellant agreed. Sergeant Mosqueda then drove appellant to the Southeast
Command Station, which is a designated juvenile processing center. He placed
appellant in an interview room, left the room to pick up some paperwork
regarding juvenile warnings, and returned to the interview room to fill out the
paperwork. Sergeant Mosqueda told appellant he needed to take him before a
magistrate to receive his warnings, and then took appellant to Judge Jonietz's
courtroom where the judge explained appellant's rights to him.
Sergeant Mosqueda subsequently returned to the interview room with appellant and
reiterated the warnings. Appellant said he understood his rights, and agreed to
waive them and give a statement. After the statement was completed, Sergeant
Mosqueda took appellant to Judge Garrett's office. Appellant entered alone and
the judge gave appellant his warnings and went over his statement with him,
after which appellant signed the statement in the judge's presence. Tax died
that same day from a gunshot wound to the upper back part of the head.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court
committed reversible error when it denied appellant's motion to suppress his
written confession. Specifically, he claims his statement was involuntary
because Sergeant Mosqueda (1) did not tell appellant of the seriousness of Tax's
condition, and (2) failed to give appellant his warnings as soon as appellant
agreed to go with him to the station.
Appellant first argues that his confession was involuntary because he believed
the statement he gave was in regard to an attempted capital murder, rather than
capital murder. Appellant contends that Sergeant Mosqueda only told him Tax was
injured, not that he was in grave condition, and thereby misled him rendering
his confession involuntary. However, while misrepresentations made by police to
a suspect during an interrogation are a relevant factor in assessing the
voluntariness of a confession, they are insufficient to render an otherwise
voluntary confession inadmissible. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 99
(Tex.Crim.App.1996). Instead, the alleged misrepresentation must be viewed in
the context of the totality of the circumstances. See id.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress his written confession and the trial court
held a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of his
confession. Initially, we note that no evidence was adduced at the suppression
hearing regarding Tax's condition at any time relevant to this confession.
Furthermore, the record does not contain any evidence to suggest that Sergeant
Mosqueda was aware of the details of Tax's condition or that he knew it was
deteriorating. Additionally, the record does not reflect that Sergeant Mosqueda
knew that Tax died while appellant was giving his written statement. We
consequently find there is insufficient evidence to support appellant's
contention that Sergeant Mosqueda minimized the seriousness of Tax's condition
to encourage appellant to confess.
Appellant also argues that his statement was involuntary because he was in
custody when Sergeant Mosqueda took him to the police station, and the sergeant
did not give him his juvenile warnings. However, when a person voluntarily
accompanies a police officer who is in the course of investigating a crime, and
the person knew or should have known that the police might suspect he is
implicated in the offense, whether he is acting upon the invitation, urging, or
request of police officers and not being forced, coerced, or threatened, the act
is voluntary and the person is not in custody. See Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d
9, 19 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). The record reflects that appellant was not in custody
when he went to the station based upon the following facts: (1) when asked
whether he was willing to go to the police station, appellant voluntarily agreed
to go; (2) Sergeant Mosqueda did not handcuff appellant, and he kept his weapon
concealed; (3) Sergeant Mosqueda and appellant rode in an unmarked
investigator's vehicle; (4) during the ride to the station, Sergeant Mosqueda
talked to appellant about what he wanted to be when he grew up; and (5) shortly
after arriving at the station, Sergeant Mosqueda took appellant before the judge
to receive his warnings before appellant gave his written statement. We find
these facts demonstrate that appellant was not in custody upon being taken to
the police station, and therefore, Sergeant Mosqueda was not required to give
him his juvenile warnings at that time as a predicate to the admissibility of
his statement. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
In his final point of error, appellant contends defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because he did not object to the introduction of his
written confession which was taken in violation of section 52.025(a) of the
Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 52.025(a) (Vernon Supp.1999).
However, section 52.025(a) addresses the temporary detention of a child who has
been taken into custody. As noted above, appellant voluntarily accompanied
Sergeant Mosqueda to the police station and was, therefore, not in custody or
detained during that time. Thus, section 52.025(a) is inapplicable in this case,
and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the
introduction of appellant's written confession on that basis. We therefore
overrule appellant's eighth point of error.