By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Arkansas juvenile adjudication admissible as
evidence of extraneous offense or bad act (99-4-11)
On September 21, 1999, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a pen packet
from Arkansas was admissible as evidence of an extraneous offense or bad act
even though it could not be determined whether the adjudication was in juvenile
or criminal court.
99-4-11. Stanley v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 07-98-0328-CR, 1999 WL 740656, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Amarillo 9/21/99)[Texas Juvenile Law 237 (4th
Edition 1996)].
Facts: In this appeal, appellant Jack Stanley III challenges his conviction of
burglary of a habitation/aggravated assault and subsequent punishment of life
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Department of Criminal Justice.
In five points of error, appellant claims the trial court erred by 1)
restricting his cross-examination of the victim and his father about their
activities the day before the offense; admitting evidence of 2) an Arkansas pen
packet not properly identified as appellant's; 3) a 1969 Arkansas conviction for
murder in the first degree which occurred at a time when appellant was a
juvenile; 4) multiple Arkansas judgments that did not reflect several relevant
circumstances; and 5) a "mug shot" photograph of appellant.
On February 7, 1996, Justin Adam Bryant (Justin), a juvenile, stayed home from
school because of a backache. He testified that about 2:00 p.m. on that day, he
heard a loud banging noise coming from outside the house. As he went into the
living room, he saw a man he later identified as appellant standing inside the
room. He said he recognized the man as appellant because he had known him for
about three months, had gone places with him, and had seen him at a neighbor's
house. Although Justin testified he asked appellant what he was doing in the
house, he did not remember appellant's reply. A "scuffle" then ensued,
during the course of which Justin noticed a knife in appellant's waistband
"in his back." Justin went back to his bedroom "to get away from
him." He averred that appellant followed and stabbed him
"straightforward into my chest." Justin described the knife used by
appellant as being similar to a brown handled steak knife he had seen at the
neighbor's house where he and appellant had been.
Justin fell to the ground after appellant's initial attack upon him and he
testified that "I remember him stabbing me some more times while I was on
the ground." He believed he was stabbed about a dozen times. Appellant then
turned and left the room. Justin tried to contact the police on his bedroom
telephone but was unable to do so because it was not working. Appellant then
returned, grabbed the phone, broke it, and stabbed him "a couple more
times." Justin remembered that at some time during the assault, appellant
asked "where the jewelry was" to which Justin replied that he did not
know. He also testified that during the course of the assault, "after he'd
stab me, he'd take the knife and get down on his knees, and it appeared to me
that he was straightening the knife out." Appellant finally left and Justin
crawled to his parent's room and called 911.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: The thrust of appellant's third point of error is that the trial
court reversibly erred in admitting into evidence a 1969 murder conviction that
occurred when appellant was only 15 years old. Appellant cites the presumption
we referred to above that in the absence of contrary proof, the law of a sister
state is presumed to be the same as Texas law. Appellant points out that under
Texas law, a "child" is a person who is ten years of age or older and
under 17 years of age or older, and under 18 years of age when alleged to have
engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a
result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age. Tex. Fam.Code Ann.
art. [sic] 51.02(A)(B) (Vernon 1996). Thus, appellant concludes that at the time
of the 1969 conviction, he was a "child" under the Texas standard.
Under Texas law, appellant posits, the State has only two alternate methods to
prosecute minors for murder, namely, to follow the provisions of the Juvenile
Code and continue the proceedings within the juvenile system, or seek to have
the juvenile court waive its exclusive jurisdiction and transfer the minor to
the appropriate felony court for trial as authorized under section 54.02 of the
Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.02 (Vernon 1996). Under this record,
appellant argues, there is nothing to show either method was followed. His trial
objection was that the judgment and sentence were inadmissible as "not
being a judgment that could have been rendered in Texas against a 14[sic] year
old person." Hence, he reasons, because the conviction could not have been
obtained in Texas, its receipt into evidence was violative of the Family Code
and he was deprived of due process of law. We disagree. Code of Criminal
Procedure art. 37.07(a), in relevant part, provides that at the punishment
hearing, evidence may be admitted as to any matter the court deems relevant,
including the "prior criminal record of the defendant," any other
evidence of an "extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant," as
well as evidence of an adjudication of delinquency based upon violation of a
felony grade law. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 47.07(a) (Vernon Supp.1999).
Regardless of what procedure was followed by the Arkansas authorities in
obtaining the conviction, it was clearly evidence of an extraneous crime or bad
act admissible within the discretion of the trial court, and even if it be
considered a juvenile adjudication, murder is certainly a felony grade
violation. Additionally, even assuming arguendo that the records relating to the
1969 murder conviction were erroneously admitted, in view of the number of other
prior convictions admitted into evidence, as well as the other evidence in the
case, the admission of this single record was not sufficient to deprive
appellant of a substantial right. King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271
(Tex.Crim.App.1997). Appellant's third point is overruled.