By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Juvenile has no right to pre-trial release on
bail (99-4-16)
On October 6, 1999, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a juvenile being
detained pre-trial has no federal or state right to have bail set. The court
said that the because the state is proceeding in a benevolent fashion in dealing
with juveniles, there is no right to bail. The court might have added that the
statutory detention hearing provided for in the Family Code is a fully effective
substitute for bail.
99-4-16. Ex parte D.W.C., ___ S.W.2d ___, No. 09-98-422-CR, 1999 WL 808630, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ____ (Tex.App.--Beaumont 10/6/99)[Texas Juvenile Law 71 (4th Ed.
1996)].
Facts: D.W.C., a juvenile, appeals from the denial of relief upon his
application for writ of habeas corpus. He contends in a single issue that his
detention without bail violates his rights as contained in art. I, §§ 11 and
29 of the Texas Constitution. Although he is no longer subject to pretrial
detention, we will rule on the issue even though it is now moot, because the
alleged wrong is capable of repetition yet evading review. See Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253, 256, n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 2403, n. 3, 81 L.Ed.2d 207, 212, n. 3 (1984);
General Land Office of Texas v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Tex.1990).
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: We affirm the trial court's order denying D.W.C. relief upon his
application for writ of habeas corpus because the denial of bail to a juvenile
who is the subject of pretrial detention does not violate the juvenile's rights
under the Texas Constitution due to the State's parens patriae interest.
It has long been held in Texas that a juvenile has no right to bail because
juvenile cases are civil, as opposed to criminal proceedings. See Espinoza v.
Prince, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex.1945). However, in the case of In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the United States
Supreme Court held that, despite the civil law designation, a juvenile is
entitled, by virtue of the right to due process, to the right to adequate notice
of charges, the right to counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-
examination, and the right to the privilege against self-incrimination. Id., 387
U.S. at 33-34, 41-42, 55, 57. The court did not rule on whether a juvenile is
entitled to bail.
Since that time, numerous state courts have considered whether the denial of
bail to juveniles constitutes a violation of the United States Constitution or
of their state constitutions. Most have held that it does not. See Pauley v.
Gross, 1 Kan.App.2d 736, 574 P.2d 234, 240 (Kan.Ct.App.1977); Morris v. D'Amario,
416 A.2d 137, 140 (R.I.1980); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205,
208-09 (Wash.1968); In re Ort, 407 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (Ind.Ct.App.1980); State v.
M.L.C., 933 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah 1997); Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149, 152
(Ky.1971); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 52-53 (Alaska 1971); L.O.W. v. District
Court, 623 P.2d 1253, 1255 (Colo.1981); Aubry v. Gadbois, 50 Cal.App.3d 470, 123
Cal.Rptr. 365, 368 (Cal.Ct.App.1975); and In re Kelly, 1999 WL 132862, at *5
(Ohio Ct.App., 10th Dist., May 4, 1999). The only state of which we are aware
that has held to the contrary is Louisiana. See State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439,
12 So.2d 211, 213 (La.1943). A federal district court in the District of
Colombia has also held that a juvenile has a constitutional right to bail. See
Trimble v. Stone, 187 F.Supp. 483, 488 (D.D.C.1960). For further discussion and
authorities, see "Right of Bail in Proceedings in Juvenile Court," 53
A.L.R.3d 848.
The general basis for the holding of the majority of these courts is the
doctrine of parens patriae. Our juvenile law is founded upon the application of
this doctrine. See S.D.G. v. State, 936 S.W.2d 371, 377 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996, writ denied). See also Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.01 (Vernon 1996).
Based upon that doctrine, then, we hold that juveniles do not have an absolute
constitutional right to bail, either under the United States or the Texas
Constitutions.
D.W.C. primarily relies upon the cases of Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 1968, no writ); Villareal v. State, 495 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus
Christi 1973, no writ); In re D.B., 594 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi
1980, no writ); and M.B. v. State, 905 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no
writ). Two of these cases, Collins and M.B., hold that a juvenile is guaranteed
all of the privileges and immunities to which one would be entitled in a
criminal proceeding because the proceedings seek to deprive the juvenile of
liberty. See Collins, 429 S.W.2d at 652; M. B., 905 S.W.2d at 345. However, an
examination of these cases show that each reached that conclusion based either
upon Gault or upon a case that itself relied upon Gault. Collins, 429 S.W.2d at
652; M. B., 905 S.W.2d at 345. Villareal and In re D.B. merely hold that a
juvenile is entitled to the protection of due process. Villareal, 495 S.W.2d at
29; In re D.B., 594 S.W.2d 209. Villareal, relying on Gault, indicated that the
due process rights are the same for juveniles as for adults. Villareal, 495
S.W.2d at 29. In re D.B., a later decision by the same court, merely states that
the due process requirements for juveniles and adults are similar. In re D.B.,
594 S.W.2d at 209.
In Schall v. Martin, the United States Supreme Court, in holding that New York
juvenile pretrial detention procedures do not violate the juveniles' due process
rights, stated that while certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by
adults also apply to juveniles, the Constitution does not mandate the
elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles, because of the
State's parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the
child. Id., 467 U.S. at 263, 81 L.Ed.2d at 216. It specifically noted that a
juvenile does not enjoy the right to a jury trial. Id. We therefore respectfully
disagree with those cases that have indicated that the holding in Gault requires
that a juvenile be afforded all of the same rights as a criminal defendant. We
overrule D.W.C.'s contention as presented in the sole issue on appeal.