By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Failure to notify parents that juvenile was
taken into custody invalidates confession (99-4-26)
On November 4, 1999, the Houston First District Court of Appeals held on
rehearing that the failure of police to notify the appellant’s parents he had
been taken into custody invalidated a subsequent murder confession.
99-4-26. Gonzales v. State, ____ S.W.2d ___, No. 01-98-00540-CR, 1999 WL 997798,
1999 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 11/4/99)[Texas Juvenile
Law 287 (4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: Chance Derrick Gonzales, the appellant, pled guilty to murder after the
trial court denied the motion to suppress his written confession. The appellant
was sentenced to 45 years confinement. On April 22, 1999, the Court affirmed the
trial court's judgment. [See Juvenile Law Newsletter ¶ 99-2-22] In light of new
case law issued after our original opinion, the appellant's motion for rehearing
was granted, and the April 22 opinion is withdrawn. We substitute this opinion
in its stead. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The appellant was 15 years old when he was arrested. The juvenile court waived
jurisdiction over the appellant, and he was indicted with the offense of capital
murder. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress his written
confession, the appellant pled guilty to the lesser included offense of murder.
His punishment was assessed according to the plea bargain at 45 years
imprisonment. The appellant's written notice of appeal indicates the appeal is
based on the denial of the motion to suppress. The complainant was shot to death
during the robbery of his convenience store on February 18, 1996. The police
investigators received information from a confidential informant who led them to
Joe Vallejo. The informant identified Vallejo as the individual who shot the
complainant while attempting to steal beer for a gang party.
On March 8, 1996, the police arrested Vallejo and interviewed him. Vallejo said
he and "Scrappy" tried to steal some beer from the complainant's
store, and that Scrappy was the one who shot the complainant. Vallejo identified
the appellant as Scrappy.
The police showed a witness the appellant's photo, and the witness identified
him as one of the people who robbed the store. The police viewed the
surveillance tape from another convenience store. On that tape, the appellant
was seen committing a similar beer theft on the same night the complainant was
shot.
After taking Vallejo's written statement, Officer Hoffman contacted the district
attorney's office, and spoke to an assistant district attorney (ADA). The ADA
told Hoffman a warrant was not needed to take the appellant into custody because
he was a juvenile. The police went to the appellant's house, but he was not
there. Instead, they found him at another house where several juveniles were
having a party. The police were allowed into the house by the person who
answered the door. Hoffman said that when they went into the house, it did not
appear there were any adults supervising the juveniles.
The appellant was found hiding in a back room of the house. Hoffman did not know
when the appellant was arrested, but that it was between midnight and 1:30 a.m..
The appellant was taken to the sheriff's department annex on Clay Road, a
designated juvenile processing office. The appellant was placed in a room by
himself, isolated from adult prisoners, during the 20-30 minute stop at the Clay
Road annex. While at this location, the officers picked up the surveillance
video that showed the appellant stealing beer on the night of the murder.
The officers left the Clay Road facility with the appellant, and took him to the
offices of the homicide division of the sheriff's department at 601 Lockwood,
another designated juvenile processing office. The appellant was given his
Miranda warnings in the car. At 2:30 a.m., they arrived at the Lockwood office,
where they remained for approximately 40 or 45 minutes. Hoffman spoke to the
appellant briefly at his desk while another detective located a magistrate. The
detective found a municipal judge, Judge Biggs, for the City of Galena Park.
The officers took the appellant to the judge's chambers in the Galena Park City
Hall. They arrived there at about 3:35 a.m.. Judge Biggs gave the appellant the
warnings required by the Family Code, and then left the appellant alone in his
chambers with Officers Hoffman and Roberts. Hoffman and Roberts took the
appellant's written statement. Judge Biggs returned to his chambers when the
statement was completed. The officers left the appellant alone with Judge Biggs.
Judge Biggs determined that the appellant had knowingly and voluntarily given
his written statement. Judge Biggs witnessed the execution of the statement at
5:11 a.m..
Held: Reversed and remanded.
Opinion Text: In issue one, the appellant argues his confession should have been
suppressed because it was the result of an illegal, warrantless arrest. The
State argues a warrant was not needed because of Family Code section 52.01(a)
and Cornealius v. State, 900 S.W.2d 731,
733 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). We agree with the State.
Family Code section 52.01(a) explains the limited circumstances of when a child
may be taken into custody. There are six instances when this may happen: (1) by
order of the juvenile court; (2) according to the laws of arrest; (3) by a
law-enforcement officer if there is probable cause to believe the child has
violated a penal law of the State; (4) by a law-enforcement officer if there is
probable cause to believe the child has engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct
indicating a need for supervision; (5) by a probation officer if there is
probable cause to believe the child has violated a condition of probation; or
(6) by a directive to apprehend issued under Family Code section 52.015. Tex.
Fam.Code § 52.01(a)(1)-(5); see Cornealius, 900 S.W.2d at 733 (stating an
arrest warrant is not needed to arrest a juvenile under Family Code section
52.01(a)); Blackmon v. State, 926 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex.App.--Waco 1996, pet.
ref'd) (same).
Here, the State claims a warrant was not needed because the appellant was taken
into custody by a law-enforcement officer who had probable cause to believe the
appellant had violated the law. We agree. Family Code section 52.01(a)
authorized the police to take the appellant into custody because the officers
had probable cause to believe the appellant had engaged in conduct violating the
laws of the State, namely that he had committed two robberies and a murder. See
Cornealius, 900 S.W.2d at 733; Blackmon, 926 S.W.2d at 404.
The appellant relies on Roth v. State, 917 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, no
pet.), to argue that a warrant was needed. His reliance is misplaced. In Roth,
the defendant argued his confession should have been suppressed because of an
illegal entry into his home. 917 S.W.2d at 297. The police went to the
defendant's apartment because they were looking for a juvenile runaway whom they
believed had a gun. Id. When the police knocked on the door, the defendant
answered and told them he would get the juvenile. Id. at 298. There was disputed
testimony concerning whether the defendant consented to police entry of the
apartment. Id. at 297-98. When the police entered the apartment, they followed
the defendant into a bedroom, and along with the juvenile, they found contraband
in plain view. Id. at 298. The defendant claimed the contraband, and was
convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Id. The issue in Roth
centered on the warrantless entry into the defendant's home, which is different
from the issue we address--a warrantless arrest. [FN1] In negating all possible
theories to justify the police's entry, the court said that Family Code section
52.01(a) did not authorize the warrantless entry into the defendant's residence
for the purpose of taking custody of the runaway juvenile. Roth, 917 S.W.2d at
302. However, the court interpreted the statute as permitting an officer to take
a child into custody without a warrant under the circumstances prescribed by the
statute. Id. Thus, the dicta in Roth supports our interpretation of the
statute-- that Family Code section 52.01 permits the warrantless arrest of a
child under the prescribed circumstances.
FN1. Even if this were a warrantless entry case, the appellant does not have
standing to complain of a Fourth Amendment violation because he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of a third party where he was
arrested, and because the police could rely upon the apparent authority of the
individual who admitted them into the home.
We overrule the appellant's issue one.
In issue two, the appellant argues his confession should have been suppressed
because the police did not comply with the Family Code requirements. The
appellant claims (1) the police did not take him to facilities designated by the
juvenile courts as juvenile detention centers, and (2) he was denied the right
to have either his family, an attorney, or a representative from the probation
office present when he was in custody.
1. Juvenile detention centers
The testimony before the trial court established that the appellant was taken to
the Clay Road annex, 601 Lockwood, and Judge Biggs' chambers at the Galena Park
City Hall. The appellant claims the Clay Road annex and the Lockwood office were
not properly
designated as juvenile processing offices.
Upon request of both the appellant and the State, the trial court took judicial
notice of the guidelines that set forth designated juvenile processing offices.
The State requests this Court take judicial notice of the guidelines as well.
The guidelines indicate that the Clay Road and Lockwood locations are properly
designated as juvenile processing offices. At the Clay Road
location, the appellant was kept in a room by himself, isolated from any adult
prisoners. At the Lockwood location, Hoffman sat with the appellant at his desk
while they waited for Roberts to find a magistrate.
The appellant relies on Anthony v. State, 954 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.App.--San Antonio
1997, no pet.), which is distinguishable from the present case. In Anthony, the
court held it was error for the police officers to take the juvenile's statement
in the homicide office because it was not an exclusive juvenile holding area.
954 S.W.2d at 135-136. Although the appellant was taken to the homicide division
of the sheriff's department (the Lockwood location), his statement was not taken
there. The appellant's written statement was transcribed, witnessed, and
executed in the chambers of the magistrate, Judge Biggs, an official designated
by the juvenile court. Therefore, the appellant's argument is without merit.
2. Parental notification
The appellant also argues his confession should have been suppressed because the
police did not promptly notify his parents that he was in custody, rendering his
confession illegal and inadmissible. Under Family Code section 52.02(b), the
officer must promptly notify the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, and the
office or official designated by the juvenile court, that he has taken the child
into custody, and state the reason for doing so. See In re C.R., 995 S.W.2d 778,
782 (Tex.App--Austin, pet. filed Sept. 28, 1999) (finding juvenile's confession
inadmissible because Family Code section 52.02(b) was violated). We initially
held section 52.02(b) does not provide a grounds to exclude the appellant's
confession, because section 51.095(a)(1)(A) addresses the proper procedure for
obtaining a written statement from a juvenile. Under section 51.095(a)(1)(A), a
juvenile's written statement is admissible as evidence if the statement is made
in writing and the statement shows that the child has received his warnings from
a magistrate. Tex. Fam.Code § 51.095(a)(1)(A); Anthony v. State, 954 S.W.2d
132, 134 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). As Judge Biggs testified, he
gave the appellant the statutory warnings at least twice, when the appellant
first arrived and before he signed his statement. Judge Biggs verified that the
appellant knowingly and voluntarily made the statement.
Although we find that the requirements of section 51.095(a)(1)(A) were met, we
must conclude the appellant's confession was inadmissible because of the
violation of Family Code section 52.02(b). See Le v. State, 993 S.W.2d 650,
655-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding juvenile's written confession inadmissible
because of violation of Family Code section 52.02(a)); C.R., 995 S.W.2d at 782
(finding juvenile's confession inadmissible because of violation of Family Code
section 52.02(b)). The State did not meet its burden of showing that the
appellant's parents, guardian, or custodian, and the office or official
designated by the juvenile court, were promptly notified. Instead, the arresting
officer testified that he did not notify the appellant's parents that the
appellant was in custody.
We sustain the appellant's issue two.
We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial. [FN3]
FN3. We note that in Le, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded to the appellate
court to conduct a harm analysis in light of the remaining evidence offered at
the defendant's trial. In the present case, the appellant pled guilty; thus, we
are unable to conduct a harm analysis.