By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Juvenile voluntarily confessed to capital
murder despite low IQ (99-4-31)
On November 18, 1999, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the certified juvenile
voluntarily confessed to capital murder despite low IQ.
99-4-31. Reyes v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 14-97=00933-CR, 1999 WL 1041477, 1999
Tex.App.Lexis ____ (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 11/18/99)[Texas Juvenile Law
275 (4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: Alejandro Reyes appeals a conviction for capital murder on the grounds
that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting his written confession because: (a)
it was obtained as a result of an illegal detention; (b) there was no valid
waiver of his rights; and (c) the confession was not given voluntarily; (2) the
trial court erred in admitting an in-court identification; (3) the evidence was
legally and factually insufficient; and (4) appellant received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
While a minor, appellant was charged with capital murder. His case was
transferred from juvenile court to criminal district court. After a trial on the
merits, a jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at life in prison.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Written Statement
Illegal Detention
The first of appellant's seven points of error argues that the trial court erred
in admitting into evidence a written statement he gave to police because it was
obtained before turning him over to appropriate juvenile authorities as required
by section 52.02(a) of the Texas Family Code and was thus the product of an
illegal detention.
To preserve error in admitting evidence for appellate review, an appellant must
generally make a timely objection and state the grounds for it. See Tex.R. Evid.
103(a)(1); see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. In addition, the grounds for a complaint
on appeal must comport with those for the objection at trial. See, e.g., Trevino
v. State, 991 S.W.2d 849, 854-55 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
In this case, appellant argued at trial that his written statement was
inadmissible only because it was not voluntary in that he did not understand
what he signed or what constituted a waiver of his rights. Because appellant
objected at trial based only on voluntariness and not an alleged violation of
Family Code procedures, point of error one presents nothing for our review and
is overruled.
Voluntariness
In addition to reiterating the grounds set forth in the first point of error,
appellant's second point of error argues that the trial court erred in admitting
his written statement because the waiver of his constitutional right against
self-incrimination was not voluntary. In particular, appellant contends that his
youth, low I.Q., and lack of reading and language skills rendered him incapable
of understanding his right or making an intelligent waiver of it.
Appellant asserts that the evidence demonstrated that his 75 I.Q. was far below
average and that he had a learning disability that diminished his reading and
language skills to the five to seven year old range. Appellant had been placed
in special education classes throughout his educational career, and a special
education teacher who knew appellant testified that he would not have understood
many of the phrases on the statutory warnings signed by appellant.
When a defendant presents evidence raising a voluntariness question, the
prosecution must controvert that evidence and prove voluntariness by a
preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Terrazas, No. 1191-98, 1999 WL
722548, at *4 (Tex.Crim.App. Sept. 15, 1999). Where a trial court makes no
express findings of fact, the reviewing court implies all fact findings
necessary to support the trial court's ruling. See id. at *5. In addition, we
defer to the implied fact findings that the record supports where those findings
are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. See id. We may review a
trial court's legal ruling on voluntariness de novo. See id.
The statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him only if it
appears that the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion
or persuasion. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (Vernon 1979). A
determination of voluntariness is based on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the statement's acquisition. See Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744
(Tex.Crim.App.1995). In ascertaining the voluntariness of a confession and the
waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self- incrimination, mental
deficiency is a factor but is not alone determinative. See id. Where the
evidence shows that the appellant was advised of his statutory rights, had the
basic reasoning skills to understand them, and voluntarily waived them, evidence
of mental retardation or illiteracy does not alone render the confession
inadmissible. See id. at 746.
In the present case, the evidence shows that, after appellant's arrest, he was
taken before Judge Jonietz, who administered statutory warnings to appellant.
Judge Jonietz testified that he believed appellant understood the warnings and
that appellant's understanding was clear and unequivocal. After appellant's
statement was prepared, a second judge, Judge Abercia, testified that he met
with appellant in his office outside the presence of the police. In this
meeting, appellant indicated that he could read and write English. Judge Abercia
went over appellant's entire statement with him, line by line. Judge Abercia
testified that he believed appellant understood the entire statement. Appellant
signed the statement in Judge Abercia's presence. In Judge Abercia's opinion,
appellant understood the nature and contents of the statement and signed the
statement voluntarily. The evidence also reflects that appellant located several
errors in the statement and corrected them himself.
In light of the conflicting evidence, we afford deference to the trial court's
implied determination, based on an evaluation of the credibility of the
witnesses, that appellant possessed the mental capacity to make a voluntary
waiver of his right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, appellant's second
point of error is overruled.
Higher Standard Under Texas Law
Appellant's third point of error argues that the trial court erred in finding
his written statement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because Texas law has
a higher burden of proof than federal law for the admissibility of written
statements. Appellant contends that the voluntariness of a statement must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at a suppression hearing because it must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt when the issue is submitted to a jury at trial.
Although appellant is correct that voluntariness must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt when the issue is submitted to a jury at trial, the same is not
true at a suppression hearing where voluntariness need only be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Terrazas, 1999 WL 722548, at *4; Alvarado v.
State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Therefore, appellant's third
point of error is overruled.