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By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
On December 6, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not cross the line
of impartiality by engaging a respondent in a dialogue during disposition
proceedings.
On December 20, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that when an officer viewed three young men on
the streets at 3 am carrying electronic equipment he had reasonable suspicion
to stop the youths to investigate for a possible burglary. Handcuffing the
suspects did not convert the stop into an arrest. While the San Antonio curfew
ordinance prohibits an arrest for the first offense, the stop here was made
independently of that ordinance.
On December 28, 2000, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that a delay of 6 hours in
notifying the juvenile's parents of his arrest invalidated his murder
confession that the juvenile gave to police. This procedure did not comply
with the Family Code's requirement of prompt notice to parents.
On December 28, 2000, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication and
commitment to the TYC because the juvenile law master did not adequately
inform the juvenile of his right to a hearing before the judge of the juvenile
court.
On December 14, 2000, the El
Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court was justified in committing
the respondent to TYC because the probation department would not pay for local
sex offender treatment for the 17 year old respondent.
On December 7, 2000, the Texas
Supreme Court denied review in a case raising the question whether Chapter 55
applies to a person 18 or older who is the subject of a release/transfer
hearing under the determinate sentence act. According to a concurrence, the
court denied review because the issue had not been preserved in the trial
court.
On December 7, 2000, the First
District Court of Appeals held that a juvenile adjudicated CINS for disruption
of class did not preserve by trial objection the claim that the statute was
void for vagueness.
On November 30, 2000, the
Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
permit the respondent to cross-examine the child complainant in a sexual
assault case that about the divorce proceedings and custody fights between her
parents. The court also held that statements made two years after the event to
a nurse about the event were admissible under the medical interview exception
to the hearsay rule because sought in part to provide information for
diagnosis and treatment.
On November 22, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held on motion for rehearing that the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in certifying the respondent for murder committed
during a gang initiation ceremony, but that the respondent was entitled to
receive on his adult sentence credit for time served in juvenile detention.
On November 14, 2000, the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that a confession that was signed in a juvenile
processing office is admissible even though the questioning occurred
elsewhere. The court also held that a custodial statement made to a
psychiatrist is admissible to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony.
On November 14, 2000, the
Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated
robbery with a 20 year determinate sentence because the State failed to prove
the identity of the complainant. The sole evidence in the case consisted of
statements made by the respondent in an inquiry from the trial judge following
respondent’s entry of a plea of not true.
On November 9, 2000, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that a juvenile’s confession which was given
to the Chicago police concerning a capital murder in Texas is not admissible
in a Texas juvenile proceedings because not taken in compliance with the Texas
Family Code.
On November 6, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals upheld a transfer from TYC to TDCJ under the determinate
sentence act based on the juvenile’s misconduct while at TYC and his
unwillingness to assume responsibility for the sexual assault for which he was
committed or any of the instances of misconduct.
On November 2, 2000, the El
Paso Court of Appeals held it did not have to decide about the admissibility
of psychological and psychiatric reports at the TDCJ transfer hearing because
the juvenile’s conduct while in TYC justified the transfer.
On November 2, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that because a minor to whom a controlled substance had
been delivered had an affirmative defense to a charge of delivery of a
controlled subtonic to a minor, that person was not an accomplice witness in a
criminal trial of the adult for delivering the controlled substance.
On November 2, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that it is not required that a determinate sentence
petition must be filed in juvenile court before it is approved by a grand
jury. It can be approved and then filed.
On November 12, 2000, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that a school law enforcement
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a student in the halls whom he saw
carrying ladies jewelry; accomplice corroboration in burglary adjudication
hearing was sufficient.
On October 31, 2000 the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that postponing a transfer hearing corrected a failure
to serve the summons on respondent more than two days before the scheduled
hearing.
On October 31, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that a certified juvenile cannot appeal from a plea
bargained criminal conviction to challenge the certification for a
jurisdictional defect without filing the special notice of appeal required by
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On October 27, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that if the law requires corroboration of a plea of
true, which it did not decide, the respondent’s judicial confession was
sufficient corroboration; the court also held there was sufficient evidence to
support a restitution order of $3000 for damages to stolen automobile.
On October 27, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
modifying probation to provide for placement in a secure facility on a plea of
true to probation violation; no showing of material change in circumstances is
required.
On October 25, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court certification for murder in a
gang initiation ritual. It held the adult defendant was entitled to receive
credit on his sentence for 113 days spent in juvenile detention before
certification.
On October 26, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals upheld an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated sexual
assault against a claim that the juvenile court should not have admitted
evidence of a prior assault on a female. The court of appeals also held a
threat of serious bodily injury was proved even though the respondent lacked
the means to carry out exactly the threat made at the time he made it.
On October 19, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals, on motion for rehearing, adhered to its previous decision in
this case. It held that when appellant gave an inadmissible written statement
(because warned by the peace officer instead of a magistrate) and later after
release telephoned the officer to make corrections in the written statement,
the telephoned statements were not admissible because they were fruits of the
inadmissible written statement. There is a dissenting opinion.
On October 5, 2000 the Austin
Court of Appeals considered the pro se appeal of a juvenile. It held the
juvenile pro se appellant to the standard of an attorney in prosecuting the
appeal and, finding no abuse of discretion in commitment to the TYC, affirmed
the revocations.
On October 5, 2000, the First
District Court of Appeals held that a dialogue on the record with the master
in which the respondent and his attorney both agreed to have the master hear
the case satisfied the wavier requirements of the Family Code.
On October 4, 2000, the Waco
Court of Appeals reversed revocation of juvenile probation because it was
based on a motion to modify that had been filed after probation had expired. A
motion had been filed before probation expired, but it had not been served on
the respondent.
On September 28, 2000, the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that by supplemental record
it was shown that respondent was served with a summons and petition prior to
his adjudication hearing. Therefore, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over
the case and its subsequent revocation of probation was valid.
On September 20, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to
order appellant transferred from TYC to TDCJ because the Court of Appeals had
set aside a previous transfer order and the case had not yet been remanded to
the juvenile court.
On September 14, 2000, the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that admission of a written
confession that the Court of Criminal Appeals had determined was unlawfully
obtained under Section 52.02 of the Family Code was harmless in light of the
other evidence introduced in the trial.
On September 14, 2000, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld a revocation of probation over a claim that
the juvenile court had improperly delegated authority to an external program
to set the conditions of probation.
On September 14, 2000, the
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did
not err in failing to make a finding of necessity to permit a witness
coordinator to stand next to a child complainant while testifying. Also, the
Court of Appeals held without discussion that CCP article 38.071, the child
victim videotaping statute, applies in juvenile proceedings.
On September 13, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a transfer to TDCJ under the determinate
sentence against a claim that the juvenile was entitled to a fitness hearing
prior to the transfer hearing. The juvenile court appointed a psychiatrist,
which satisfied any constitutional claim that might exist.
On September 12, 2000, the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile respondent was provided with
ineffective assistance of counsel because the lawyer failed to investigate a
potential alibi defense.
On September 8, 2000, the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the hearing was factually
and legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s adjudications for
assault and criminal mischief by the juvenile against his mother.
On August 31, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the record failed to show that a summons had been
served on the juvenile. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded the juvenile
court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the case. Accordingly, it vacated the
adjudication and TYC commitment and remanded the case to the juvenile court.
On August 31, 2000, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals, in the context of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, approved of the use of hearsay to prove unadjudicated juvenile
offenses at the penalty stage of a criminal trial.
On August 25, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence
through proof of disciplinary infractions that respondent violated probation
by failing to complete his placement and being unsatisfactorily discharged
from placement.
On August 10, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that when a police officer investigating a report of a
runaway juvenile pressed the remote control device on a key taken from a male
juvenile companion in a frisk, that action was not a search. The officer found
cocaine in the car that beeped in response to his action.
On July 24, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s motion to dismiss his appeal was
deficient so rejected it but then dismissed the appeal for want of
prosecution.
On August 3, 2000, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court was acting within its
discretion when it rejected a claim of self-defense in a probation revocation
hearing.
On July 27, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals reversed an adjudication of delinquency for aggravated sexual
assault because the juvenile court permitted a psychologist to testify that in
her professional opinion the complaining witness was telling the truth.
On July 26, 2000, the Waco
Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant is not entitled under Davis v.
Alaska to place before the jury a closed juvenile case involving a co-actor
who testified against the defendant. Such impeachment is prohibited by the
Texas Rules of Evidence.
On July 26, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a juvenile court’s order placing the
juvenile on probation outside her home. The Court of Appeals recited the
mother’s denial of the juvenile’s responsibility for the assault,
resulting in her removing the child from school for home schooling. The Court
also recited numerous school infractions and a psychological report asserting
a need for structured supervision.
On July 19, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a plea form signed by the juvenile and his
attorney can be given effect under Section 51.09 as a waiver of the
juvenile’s right to receive an explanation of the charges from the judge.
On July 18, 2000, the Texas
Attorney General stated that because adult probation department employees are
state employees a county cannot include them in the county’s civil service
system despite a provision in the Local Government Code that appears to
authorize their inclusion.
On July 20, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that in a criminal trial defense
counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to object to a
confession of a certified juvenile on the ground it was not obtained in a
juvenile processing office when the confession contained evidence of coercion,
which was the sole defense in the case.
On July 18, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that it was not a denial of a criminal defendant's right
to confrontation to refuse to permit him to cross-examine the complaining
witness in a sexual assault of a child case about the witness' juvenile
record.
Respondent was adjudicated
delinquent for carrying a loaded handgun to elementary student while a student
at the age of 10. He was also adjudicated for terroristic threat and
aggravated assault. In the adjudication hearing, the judge rejected the
defense of lack of responsibility because of mental illness. The Court of
Appeals upheld that decision.
On July 13, 2000, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court's removal from home findings
were supported by the evidence and that commitment to TYC was lawful.
On July 12, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the required removal from home findings in
Section 54.04 apply only to disposition decisions, not to modification of
disposition decisions.
On July 13, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that failure of the defendant to object to
being proceeded against in criminal court for an offense committed while a
juvenile without a juvenile court certification waived that claim under Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 4.18. The court also held that adult probation
can be revoked for an offense committed by the probationer while a juvenile.
On July 11, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant's right of confrontation was
not violated by the trial court's ruling that the jury would be told that a
State's witness had legal trouble as a juvenile rather than that she had been
adjudicated for burglary.
On July 5, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that stolen bicycle parts were admissible under
Evidence Rule 404(b) to show intent to deprive the owner of his property in a
trial for bicycle robbery.
On June 29, 2000, the Texas
Attorney General stated the opinion that unlike in criminal cases, in juvenile
proceedings the State has no right to trial by jury. Therefore, the State
cannot "veto" a juvenile’s waiver of trial by jury.
On June 28, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that even if the Family Code imposes a plea
substantiation requirement similar to that required in criminal cases by Code
of Criminal Procedure Article 1.15, it was fully met by appellant’s
acknowledgement in response to a question from the judge that he was pleading
guilty because the allegations in the petition are true.
On June 22, 2000, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that a transferred juvenile may in criminal court be
charged with and convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under a
transfer order that certified assault on a peace officer for the same conduct.
On June 7, 2000, the Texas
Attorney General stated the opinion that under Chapter 63 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure a law enforcement officer must take possession (and may use
reasonable force to do so) of an unemancipated 17-year-old person who has been
reported by a parent as being missing. The officer must deliver possession of
person to a parent or to DPRS.
On February 9, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the juvenile
court’s removal from home findings and commitment to the TYC for two
offenses of aggravated sexual assault. It also held that the judge’s remarks
to the juvenile at disposition did not constitute a comment on the
juvenile’s failure to testify in the trial.
On February 9, 2000 the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a juvenile murder suspect was not in
custody when questioned by the police at the stationhouse. His statement was
therefore admissible against him in his criminal trial after certification.
On June 22, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a certification report was not deficient merely
because it failed to address the four factors the juvenile court is required
to consider when certifying a juvenile to criminal court.
On June 21, 2000, the Texas
Supreme Court held that under Section 56.02 of the Family Code the requirement
of Rules of Appellate Procedure 20.1 that an affidavit of indigency must be
filed is excused when the juvenile court conducts a hearing on indigency.
On June 15, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the 1999 enactment restricting TYC commitments to
cases with multiple prior misdemeanor adjudications does not apply probation
violations that occur before the effective date of the legislation—9/1/99.
On June 15, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a back seat passenger in a vehicle stopped for a
traffic violation could be arrested for possession of a firearm under the
front passenger’s seat. However, the passenger lacked standing to challenge
the lawfulness of either the stop or the search of the vehicle.
On June 15, 2000, the Houston
14th District Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor in a criminal trial is
permitted to question potential jurors about their feelings concerning
certification of juveniles to criminal court despite the fact that the
certification process does not present any issues for a jury to decide.
On June 15, 2000, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that under the 1995 amendment to the
Family Code a juvenile cannot directly appeal a certification order but must
await criminal conviction to take a consolidated appeal. Therefore, it was not
ineffective assistance of counsel for appellant’s juvenile court lawyer not
to take a direct appeal. The Court of Appeals overruled its opinion in
Melendez v. State, which had erroneously held such an appeal could be taken.
On June 8, 2000, the El Paso
Court of Appeals decided an important case in which it said that a juvenile
has a privilege against self-incrimination in a post-adjudication interview by
a probation officer for a social history report to be used in disposition
proceedings. Because the officer did not warn the juvenile of his
constitutional rights, the statements he made to the probation officer should
not have been included in the social history report.
On June 8, 2000, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
committing appellant to the Texas Youth Commission.
On June 1, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that when a juvenile falsely claimed
to police to be 17 years of age and his physical appearance corroborated that
claim, he waived the protections of the Family Code for the interrogation of
juveniles.
On May 25, 2000, the El Paso
Court of Appeals held that testimony about the community's access to a middle
school during non-class hours was proof that the school also was a community
center under the punishment provisions of the graffiti statute.
On May 23, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the 1995 amendment to the Family Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure postponing certification appeals until after a criminal
conviction did not authorize an appeal raising certification issues when the
criminal case terminated with deferred adjudication, which is not a
conviction.
On May 18, 2000, the Texarkana
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s lawyer rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel when the lawyer failed to seek the appointment of a
mental health expert in a release/transfer hearing in which the juvenile’s
brain injury may have been an important factor in the commission of the
offense.
On May 10, 2000, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed as improvidently granted a petition for
discretionary review that challenged the Fifth Amendment violation holding of
the Court of Appeals but not the Sixth Amendment holding in a case in which a
psychologist was permitted to testify about appellant’s lack of remorse
during a certification examination.
On May 9, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not err in permitting a
juvenile probation officer and the victim of the aggravated robbery to testify
at the disposition hearing that the juvenile should be committed to TYC.
Neither witness recommended a particular term of years for the determinate
sentence.
On May 2, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to support factually
the finding that appellant committed the offenses of auto theft and
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (00-2-21)
On April 27, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the failure of the juvenile court to appoint a
guardian ad litem when the respondent’s parents did not appear at the
adjudication hearng was harmless error in view of the appearance and friendly
support of his aunt and uncle.
On April 20, 2000, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the Texas sex offender registration program,
as applied to juveniles, does not violate due process of law or equal
protection of the laws.
On April 19, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in commiting a 13-year-old child with an extensive juvenile history
to the TYC for the offense of resisting arrest.
On April 19, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held the juvenile court erred in submitting only the question
of whether respondent violated his determinate sentence probation to the jury
at the revocation hearing. Respondent had not waived jury punishment and was
entitled to have the jury assess punishment as well as find whether he had
violated probation.
On April 12, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that a photo array shown to the victim of a
carjacking was not impermissibly suggestive because respondent was pictured
wearing the shirt he wore when arrested.
On April 12, 2000, the Texas
Attorney General stated that the juvenile board of Potter County may pay
attorney fees it incurred in defending a lawsuit brought against it by Potter
County in a dispute over county salary supplementation for member of the
juvenile board. The fees may be paid from the probation department budget
without approval by the commissioners court.
On April 6, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that a search of a probationer in school by residential
officers on a tip from another student was lawful, given the diminished
privacy rights of probationers.
On April 5, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile’s youthful appearance
justified a stop for investigation of a curfew violation. The officer was
justified in frisking the juvenile for his own protection. During the first he
felt baggie, which he was justified in removing, leading to the discovery of
marijuana.
On April 5, 2000, the Court of
Criminal Appeals vacated the judgment of the Austin Court of Appeals, which
had held that the juvenile was not personally served with a summons to a
discretionary transfer hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the
Court of Appeals had failed to consider an argument that the juvenile admitted
in court that he had been served with summons.
On March 30, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the evidence in a robbery case
was legally and factually sufficient despite a one-on-one show-up shortly
after the offense.
On March 30, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a prompt, crime scene one
person show up of the juvenile to a robbery victim was not unduly suggestive.
The Court of Appeals also held that failure at trial to object to evidence of
the show-up on the grounds the officer did not comply with section 52.02 of
the Family Code waived any error there may have been.
On March 30, 2000, the Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that once a delinquency petition was
served on respondent, the failure to serve an amended version of that petition
that had been approved by the grand jury under the determinate sentence act
was not a jurisdictional defect.
On March 23, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the request of TYC to transfer appellant to TDCJ under the new law
for chronically disruptive behavior.
On March 15, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeal dismissed the juvenile’s appeal from a criminal
conviction in which he had attempted to appeal certification issues in an
appeal from the resulting criminal conviction, as required by the 1995
amendment to the Family Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Assuming the
offense was committed January 1, 1996 or later, as seems likely from the facts
stated, this decision was in error.
On March 9, 2000, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in transferring respondent who had been adjudicated for murder from
TYC to TDCJ.
On March 9, 2000, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that an inadvertent failure to file the juvenile
court’s transfer order with the district clerk did not preclude the district
court from having jurisdiction over the transferred case. The order was found
and filed after the appeal was filed and abated.
On March 9, 2000, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary that the
juvenile court record show that the respondent had been given notice of the
release/transfer hearing under the determinate sentence act, at least in the
absence of a claim that timely notice had not been provided.
On March 9, 2000, the Houston
First District Court of Appeals held in a case of first impression that the
mental illness provisions of Chapter 55 do not apply to a hearing to transfer
a person from TYC to TDCJ under the determinate sentence act when the person
to be transferred is 18 or older at the time of the hearing.
On March 2, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals joined other Courts of Appeals in holding that the removal
from home requirements of Family Code Section 54.04(i) do not apply in
modification of disposition proceedings.
On March 2, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals upheld the removal from home findings required for commitment
to the TYC in a possession of cocaine case. It also held that under the 1997
statute, a trial objection is required to preserve for appellate review a
claim that there was a defect in the admonitions.
On February 23, 2000, the Court
of Criminal Appeals held that a juvenile is entitled to credit and good
conduct credit on his criminal sentence for time spent in a juvenile detention
facility pending certification to criminal court.
On January 27, 2000, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the
appellant’s case supported the findings required to be made to remove
appellant from his home and to commit him to the TYC.
Facts: The issue presented by
this case is whether our abolition of the juvenile exception to the accomplice
witness rule, announced by Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App.1998),
applies retroactively to cases currently pending on direct review or not yet
final. We hold that our holding in Blake is retroactive and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
On January 21, 2000, the Austin
Court of Appeals held that failure of the juvenile respondent to participate
in a treatment program ordered as a condition of probation was a ground for
revoking probation.
On December 2, 1999, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals held that TYC officials who not liable for statements
that made concerning misconduct allegations being investigated in their
official capacities. They had official immunity, which they acted within and
therefore could not be held liable.
On October 21, 1999, the
Amarillo Court of Appeals ordered the district court to re-consider the
question of appointment of counsel for a transferred juvenile who wished to
appeal a decision refusing to reduce bond. The issue apparently was whether to
take into account the financial ability of the parents to pay for counsel.
On January 14, 2000, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that under the rule of idem sonans there was no fatal
variance between the complainant’s name as alleged in the petition and as
proved at the adjudication hearing.
On January 13, 2000, the
Houston First District Court of Appeals granted the State's motion for
rehearing. It held that the respondent's oral statement given while in police
custody was not in response to interrogation and was therefore admissible in
evidence. It also held that the officer taking the respondent to where the
respondent had concealed stolen property instead of taking him to a juvenile
processing office did not require the exclusion of the statement from
evidence.
On January 5, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the juvenile court's
findings to justify commitment to the TYC.
On January 5, 2000, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held there was insufficient corroboration of the
trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest to admit it into
evidence under the Rules of Evidence.
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