By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence was factually sufficient to
support adjudications for auto theft and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle
(00-2-21)
On May 2, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient
evidence to support factually the finding that appellant committed the offenses
of auto theft and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (00-2-21)
00-2-21. In the Matter of C.P.D., UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-99-00858-CV, 2000 WL
567003, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 5/2/00)[Texas Juvenile Law 169
(4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: C.P.D., a minor, appeals two findings by the trial court that he engaged
in delinquent conduct. In the first finding, appellant was found delinquent for
the theft of a maroon 1989 Chevrolet pickup. In the second finding, appellant
was found delinquent for the unauthorized use of a gray 1985 Cadillac. Appellant
was placed on one year probation for both offenses and he and his parent were
ordered to pay $6,412 in restitution. In two points of error, appellant contends
that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court's
findings.
On October 19, 1998, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Kristi Bragg was informed by
Officer Jay Shoemake of the Seagoville Police Department that her maroon 1989
Chevrolet pickup was on fire down the street from her apartment. Bragg lived in
the Cedar Point Apartments in Seagoville, Texas. She last saw her truck at
approximately 4:00 p.m. the day before, October 18th, in the parking lot of her
apartment complex. She gave no one permission to use the truck. As a result of
the fire the vehicle was a total loss.
Approximately two weeks later, on October 28, 1998, at about 8:30 p.m., Billie
Sweet reported her 1985 gray Cadillac stolen from the parking lot of her church
in the Pleasant Grove area of Dallas, Texas. She was in church from about 6:55
p.m. until about 8:30 p.m. for Wednesday services. She gave no one permission to
drive her car that evening. At about 10:00 p.m. that evening, Sweet received
phone calls from the Seagoville Police and Fire Departments informing her that
her Cadillac was on fire at the intersection of East Simonds and Cain Street in
Seagoville, Texas. As a result of the fire the vehicle was a total loss.
Detective Greg McKinley of the Seagoville Police Department investigated both
incidents. McKinley took the statements of Randy Roberts, Gary Jones, and Amy
Smith. Based on information from these sources, McKinley had appellant taken to
the juvenile detention center on December 31, 1998. On the way to the detention
center, appellant told the officers, "Think about it. You know you don't
have any good physical evidence." Appellant also told officers that if they
would not take him to the juvenile detention center, he would tell them
everything they wanted to know about the offenses.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: STANDARD OF REVIEW
When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we view all evidence in a neutral
light to determine whether the proof of guilt (1) is so obviously weak as to
undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or (2) although adequate if
taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. See Johnson v. State,
No.1915-98, slip op. at 18, 2000 WL 140257, at *8 (Tex.Crim.App. February 9,
2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Clewis v. State,
922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). It is the fact finder's role to weigh
the credibility of witnesses, determine the weight to give their testimony, and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407. We may not
disagree with the fact finder's determinations unless the record clearly
indicates such a step is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. See Johnson,
No.1915-98, slip op. at 12-13.
THEFT FINDING
In his first point of error, appellant claims that the evidence is factually
insufficient to support the finding that he committed the offense of theft. More
specifically, appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that
he was the person who stole Bragg's pickup. We disagree.
Bragg's 1989 maroon Chevrolet pickup was stolen from the parking lot of the
Cedar Point Apartments between 4:00 p.m. on October 18th and 5:00 a.m. the
following morning. It was later found burning on Cain Street behind those same
apartments. Gary Jones and Amy Smith, both of whom lived in the Cedar Point
Apartments, stated that they saw appellant driving a red Chevrolet pickup truck
in the parking lot of the Minyard's grocery store in Seagoville, Texas, before
the two of them entered the grocery store. Though neither knew the specific time
or date of the sighting, both recalled that it was at night in mid-October of
1998. Smith dated the sighting about two weeks before the end of October. Jones
originally dated the sighting around October 29, 1998, the same day Jones was
jailed for an unrelated offense, but later recanted and maintained that the
sighting occurred about two weeks before he was jailed. Smith, who was dating
Jones at that time, also claimed that the sighting was about two weeks before
Jones went to jail.
Jones stated that after Smith entered the store, he approached appellant in the
truck in the Minyard's parking lot. Appellant asked him if he wanted to buy the
seats out of the truck. Jones also noticed that the steering column of the truck
was broken, but did not notice if there were keys in the ignition. Jones, who
knew appellant for about three months prior to October 1998, stated that he did
not know appellant to own a red Chevrolet pickup and never saw him in the pickup
again. Randy Roberts, who also knew appellant for a few months prior to October
1998, saw appellant driving a red, full-sized Chevrolet pickup at approximately
7:30 p.m. in the parking lot of the Cedar Point Apartments in Seagoville, Texas.
Roberts did not know the model year of the truck, but stated it could have been
a 1989 or 1990 model. Roberts dated the sighting as being approximately two
weeks before he saw appellant driving a gray Cadillac in the same apartment
parking lot towards the end of October 1998. As Roberts approached appellant on
the driver's side, he noticed that the steering column of the truck was broken.
After a brief conversation, appellant then drove off in the pickup truck.
Appellant returned to Roberts' apartment early the next morning between 1:30
a.m. and 2:00 a.m. and asked Roberts for a ride home. Roberts declined and
appellant left. About ten to fifteen minutes later, Roberts saw a red pickup
truck, which appeared to be the same truck appellant was driving earlier,
burning two or three blocks down the street. Appellant later told Roberts that
he burned the pickup that Roberts saw him driving that night.
Appellant denied driving Bragg's pickup and originally claimed he was buying
clothes at the mall with his mother on the evening Bragg's truck was stolen.
However, appellant initially believed he and his mother went to the mall on a
Wednesday, then could not recall whether it was a Wednesday or not. Finally,
after discovering that October 18 th was a Sunday, appellant could not say for
certain where he was on the night Bragg's truck was stolen.
Linda Adams, appellant's mother, stated that she and appellant went shopping at
the mall on the Saturday before Bragg's truck was stolen and were there until
the mall closed. She then maintained that on the next day, Sunday, October 18 th,
they went to church and then came home to watch the Dallas Cowboys football
game. She claimed that appellant was with her that entire day.
Appellant also contends that Jones and Roberts lied during their testimony.
Appellant asserts that Jones lied because Jones held a grudge against appellant
after appellant and Jones' girlfriend, Smith, had gone out together. Appellant
claims Roberts lied because Roberts and Jones were friends, and Jones told
Roberts to lie.
While the evidence often conflicts, reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence
is within the province of the trial court. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647. The
fact finder can draw reasonable inferences and make reasonable deductions within
the context of a crime. Lockett, 874 S.W.2d at 813. And, while appellant alleges
the witnesses' testimony was false, in a trial before the court, the judge
determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647; See Lockett, 874 S.W.2d at 813; C.D.F.,
852 S.W.2d at 284. The judge may believe or reject all or any part of the
testimony. C.D.F., 852 S.W.2d at 284.
We conclude that the evidence is not so obviously weak as to undermine
confidence in the trial court's decision, nor is the trial court's finding
greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Several witnesses saw appellant driving a
truck that matched the description of Bragg's stolen pickup. Jones and Roberts,
on separate occasions, noticed that the steering column of the truck was broken,
and appellant asked Jones if he wanted to buy the seats out of the truck.
Furthermore, Jones never knew appellant to own a red Chevrolet pickup, and never
saw him driving the truck again. Roberts, who had seen appellant driving a red
Chevrolet pickup, refused appellant a ride home just minutes before Roberts saw
the red Chevrolet pickup burning down the street from Roberts apartments.
Appellant even admitted to Roberts that he had burned the pickup Robert's had
seen him driving. Finally, appellant's statements to police were inculpatory. We
conclude that the trial court's finding that appellant was the person who stole
Bragg's 1989 Chevrolet pickup is not so against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust or wrong. Consequently, we overrule
appellant's first point of error.
UNAUTHORIZED USE FINDING
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is factually
insufficient to show that he committed the offense of unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle. Again, appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to show
he was the person who used Billie Sweet's Cadillac without her authorization. We
disagree.
Sweet's 1985 gray Cadillac was stolen from the parking lot of her church in
Pleasant Grove between 6:55 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. on October 28 th. The car was
later found burning on Cain Street behind the Cedar Points Apartments in
Seagoville, Texas, at approximately 10:00 p.m. that night. Jones never saw
appellant in the gray Cadillac, but he did overhear appellant tell someone named
Marcus that appellant stole a Cadillac from a church parking lot in Pleasant
Grove and later burned the car off Scyene Road in Dallas.
Roberts saw appellant driving a gray Cadillac in the parking lot of the Cedar
Point Apartments. The Cadillac had one of the back windows broken out and the
steering column was broken. The model year was somewhere between a 1985 and
1989. Appellant told Roberts he got the car from Pleasant Grove. Roberts dated
the sighting as occurring about two weeks after he saw appellant in the red
pickup truck in the same parking lot. About fifteen minutes after appellant
drove off, Roberts heard sirens and saw smoke coming from Simonds Road in
Seagoville, Texas, but did not investigate. A few days later, appellant admitted
to Roberts that he stole the Cadillac from a church parking lot in Pleasant
Grove. Appellant also talked to Roberts about stealing cars and explained that
the best way to get rid of a stolen car was to burn it by lighting it underneath
the seats.
Appellant denied driving Sweet's Cadillac. Appellant stated that on the night of
October 28, 1998, he was at home grounded and was unable to leave the house.
Appellant's grandfather, Robert Burris, confirmed appellant's account. Burris
was remodeling appellant's house during the week that included October 28 th,
and was at the house that day from 4:00 p.m. until about 9:00 p.m. Burris
maintained appellant was with him the entire time.
Adams, appellant's mother, also claimed the appellant was at home the evening of
Wednesday, October 28 th. Adams stated she worked until 5:30 p.m. that evening,
and when she got home, appellant was already there with Burris. She maintained
appellant was at the house the entire evening. Adams also stated appellant was
grounded the entire week before Halloween and that appellant was required to
come straight home from school, could not talk on the telephone, and could not
go anywhere. A note from Amy Smith to appellant, dated November 2, 1998, refers
to appellant's grounding. ("So how is your grounded life?"). However,
in a note from Smith to appellant dated November 5, 1998, Smith refers to the
night of October 28, 1998, when asking appellant, "How did you like the
other night?" Smith stated that she did not recall what happened that
night, but thought it was the night that she and appellant began dating and that
appellant had come over to her house. She stated she did not know appellant was
grounded at that time. Appellant's mother, on the other hand, contends that
appellant must have gone to Smith's house after school, rather than at night.
We conclude that the evidence supporting the trial court's finding is not so
weak as to undermine the court's finding, nor is the evidence outweighed by
contrary proof. Jones overheard appellant tell someone he stole a Cadillac from
a church parking lot in Pleasant Grove. Roberts saw appellant in a car matching
the description of Sweet's gray Cadillac with the steering column broken and the
back window broken out, and appellant told Roberts that he got the car from a
church parking lot in Pleasant Grove. Shortly after appellant left Roberts,
Roberts saw smoke and heard sirens coming from Simonds Road in Seagoville,
Texas. Sweet's Cadillac was found burning on Simonds Road in Seagoville, Texas.
A few days later, appellant admitted to Roberts that he stole the Cadillac from
a church parking lot in Pleasant Grove. Appellant also told Roberts about
stealing cars and that the best way to get rid of them was to burn them.
Appellant claims he was grounded the evening of October 28, 1998, and was at
home with his grandfather. However, the trial court had discretion to reject any
of appellant's testimony. See C.D.F., 852 S.W.2d at 284.
We conclude that the trial court's finding that appellant used Sweet's car
without her authorization is not so against the great weight of the evidence as
to be manifestly unjust. Therefore, we overrule appellant's second point of
error.