By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Juvenile murder suspect was not in custody
so statement admissible in criminal trial (00-3-09)
On February 9, 2000 the San Antonio Court
of Appeals held that a juvenile murder suspect was not in custody when
questioned by the police at the stationhouse. His statement was therefore
admissible against him in his criminal trial after certification.
00-3-09. Mata v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 04-98-00411-CR, 2000 WL 816767, 2000
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2/9/00)[Texas Juvenile Law 278 (4th
Edition 1996)].
Facts: Joe Richard Mata ("Mata") appeals his murder conviction. Mata
asserts four points of error in his brief, challenging: (1) the legal and
factual sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admissibility of his statement; and
(3) the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his third point of error, Mata contends that his statement was
inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of sections 51.09, 52.095,
52.02 and 52.025 of the Texas Family Code, chapters 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Unites States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.
The State contends that the only issue with regard to the admissibility of
Mata's statement is whether Mata was subject to improper custodial interrogation
in violation of his privilege against self- incrimination under the United
States and Texas Constitutions and in violation of the then applicable juvenile
confession statute, section 51.09 of the Family Code, and whether the statement
was involuntary under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
due course of law provision in Article I, Sections 13 and 19 of the Texas
Constitution.
We agree with the State that the scope of the issue before us as it relates to
the admissibility of Mata's statement is limited. The Court of Criminal Appeals
has held that until transfer from juvenile court jurisdiction is ordered, issues
involving substantive rights of pre-transfer juveniles, such as the
admissibility of statements, are controlled by the applicable provisions of the
Family Code even when they are raised in a criminal forum. See Griffin v. State,
765 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Kendrick v. State, 942 S.W.2d 120, 122
(Tex.App.--Beaumont 1997, no pet.). Therefore, articles 38.22 and 38.23 are not
relevant in determining the admissibility of Mata's statement. No challenge to
the statement's admissibility was made before the trial court based on sections
52.02 and 52.025 of the Family Code, and no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached. See Guidry v. State, 1999 WL 1144826, at *4-5 (Tex.Crim.App. Dec. 15,
1999) (Sixth Amendment right does not attach until adversarial proceedings
initiated).
The focus of Mata's brief and the argument at the suppression hearing was
whether Mata was in custody at the time he made his statement. If Mata was not
in custody, his statutory and constitutional rights were not violated, and the
trial court properly admitted his statement into evidence. Courts employ a
two-step analysis to determine whether an individual is in custody. See In re
M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d 319, 323 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.). First, all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation must be examined to determine
whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement to the
degree associated with a formal arrest. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 322 (1994); In re M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323. This initial determination
focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the individual
being questioned. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323; In re M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323.
Second, a court considers whether, in light of the given circumstances, a
reasonable person would have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); In re
M.R.R., 2 S.W.3d at 323. Traditionally, courts considered four factors in making
this determination: (1) whether probable cause to arrest existed at the time of
questioning; (2) the subjective intent of the police; (3) the focus of the
investigation; and (4) the subjective belief of the defendant. In re M.R.R., 2
S.W.3d at 323. Under Stansbury, however, the subjective intent of both the
police and the defendant are irrelevant except to the extent that they may be
manifested in the words or actions of the investigating officials. Id. The
custody determination is based entirely upon objective circumstances. Id.
Stationhouse questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody. Id.
Neither does being the focus of the investigation. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324;
Snow v. State, 994 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
Even a clear statement by an officer that the person under interrogation is the
prime suspect is not in itself dispositive of the custody issue, for some
suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest. Id.
at 324-26; Snow v. State, 994 S.W.2d at 741. Rather, a person is considered in
custody only if, based upon the objective circumstances, a reasonable person
would believe he was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Id. at 322-24; Snow v. State, 994 S.W.2d at 741.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has outlined four situations which may constitute
custody: (1) when the suspect's freedom of action is physically deprived in any
significant way; (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he
cannot leave; (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would
lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been
significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law
enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Dowthitt
v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). In reviewing a trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford almost total deference to the trial
court's determination of historical facts and view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's ruling; however, we review the trial court's
application of the law to the facts de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
87-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
Two detectives testified at the suppression hearing. Detective Mendoza testified
that two days after Rogelio Lopez's murder, Loco was shot at across the street
from the murder location. Loco identified Mata as the shooter. Officer Johnson
went to Mata's house and obtained his mother's permission to search. He searched
a car parked in front of the house. Officer Johnson then spoke with Detective
Mendoza, who was investigating Rogelio Lopez's murder. At that time, Detective
Mendoza was investigating the possibility that the shooting of Rogelio Lopez was
mistaken identity and that the intended target was across the street. Prior to
being contacted by Officer Johnson, Detective Mendoza found a disturbance in the
police records involving Loco, and Mata was listed as a suspect. Detective
Mendoza began investigating whether the two incidents were related and decided
to talk with Mata. Detective Mendoza asked Officer Johnson to have an officer
watch Mata's house from a distance.
Detective Mendoza and Detective Hernandez, together with a uniformed police
officer, went to Mata's house. Mata was not home, but his sister went to get
him. Mata arrived home ten minutes later, and Detective Mendoza advised him that
they were investigating a shooting in which he had been named the shooter.
Detective Mendoza advised Mata that he was not under arrest. He asked Mata
whether he would come down to the station. He advised Mata, his mother, his
sisters and his cousin that he wanted to talk with them. They consented to going
to the station. Detective Mendoza then asked for permission to search the house,
which Mata's mother gave. After the search was completed, Mata rode to the
station with his mother.
Upon arriving at the station, Mata, his mother, his sisters and his cousin were
separated. Detective Mendoza asked Detective Moffitt to assist in taking Mata's
statement. Moffitt advised Mata that he was not under arrest and that he wanted
to talk to him about the shootings. After Moffitt spoke with Mata for
approximately an hour, he wanted to begin taking the statement. Moffitt asked
Mata if he objected to his mother being present during the questioning. Mata did
not object, so Moffitt asked Mata's mother to come into the room. After the
statement was taken, Moffitt had Mata and his mother review it for changes. Mata
made a few changes and signed the statement. Mata left with his mother.
Mata's mother also testified at the suppression hearing. She stated that the
detectives and officers told her when they arrived that they had a warrant for
Mata. She further stated that they proceeded to search Mata and his room without
her consent. After the search, they told her to sign a paper indicating that she
consented to the search or they would obtain a warrant. Mata's mother stated
that Mata was never told that he was not under arrest. She testified that she
believed that they were required to go downtown with the officers because one of
the officers threatened to tell her parole officer that she was uncooperative.
Mata's mother stated that she was not allowed to be present in the room during
Mata's questioning until after she gave her statement.
It was within the trial judge's province to evaluate the credibility of the
various witnesses. Based on the trial judge's ruling, we presume that she
believed the officers. The officers stated that Mata was advised that he was not
under arrest. He voluntarily agreed to accompany them to the station and was
permitted to ride to the station with his mother. While the officers took Mata's
statement, his mother was permitted to be present. Mata and his mother were
given the opportunity to review the statement and make changes. Mata left the
station with his mother. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial
court's conclusion that Mata was not in custody; therefore, his statement was
properly admitted. Mata's third point of error is overruled.