By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence is sufficient to support removal
from home findings; judge’s remarks were not a comment on failure to testify
(00-3-10)
On February 9, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the evidence
supported the juvenile court’s removal from home findings and commitment to
the TYC for two offenses of aggravated sexual assault. It also held that the
judge’s remarks to the juvenile at disposition did not constitute a comment on
the juvenile’s failure to testify in the trial.
00-3-10. In the Matter of C.Y., UNPUBLISHED, No. 04-99-00157-CV, 2000 WL 799075,
2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2/9/00)[Texas Juvenile Law 179 (4th
Edition 1996)].
Facts: Following C.Y.'s plea of true to the State's allegations of two counts of
aggravated sexual assault, the juvenile court committed C.Y. to the custody of
the Texas Youth Commission for a determinative term of three years. C.Y. appeals
his commitment in three issues. In his first issue, C.Y. contends the juvenile
court abused its discretion in assessing the disposition. In his second issue,
he alleges his plea was involuntary. In his third issue, C.Y. argues the
juvenile court improperly exercised its discretion in committing him to the
Texas Youth Commission.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Improper Judicial Comment
In his first issue, C.Y. claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in
assessing the disposition in his case. Specifically, he claims the juvenile
court improperly considered his silence in drawing its conclusions about the
appropriate disposition and therefore violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. However, the record does not affirmatively reflect that the
juvenile court considered C.Y.'s refusal to testify in assessing the
disposition. At the disposition hearing the juvenile court stated:
The Court has already found, [C.Y.], there is a need for disposition in the case
for your rehabilitation and for the protection of the public. Nothing was told
to the Court that would explain why you might commit such reprehensible conduct,
to rape two boys by force.
C.Y. interprets this statement to be a comment on his refusal to testify.
However, C.Y.'s mother, as well as his probation officer, both testified during
the disposition hearing. C.Y.'s probation officer, Jason O'Toole, primarily
testified about how cooperative C.Y.'s family had been, C.Y.'s behavior, and
O'Toole's belief that those offenses for which C.Y. was charged were isolated
events that were unlikely to happen again. He further testified that the
Juvenile Probation Department had excellent resources to provide C.Y. with the
help and guidance he needed and that he believed C.Y.'s rehabilitative needs
would best be met through placement on probation with intensive supervision.
C.Y.'s mother's testimony largely focused on her ability to provide C.Y. with
appropriate supervision as well as her desire to cooperate fully with the court.
In light of both O'Toole's and C.Y.'s mother's testimony, the juvenile court's
remarks reasonably can be interpreted to be in relation to his mother's and
probation officer's failure to provide any explanation, or to offer any
circumstances that might have compelled C.Y. to commit such offenses. Cf.
Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223, 225 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (stating that in order
for a prosecutor's comment on the failure of an accused to testify to be
reversible error, "it is not sufficient that the language might be
construed as an implied or indirect allusion thereto").
Involuntary Plea
In his second issue, C.Y. contends his plea of true was involuntary.
Specifically, C.Y. asserts that the juvenile court, in assessing the
disposition, considered C.Y.'s failure to testify and therefore did not
contemplate the full range of punishment.
The Texas Family Code provides that the "disposition hearing shall be
separate, distinct, and subsequent to the adjudication hearing."
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(a). It was during the separate adjudication hearing
that C.Y. pled true to the allegations of aggravated sexual assault. At the
adjudication hearing he was properly admonished in conformity with the Texas
Family Code and there is no indication, nor does C.Y. allege, that his plea was
involuntary at that point. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(b). The juvenile
court's comment, about which C.Y. complains, was made during the subsequent
disposition hearing and there is no evidence to show how that statement rendered
C.Y.'s plea involuntary. We overrule C.Y.'s second issue.
Abuse of Discretion
In his third issue, C.Y. submits that the juvenile court's findings were not
supported by sufficient evidence and therefore the juvenile court abused its
discretion in committing him to the Texas Youth Commission. Once a child has
been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior, the juvenile court
retains broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition of that
child. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(c), (d) (Vernon 1999); In the Matter of
T.K.E., 5 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.). Accordingly,
we will not disturb the juvenile court's findings regarding disposition absent a
clear abuse of discretion. See T.K.E., 5 S.W.3d at 784. A juvenile court abuses
its discretion when its actions are arbitrary, unreasonable, or without
reference to guiding principles of law. See In the Matter of T.A.F., 977 S.W.2d
387, 387 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
The Texas Family Code counsels a juvenile court's disposition in a juvenile
case, directing the juvenile court to include in its order a determination that:
(1) it is in the child's best interest to be placed outside of the child's home;
(2) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the
child's removal from the home; and (3) while in the home, the child cannot be
provided with the necessary support and supervision to meet the conditions of
probation. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(i) (Vernon 1999); In re J.S., 993 S.W.2d
370, 372 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.). Therefore, when the
sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a juvenile case, we must review the
evidence to determine whether the juvenile court followed these guiding rules
and principles.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that supports the
juvenile court's disposition in a juvenile case, we employ the civil standard of
review. See T.K.E., 5 S.W.3d at 785. Accordingly, in reviewing C.Y.'s legal
sufficiency claim we consider only the evidence and inferences that tend to
support the finding and set aside the judgment only when there is no probative
evidence to support the findings. See id. In reviewing C.Y.'s factual
sufficiency challenge, we evaluate all the evidence and set aside the judgment
only where the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See id.; see also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d
175, 176 (Tex.1986).
The limited evidence before us supports the juvenile court's findings. At the
disposition hearing, the juvenile court had before it C.Y.'s admission that he
sexually assaulted the two complainants, and a police report, which detailed the
forceful nature of C.Y.'s actions as well as C.Y.'s and his mother's failure to
cooperate with the police in the early stages of their investigation. Despite
C.Y.'s mother's statements that she would cooperate with the court, and C.Y.'s
probation officer's recommendation that he receive probation, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in placing C.Y. in the Texas Youth Commission for a
determinative term. After considering the evidence before it, the juvenile court
could have reasonably found that although reasonable efforts were made to
eliminate the need to place C.Y. outside the home, C.Y. would not have been
provided with the necessary supervision and guidance he needed, and that it was
therefore in his best interest to be placed outside the home. We find the
evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's
placement of C.Y. in the Texas Youth Commission. We overrule C.Y.'s third issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled C.Y.'s three issues, we affirm the juvenile court's
disposition.