By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Stolen bicycle parts in juvenile’s
apartment admissible to show intent to deprive in bicycle robbery case (00-3-15)
On July 5, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that stolen bicycle
parts were admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b) to show intent to deprive the
owner of his property in a trial for bicycle robbery.
00-3-15. In the Matter of C.D., UNPUBLISHED, No. 04-99-00092-CV, 2000 WL 924628,
2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—San Antonio 7/5/00)[Texas Juvenile Law 172
(4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: A jury adjudicated C.D. of engaging in delinquent conduct for committing
robbery. The court placed C.D. on probation for one year. In two points of
error, C.D. challenges an evidentiary ruling and the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's finding of delinquent conduct.
Although the underlying facts for July 9, 1998 are not in dispute, the parties
differ as to their interpretation of that day's events. According to the
complainant, he was riding his bicycle when he was approached by C.D., C.D.'s
brother, Kevin, and C.D.'s friend, Richard. C.D. and friends, also on bicycles,
rode up to the complainant and asked him if he would be interested in trading
bicycles with Richard. After indicating he had no interest, C.D. threatened the
complainant that he "would get jacked" if he did not do so. The
complainant once again stated that he did not want to trade his bicycle. C.D.
and Richard got off of their bicycles and grabbed the complainant's handle bars.
The complainant testified that C.D. and Richard grabbed his arms, squeezed them
with enough pressure to leave red marks, and restated their threat to beat him
up if he did not turn over his bicycle. The complainant complied with C.D.'s
demand out of fear of being beaten up by the three boys.
By contrast, C.D. denies that he or the other boys threatened the complainant.
C.D. alleged that the complainant misunderstood the general nature of the boys'
conversation. According to C.D., the complainant misunderstood the fact that
C.D. and his friends were only joking about "jacking" the complainant.
C.D. testified that he and his friends were riding their bicycles when they ran
into the complainant. C.D. explained that they began to joke with the
complainant and asked if he would be interested in trading bicycles with
Richard. During the course of this conversation, C.D. and Richard got off of
their bicycles and took hold of the complainant's handlebars. C.D. testified
that he told the complainant "in a playful manner" to trade bicycles
with Richard or get "jacked." To C.D.'s surprise, the complainant got
off of his bicycle and walked away. C.D. testified that he and Kevin attempted
to return the complainant's bicycle to him, explaining that they were only
joking. According to C.D., the complainant refused his bicycle, leaving it in
Richard's possession. Thus, C.D. contends the complainant voluntarily
relinquished his bicycle.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
In his first point of error, C.D. argues the trial court erred in allowing the
State to admit into evidence a box of bicycle parts found in his apartment. C.D.
contends that because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he committed the extraneous offense of stealing these parts, the evidence is
inadmissable under Tex.R.Evid. 404(b). C.D. argues, alternatively, that even if
this evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), it should be excluded because it
is highly prejudicial. We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility
of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Moreno v. State, 961 S.W.2d
512, 513 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, pet. ref'd). This court will not disturb
the trial court's ruling so long as it is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.
As a preliminary matter, the State contends that C.D. waived his right to
challenge the admissibility of this evidence. The State argues that because C.D.
objected only to the relevancy of the bicycle part evidence, he is limited to
complaining only about relevancy on appeal. We disagree. Prior to the State's
use of the evidence, C.D. requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury
to discuss the admissibility of the bicycle part evidence. C.D. argued that any
bicycle parts not belonging to the complainant constituted evidence of
extraneous bad acts, which unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt, is
inadmissable. C.D.'s argument clearly demonstrates that he opposed the admission
of this particular evidence and that the trial court was on notice of his
objection. Accordingly, we find that C.D. properly preserved his right to
challenge the admission of this evidence. See Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949,
957-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). We turn then to the merits of C.D.'s complaint.
The facts at issue in C.D.'s first point of error involve a box of bicycle parts
confiscated from C.D.'s apartment. During their search for the complainant's
missing bicycle, investigators found an assortment of bicycle parts scattered
throughout C.D.'s apartment. Upon learning that these bicycle parts did not
belong to C.D. or his family, investigators confiscated the parts. At trial, the
State offered these bicycle parts to prove C.D.'s intent at the time of the
alleged incident. Initially, the State argued that the bicycle parts,
particularly those found within C.D.'s own room, were relevant to show his
adeptness for dismantling bicycles. On appeal, the State contends that C.D.'s
skill for dismantling bicycles is relevant because the complainant's bicycle was
discovered in a dismantled state within an hour of being taken from him. The
State further contends that the dismantling of the complainant's bicycle is
relevant to C.D.'s intent because it shows his intent not to return the
complainant's bicycle once dismantled, thus contradicting C.D.'s claim that the
whole incident was a joke. According to the State, nothing about its use of the
evidence directly indicates that C.D. stole any of these bicycle parts,
therefore Rule 404(b) is not implicated.
C.D., on the other hand, argues that the State could not use the bicycle part
evidence because it constitutes extraneous offense evidence. According to C.D.,
extraneous offenses cannot be admitted unless the State first proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that C.D. committed the extraneous offenses. Then, if the State
meets that burden, the evidence is admissible only if the State proves that the
evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. According to C.D.,
the State failed to prove either of these requirements. C.D. argues that neither
the testimony at the preliminary hearing nor the testimony at his trial prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the extraneous offenses. C.D.
contends that because the bicycle part evidence dominated the trial and led to
his conviction, the lower court committed reversible error in admitting the
evidence.
In response to C.D.'s argument, the State argues that even if Rule 404(b) is
implicated by its use of the evidence, it may introduce extraneous offenses to
prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. In addition, the State contends that a party is
also entitled to use extraneous offense evidence to rebut a defensive theory.
According to the State, the bicycle part evidence took on new significance when
C.D. and his brother testified as to the character of the bicycle parts. When
the boys testified that they had received all of their bicycles as gifts, the
State had the right to rebut the boys' character testimony and prove otherwise.
The State also contends that a rational trier of fact could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that C.D. stole the bicycle parts at issue. This
conclusion, according to the State, can be reached because evidence presented at
trial indicated that: bicycle parts were found in C.D.'s bedroom; a bicycle
previously stolen from the complainant was in C.D.'s apartment; C.D. played a
major role in the robbery of the complainant on July 9, 1998; C.D. was known to
steal bicycles; the complainant's bicycle was found in a dismantled state in one
of C.D.'s friend's apartments shortly after the robbery; and finally, C.D.
denied any knowledge of where the bicycle parts within his apartment came from.
Accordingly, such evidence could permit a rational trier of fact to conclude
that C.D. stole the bicycle parts in question.
Finally, the State contends that even if the trial court erred by admitting the
bicycle parts into evidence, its admission did not affect C.D.'s substantial
rights. Moreover, the State argues that if the lower court committed any
constitutional error, such error was harmless. Case law supports the State's
position.
Regardless of whether the State actually demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt
that C.D. committed the extraneous offenses, or if it could use such evidence to
rebut a defensive theory, the evidence is still admissible. See Tex.R.Evid.
404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of other wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity with that character. Id. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. Therefore, under the
Texas Rules of Evidence, the State could use the bicycle part evidence to show
C.D.'s intent to deprive the complainant of his bicycle. Such use, however, will
be permissible as long as the evidence's probative value substantially outweighs
its prejudicial effect. See id.; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 383, 387
(Tex.Crim.App.1990). Additionally, the evidence must logically serve to make
"more probable or less probable" an elemental fact, or serve to make
"more probable or less probable" an evidentiary fact that
inferentially leads to an elemental fact, or serve to make "more or less
probable" defensive evidence that undermines an elemental fact to be
admissible. Montogomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387.
In Darby v. State, the court held that extraneous offenses can be admitted to
show motive or illustrate intent where it cannot be inferred from an act. 922
S.W.2d 614, 621 622 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). There, the
appellant, masquerading as a photographer, convinced a thirteen year old girl to
pose for a video he wanted to shoot. Id. at 617. During a photograph session
with the appellant, the girl's mother left her alone with the
"photographer" for approximately fifteen minutes. Id. According to the
girl, upon her mother's departure, the appellant allegedly touched her breasts
and vagina. Id. The appellant denied the accusations and argued that the girl
took offense when he tried to adjust her bra strap for the photos he was posing.
Id. At trial, the jury disregarded the appellant's testimony and convicted him
of indecency with a child by sexual contact. Id. at 614.
During appellant's trial, the State offered a magazine depicting young girls in
sexually explicit poses to prove appellant's intent at the time of the alleged
incident. Id. at 618-19. The trial court admitted this evidence over appellant's
objections that the magazine was not relevant to his intent to commit the
charged offense. Id. at 619. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
ruling, holding that affirmative circumstantial links between the magazine,
appellant, and the charged offense could be established. Id. at 620.
Similarly, in the present case, the evidence at issue circumstantially
establishes C.D.'s intent at the time of the alleged incident. The bicycle parts
found in C.D.'s apartment logically serve to make it more probable that C.D.
intended to deprive the complainant of his bicycle. Within an hour of their
encounter with the complainant, the boys had his bicycle dismantled. Parts of
the bicycle were found in the apartment where the boys dismantled it, as well as
in C.D.'s apartment. In all likelihood, C.D.'s conduct would have prevented the
complainant from ever recovering his bicycle. Accordingly, the evidence at issue
constitutes an affirmative link to establishing C.D.'s intent at the time of the
incident.
Having found that the bicycle part evidence had an evidentiary purpose under
Rule 404(b), we turn our attention to whether the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs its prejudice. In our analysis of the
evidence's probative value, we will analyze three factors: the probative effect
of the evidence; the potential for unfair prejudice; and the proponent's need to
introduce the extraneous offense. Garcia v. State, 893 S.W.2d 17, 20-21 (Tex.App.--Corpus
Christi 1994, no pet.). With regard to the bicycle part's probative value, the
trial court implicitly found that this evidence makes it more probable that C.D.
had the requisite intent to commit robbery. Unless we find, and we do not, that
the trial court abused its discretion, we must defer to the trial judge's
determination on the issue of relevance. Id. Next, we must determine whether the
jury drew an impermissible character inference from the evidence which led it to
convict C.D. Id. In other words, we must decide if the jury convicted C.D. on a
moral or emotional basis rather than on a reasoned response to the relevant
evidence. Id. Nothing about the State's initial use of the evidence indicates
that the bicycle parts were stolen. It was only after C.D. testified as to the
character of the bicycle parts that a reasonable person could infer that the
parts may be stolen. In addition, the trial judge required the parties to
refrain from referring to the evidence as "stolen" during the
proceeding. This prevented the parties from posing to the jury that C.D. may
have stolen bicycles in the past. Finally, with regard to the State's need for
the evidence, we conclude that the State had a compelling need. Because C.D.
contended that the nature of the boys' encounter was one of jest, the State
needed the evidence to contradict this argument and establish C.D.'s true
intent.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion when
it admitted the confiscated bicycle parts into evidence. Point of error number
one is overruled.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In C.D's second point of error, he contends the evidence does not legally or
factually support the jury's finding that he engaged in delinquent conduct.
Generally, in order to preserve one's right to challenge both the legal and
factual sufficiency of evidence, the appellant must argue each claim separately.
See McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
844 (1997). Here, C.D. failed to do this. Although C.D. has not properly
preserved his factual sufficiency claim, we will consider C.D.'s argument in the
interest of justice.
When reviewing a legal sufficiency claim in a juvenile proceeding, we shall
apply the criminal standard of review. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19
(1979); In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1997, no writ). This
court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and also
determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of
the requirement proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d at 858.
The State had the burden to prove the elements of robbery beyond a reasonable
doubt. These elements include: (1) in the course of committing theft; (2) and
with the intent to obtain or maintain control of the property; (3) one
intentionally or knowingly; (4) threatens; or (5) places another in fear of
imminent bodily injury or death. Tex.Pen.Code Ann. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 1994).
For this final requirement, the fear had to be of such nature that in reason and
common experience was likely to induce a person to part with his property
against his will. Wilmeth v. State, 808 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1991,
no pet.). We are mindful as we review the evidence of these factors that the
jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Williams v. State,
827 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). The jury
determines the weight to be placed upon the given testimony and it reconciles
any conflicts in the evidence. Macri v. State, 12 S.W .3d 505, 507 (Tex.App.--San
Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd ). This court does not re-weigh the evidence when it
reviews the lower court's decision, even if the jury believed a witness whose
testimony was contradicted. See Williams, 827 S.W.2d at 616.
C.D. contends the State failed to show his conduct put the complainant in fear
of imminent bodily injury or death as required by the Penal Code. We disagree.
The testimony offered by the parties on this issue was disputed. Most notably,
the jury was presented with two contrasting versions of the nature of the boys'
interaction. As noted, C.D. indicated that the demand for the complainant's
bicycle was a joke. By contrast, the complainant testified that C.D. and his
friends used verbal threats, as well as physical force, to steal his bicycle.
Thus, whether the interaction was based upon jest was a question for the jury to
decide. Macri, 12 S.W.3d at 507. C.D. and his friends testified that they were
only "joking" with the complainant when they made comments about
"jacking" him, and that they took the complainant's bicycle only after
he left it on the ground and could not be coaxed back into returning for it.
Moreover, C.D. and his friends adamantly denied complainant's accusations about
their use of physical force against him. The jury, as fact finder, was free to
disregard this testimony if it so chose. Id. Likewise, the jury was free to
conclude that C.D.'s conduct would have put any reasonable person in fear of
imminent bodily injury or death. Id. The jury could believe that a person
surrounded by three other individuals, making verbal threats and physically
holding that lone individual's wrists, would be in fear for his own safety.
Thus, in a situation similar to the present one, it is reasonable to conclude
that a person would part with his personal property in order to protect himself
from harm.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we
find that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that C.D. committed robbery.
Turning to whether the State's evidence was factually sufficient to support
C.D.'s conviction, we shall consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside
the judgment only if the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In re A.C., 949 S.W.2d
388, 390 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ). Considering all of the evidence,
while being appropriately deferential to the determination of the jury, we
cannot say that the verdict is manifestly unjust. C.D.'s second point of error
is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.