By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Claim of underage in criminal proceedings
waived by failing to object before trial; criminal court can revoke community
supervision for offense committed while defendant was a juvenile (00-3-17)
On July 13, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that
failure of the defendant to object to being proceeded against in criminal court
for an offense committed while a juvenile without a juvenile court certification
waived that claim under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 4.18. The court also
held that adult probation can be revoked for an offense committed by the
probationer while a juvenile.
00-3-17. Pratt v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 14-99-00162-CR, 2000 WL 963530, 2000
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 7/13/00)[Texas Juvenile Law 27
(4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: Melvin Lee Pratt was charged with the felony offense of delivery of a
controlled substance. Appellant entered a plea of guilty in accordance with a
plea bargain. The trial court assessed punishment at three years probation. The
State filed a motion to revoke appellant's probation, claiming that appellant
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. After finding the
allegations in the State's motion to revoke to be true, the trial court revoked
appellant's probation and assessed punishment at confinement for one year in the
State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In two points
of error, appellant alleges that (1) the trial court erred in denying
appellant's motion in bar of prosecution, and (2) the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over appellant. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
On August 11, 1998, appellant, under the name of Michael Demond Chapman, was
charged in district court with the delivery of a controlled substance. Appellant
claimed his date of birth as October 8, 1980, which meant he could stand trial
as an adult. On August 13, 1998, appellant pleaded guilty, and the trial court
placed him on three years deferred adjudication probation. Appellant's true name
is Melvin Lee Pratt, and his true date of birth is November 8, 1981. At no time
did appellant inform the trial court of his correct name or that he was a
juvenile.
On September 3, 1998, appellant committed another offense of delivery of a
controlled substance. This time, appellant gave his correct name and identified
himself as a juvenile. The juvenile court certified appellant as an adult and
waived its jurisdiction on September 29, 1998. The 209 th District court then
heard the case. On October 6, 1998, appellant plead guilty and received three
years probation. The trial court made probation contingent on appellant's
compliance with certain enumerated conditions. One of these conditions was that
appellant would commit no offense against the laws of Texas or of the United
States.
Appellant was subsequently arrested on October 23, 1998, for evading detention,
an offense against the laws of Texas. Accordingly, the State filed a motion to
revoke probation with the district court. Appellant now contends that the use of
the offense of evading detention to revoke his probation amounted to a
prosecution by the district court. As such, appellant argues that the district
court was barred from revoking his probation because the juvenile court had not
waived its jurisdiction with respect to the offense of evading detention.
Appellant also contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the August 1998 case because appellant was a juvenile at the time.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: POINT OF ERROR ONE
By point of error one, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying
appellant's motion in bar of prosecution. Appellant claims that the juvenile
court did not waive jurisdiction over the offense of evading arrest, and,
therefore, the district court could not revoke probation based on that offense.
We note that appellant cites no authority in support of his conclusion that a
trial court cannot revoke a defendant's probation if the basis of the revocation
was an offense committed while defendant was a minor. Accordingly, appellant has
waived any error. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Smith v. State, 907 S.W.2d 522, 532
(Tex.Crim.App.1995).
However, in the interest of justice we will exercise our discretion and address
the merits of this point. A trial court retains continuing jurisdiction over a
defendant's probation pursuant to Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 10(a)
(Vernon Supp.2000). Appellant acknowledges that the juvenile court waived its
jurisdiction and that the 209 th District Court had jurisdiction to hear the
case. Since jurisdiction was properly with the district court, the court also
had jurisdiction to revoke appellant's probation based upon appellant's
commission of an offense against the laws of the State of Texas. See, e.g.,
Harris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (trial court retains its
jurisdiction to revoke probation if a motion to revoke was filed and a capias or
arrest warrant issued before the probationary period expired). Appellant does
not claim that the State failed to file a motion to revoke or that the State
failed to issue an arrest warrant before the probationary period expired. Thus,
the 209 th District Court retained jurisdiction over the case. While the order
revoking community supervision came from the 248 th District court, jurisdiction
of the case may be transferred to a court of the same rank having geographical
jurisdiction where the defendant is residing or where a violation of the
conditions of community supervision occurs. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
42.12 § 10(b) (Vernon Supp.2000). Because we find that the district court
retained jurisdiction over appellant's probation, we overrule appellant's point
of error one.
POINT OF ERROR TWO
Appellant cites to Bannister v. State, 552 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) to
support his position that the trial court in the first delivery case lacked
jurisdiction. Bannister dealt with a similar fact situation to the case at bar.
In Bannister, the defendant "played the game of 'courts' and won."
Bannister, 552 S.W.2d at 125. Using a false name, and leading her attorney and
the trial court to believe she was 19 years old or older, the defendant pleaded
guilty to the burglary of a habitation and received probation. At the time of
revocation of probation, Bannister proved that she was 15 years old at the time
of the guilty plea and was presently 18 years old. Upon review, it was held that
neither the juvenile court nor the district court had jurisdiction over her in
view of the Family Code provisions and section 8.07 of the 1974 Penal Code. See
id. at 130.
However, the State correctly asserts that such a result is obviated by article
4.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 4.18 was added to the Code of
Criminal Procedure to overcome the holding in Bannister, which read 1974 Penal
Code provisions in light of the juvenile court's jurisdiction under the Family
Code. See Light v. State, 993 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. granted);
Robert O. Dawson, Texas Juvenile Law: An Analysis of Juvenile Statutory and Case
Law For Texas Juvenile Justice Officials, Ch. 3, pp. 25-27 (4th Ed.1996); George
E. Dix and Robert O. Dawson, Criminal Practice and Procedure, § 45.91 at 489-90
(Texas Practice 1995).
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 4.18 (Vernon Supp.2000) provides in part:
(a) A claim that a district court or criminal district court does not have
jurisdiction over a person because jurisdiction is exclusively in the juvenile
court and that the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under Section
8.07(a), Penal Code, or did not waive jurisdiction under Section 8.07(b), Penal
Code, must be made by written motion in bar of prosecution filed with the court
in which criminal charges against the person are filed.
(b) The motion must be filed and presented to the presiding judge of the court:
(1) if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or no contest, before the plea;
(2) if the defendant's guilt or punishment is tried or determined by a jury,
before selection of the jury begins; or
(3) if the defendant's guilt is tried by the court, before the first witness is
sworn.
(c) Unless the motion is not contested, the presiding judge shall promptly
conduct a hearing without a jury and rule on the motion. The party making the
motion has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence those
facts necessary for the motion to prevail.
(d) A person may not contest the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction if:
(1) the person does not file a motion within the time requirements of this
article; or
(2) the presiding judge finds under Subsection (c) that a motion made under this
article does not prevail.
Appellant never challenged the trial court's jurisdiction under art. 4.18, but
instead entered a plea of guilty. He therefore waived any challenge as to the
court's jurisdiction. See generally Miller v. State, 981 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.App.-Texarkana
1998, pet. ref'd) (Because defendant failed to comply with the statutory
requirements of article 4.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, he did not
preserve for appeal his claim that the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction
and subsequent transfer of the case was void.). Because appellant failed to
comply with the requirements of art. 4.18, he failed to preserve any complaint
for appeal. We overrule point of error two and affirm the judgment of the trial
court.