By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence sufficient to support juvenile
court's finding that respondent was mentally responsible for conduct (00-3-20)
Respondent was adjudicated delinquent for carrying a loaded handgun to
elementary student while a student at the age of 10. He was also adjudicated for
terroristic threat and aggravated assault. In the adjudication hearing, the
judge rejected the defense of lack of responsibility because of mental illness.
The Court of Appeals upheld that decision.
00-3-20. In the Matter of L.J.G., UNPUBLISHED, No. 03-99-00412-CV, 2000 WL
963163, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.--Austin 7/13/00) [Texas Juvenile Law
... (4th Ed. 1996)].
Facts: The district court, sitting as juvenile court, found that juvenile
appellant L.J.G. engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of
aggravated assault and two counts of the offense of terroristic threat. See
Tex.Penal Code Ann. ss 22.02, .07 (West 1994); Tex.Fam.Code Ann. s 51.03 (West
Supp.2000). In four issues, L.J.G. appeals.
On or about October 15, 1998, appellant L.J.G. was ten years old and in the
fifth grade at an Austin elementary school. At the beginning of the school day,
appellant asked a male classmate, B.C., if he wanted to join a club and kill
people. B.C. asked appellant why he was asking and if he had a gun. Appellant
replied affirmatively, unzipped his backpack, and showed B.C. a gun inside
Appellant and B.C. sat in a square, four-desk arrangement with two female
classmates, S.F. and K.C. The girls heard the boys talking, and B.C. asked
appellant if he could tell the girls what they were talking about. Appellant
agreed, and B.C. told the girls that appellant had a gun. One girl asked
appellant why he had a gun. S.F. and B.C. testified that appellant said he was
going to take the class hostage. B.C. and K.C. testified that appellant said he
would shoot anyone who tried to stop him.
B.C. told appellant that he was going to tell the teacher. Appellant warned B.C.
that if he did so, appellant would shoot him. At some point, B.C. got up to go
tell the teacher. B.C. testified that appellant then began to remove the gun
from the backpack and that B.C. sat back down. B.C. later got up to get a drink
of water. Appellant followed B.C. around the room. K.C. said that appellant had
his hand under his shirt and that she thought he had the gun in that hand. B.C.
testified that appellant did have the gun in his hand and was pointing it at
B.C. When B.C. again returned to his seat, appellant returned the gun to the
backpack. K.C. said she saw appellant putting the gun back in his pack and that
he gave her a threatening look.
Shortly thereafter, the two girls met at the water fountain and agreed that they
must tell their teacher. The girls went to the teacher and told her that
appellant had a gun in his backpack. The teacher testified that she could tell
from the girls' demeanor that they were serious. The teacher sent the girls back
to their seats and announced to the class that anyone who still had a backpack
needed to put it away in the closet in accordance with classroom rules.
B.C. testified that appellant looked sad and angry when told to put the backpack
away and that appellant hesitated before doing so. S.F. testified that appellant
seemed nervous and was shaking and that when appellant returned from putting the
pack in the closet, he was crying and said he did not want to go to jail. B.C.
also testified that appellant was crying and said he did not want to go to jail
and that appellant also said that he thought he was disturbed.
After appellant placed his backpack in the closet, the teacher called the
school's assistant principal who came to the classroom and asked appellant to
get his backpack and come with her outside. The assistant principal asked the
teacher to go with them as a witness. Outside, the assistant principal asked
appellant if he had brought something to school that he should not have, and
appellant said yes. She asked appellant if she could see what it was. Appellant
unzipped the pocket of the backpack, and both the teacher and the principal saw
a gun. Appellant's eyes became red, as though he were about to cry, and he told
the school officials that the gun was a toy. The assistant principal told
appellant he would have to go to the office and that his parents would be
notified.
In the office, the assistant principal took the gun out of the backpack and told
appellant it seemed too heavy to be a toy. Appellant admitted that the gun was
not a toy. The assistant principal returned the gun to the backpack and placed
the pack in the school vault. She then conferred with the school principal who
told her to notify the Austin Independent School District Police.
While waiting for the police, the assistant principal asked appellant why he had
brought the gun to school. Appellant said he could not tell her but agreed to
write it down. Appellant wrote the following note, which was admitted into
evidence.
It all started when I wanted to be a marine for the U.S.A. I couldn't become a
marine until I finished coll[e]ge. So I would daydream about becoming a soldier.
Then it hit me. Why did I have to be old. I was going to do something stupid and
drastic[;] I was going to get my father[']s gun and bluff the police. I was
going to ask for a list of terrorist group[s] and a vehic[ ]le with better
weapons. I was going to take down other terrorist groups with help. I won[']t
mention their names.
At some point after appellant began writing the note, he asked the assistant
principal whether he was disturbed. She replied that normal people do not bring
weapons to school, and appellant began to cry.
When the AISD officer arrived, he spoke briefly with the assistant principal and
then removed the gun from the vault. He described the gun as a Glock nine
millimeter semi-automatic and testified that it contained a clip with eleven
bullets and a twelfth bullet was in the chamber ready to be fired. The officer
testified that he went to appellant's classroom, where appellant's teacher gave
him an "electrical shocking device" that she had found in appellant's
desk. The officer arrested appellant and took him to Gardner Betts detention
facility, where intake personnel discovered another nine millimeter bullet in
appellant's pocket during a pat down and search.
On October 23, 1998, appellant was charged with engaging in delinquent conduct.
The petition alleged one count of possession of a weapon in a forbidden
location, i.e., a school. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. s 46.03 (West 1994);
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. s 51.03. The petition also included one count of aggravated
assault, relating to B.C. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. s 22.02; Tex.Fam.Code Ann. s
51.03. Finally, the petition alleged two counts of terroristic threat relating
to S.F. and K.C. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. s 22.07; Tex.Fam.Code Ann. s 51.03.
On the motions of both the State and appellant, the juvenile was evaluated by
psychiatrists. All of the doctors recognized that the juvenile was suffering
from some type of mental disorder at the time of the offense. In January 1999,
appellant filed a motion to establish his affirmative defense of lack of
responsibility for his conduct and requested that the court try the issue. See
Tex.Fam .Code Ann. s 55.05 (West 1996). [FN1] The issue of appellant's
responsibility was tried in conjunction with his adjudication on April 29 and
30, 1999.
FN1. The legislature recently made substantial revisions to Family Code Chapter
55 governing proceedings for juveniles with mental illness or mental
retardation. See Act of June 19, 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1477, s 14, eff. Sept. 1,
1999. Because the legislature explicitly stated that "the change in law
made by this Act applies only to conduct that occurs after the effective date of
this Act," we will apply the law as it existed prior to the revisions, and
all references to Chapter 55 will be to the former statute. Id. s 39(a).
During the course of the hearing, evidence was adduced indicating that appellant
had a fixation for weapons and the military, often reading books on the topics,
and that prior to the incident appellant's father had a number of weapons in the
family home, as well as books on the topics of warfare and weaponry. Expert
testimony indicated that appellant had notions of fighting terrorists and that
he suffered from some form of psychosis either as a result of severe depression
or due to the onset of schizophrenia. One expert testified that schizophrenics
often become fixated on their delusions and lose touch with their surroundings.
Appellant's teacher testified that prior to the incident, appellant was well
behaved and gave no indication of having any special needs.
In connection with appellant's claim of lack of legal responsibility for his
conduct, the juvenile court stated on the record, "I do not find from the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time you had the--you lacked
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness or to conform your conduct
to the requirements of the law." The court also stated on the record that
the State had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant "had a
mental capacity to violate Section 46.03 of the Penal Code by taking the weapon
to school." The court did find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
committed the two terroristic threats and the aggravated assault and rendered a
judgment on those counts.
Following the disposition hearing, the court ordered appellant to spend five
years' probation in the custody of his parents. The juvenile then filed this
appeal.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Appellant raises four issues on appeal. He contends that the trial
court erred by failing to find that he lacked legal responsibility for his
conduct. He further argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to
establish each of the three offenses of which he was adjudicated delinquent.
Responsibility for Conduct
Texas law provides that a child who is alleged to have engaged in delinquent
conduct "is not responsible for the conduct if at the time of the conduct,
as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." Tex.Fam.Code Ann. s 55.05.
Appellant acknowledges that the record contains some evidence suggesting that he
was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Appellant instead
focuses his attention and argument on the second prong of the test, contending
that the evidence shows his thought disorder was "the motivator and
orchestrator of his conduct ." In other words, appellant argues that he
established as a matter of law his lack of capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law or alternatively that the trial court's failure to find
that he lacked capacity is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.
We will review the record to determine whether it includes evidence establishing
that appellant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law
with respect to the behavior for which he was held responsible--i.e., the three
offenses for which he was adjudicated to have engaged in delinquent conduct.
We review a trial court's findings for legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence by the same standards as the evidence supporting a jury's answer. See
Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.1994); Circle C Child Dev. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 981 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex.App.-- Austin
1998, no pet.). When an appellant contends that a proposition on which he had
the burden that was not accepted was established as a matter of law, we first
examine the record for evidence that supports the ruling that was made, ignoring
all evidence to the contrary. See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686,
690 (Tex.1989); Circle C, 981 S.W.2d at 485. Only if there is no evidence
supporting the finding, do we then examine the entire record to determine if the
contrary proposition has been established as a matter of law. See Sterner, 767
S.W.2d at 690; Circle C, 981 S.W.2d at 485. In reviewing factual sufficiency, we
consider and weigh all of the evidence and will reverse the decision only if the
finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to
be manifestly unjust. See In re. C.C., 13 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.App.--Austin
2000, no pet.) (on rehearing) (citing In re K.L.C., 972 S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Tex.App.--Beaumont
1998, no pet.)).
Appellant had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, at
the time of the incident, he lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. We will first review the record to see whether it contains
any evidence that the juvenile had the capacity to control and conform his
conduct to the law he is charged with violating. We believe the following
evidence reflects some capacity to conform. However, assuming there is no
affirmative evidence of that fact, we believe the evidence does not support
appellant's contention that he proved as a matter of law that he lacked
capacity.
The following colloquy between the court and psychiatrist Emilie Becker occurred
near the end of the hearing. We believe it summarizes both the evidence and
reasoning that led to the court's ruling both on the lack of responsibility
issue and the alleged offenses.
THE COURT: The psychosis that one goes through, does that automatically make
them not capable of being held accountable or responsible for their actions or
changing their action?
THE WITNESS: No, ma'am. Schizophrenics commit crimes all the time and know
they're crimes.
THE COURT: Could they stop themselves?
THE WITNESS: Sometimes. I mean, it just depends if the crime is in response to a
delusion, it's harder. If the crime is not--because they're hungry and they
steal food, they still know it's wrong.
THE COURT: Is it possible for part of a crime to be part of a delusion, and
thereafter the rest of it be intentional?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Example, if it is true that God told the child to bring the gun to
school, and bringing the [gun] on a school campus, which is a crime--
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:--could he perhaps not be accountable for that crime?
THE WITNESS: If then he--
THE COURT: If he felt like that's what he had to do.
THE WITNESS: If he felt like God was telling him what he had to do, and he felt
the authority of God outweighs the authority of the school, then he was doing
what he thought was right.
THE COURT: And thereafter, however, if other acts of aggression, with no
indications of voices telling him to do--
THE WITNESS: Right.
THE COURT:--could that have been self-preservation?
THE WITNESS: Very well might have been.
THE COURT: And intentional.
THE WITNESS: And intentional. Oftentimes, these things are not cut and dry and
black and white, they're sort of commingled, and mental illnesses fluctuating--I
mean, can fluctuate within hours.
THE COURT: When a child is in a delusional state, such as we're talking about
here, to do the type of behavior we're talking about here, to do the type of
behavior we're talking about, would one expect any other exterior or factors to
manifest themselves, anything else, would any other abnormal behavior come out,
maybe in a little more withdrawn, maybe angry, anything?
THE WITNESS: Well, specifically, if it's in response to delusions, sometimes you
can get evidence of a delusion, Well, this is for God, or this is for my mother,
or letters or communications that are evidence that--
THE COURT: At the time.
THE WITNESS: At the time. It's--or at the time, or preceding it, or subsequent
to, or--I mean, I think the man continued to write letters to Jody Foster for
years after he was incarcerated. He didn't quite get it.
THE COURT: There's no doubt from the diagnosis that the child has psychosis or
some issues that ha[ve] to be dealt with, correct?
THE WITNESS: That's correct; or at least has had one.
THE COURT: It is also possible for a young man with his age and maturity, and
intellect, to be using that as an excuse for his behavior?
THE WITNESS: I think it's definitely possible.
THE COURT: You just don't know.
THE WITNESS: I just don't know. You know, what happened with this evaluation is,
I was sort of stun-felt [sic] into this. I really wasn't looking for it, and was
really just trying to do diagnosis and treatment, and my evaluation about
diagnosis led into the state about questioning--question about mental state.
THE COURT: Would it be normal for a client to give three different stories about
the timing of the voices to three different doctors?
THE WITNESS: If someone is hearing voices, they sometimes are--I mean, mentally
unstable, they all--they're not always consistent.
THE COURT: Even if they have become mentally stable through whatever medication?
THE WITNESS: You would expect more consistency with regard to the story as to
what happened.
THE COURT: They start becoming consistent?
THE WITNESS: Right. They're thinking.
THE COURT: Instead of less.
THE WITNESS: Thinking becomes more sequential and logical, and--
THE COURT: Thank you, Doctor. Thank you for being here.
As indicated by the preceding exchange, the record contains evidence that voices
told appellant to take the gun to school, but it does not suggest voices told
him to do more. Both psychiatrists who interviewed appellant indicated that the
voices told appellant to take the gun to school but did not state that the
voices told him to assault B.C. or threaten S.F. and K.C. The psychologist who
evaluated appellant within a few days of the incident testified that appellant
gave no indication that voices were related to the incident. Neither did he
indicate that appellant's condition propelled him into a certain course of
conduct and instead stated, "[I]t wasn't like the kid was going there,
intending to do specific things. He was going to do general things that had to
do with this notion about being an anti-terrorist...."
Also, the evidence indicates that appellant told a different story regarding the
voices to each of the doctors who testified. On October 19, 1998, appellant told
psychologist David Poole that he had heard voices once or twice a year for as
long as he could remember, but "he at no point asserted that the voices had
participated in the alleged act in any direct or immediate way." In
December, appellant told Becker that he had been hearing the voices once or
twice a week, that the frequency increased to daily shortly before the incident,
and that on the day of the incident a God-like voice told him to "do what I
did." In her report, Becker stated that appellant "thought the voice
... was God telling him to bring the weapon [;] so he did what it said to
do." (Emphasis added.) In January 1999, appellant told psychiatrist Robert
Dobyns that a voice had told him to take a gun to school twice in the year
before the incident and that beginning a month before the incident, appellant
began hearing voices once or twice a week. Appellant told Dobyns that "[h]e
heard these voices a day prior to the incident but not the day of the
incident."
Regarding appellant's general condition, Poole testified that he feared
appellant was suffering from childhood schizophrenia but stated that people who
are in the early stages of schizophrenia are not likely to be actively psychotic
at all times. He indicated that delusional schizophrenics act inappropriately
because they become "sort of involved in whatever they think is going on
... and they're not aware or sensitive to the context." Poole testified
that if appellant were in the early stages of schizophrenia, it would not take
very much to break his schizophrenic focus and "bring [him] back to
reality." Poole stated that appellant's condition was "not a real hard
and crusted paranoid kind of delusion. It's pretty flimsy. It doesn't take much
to sort of get in there and make contact...." He stated that appellant had
a "fragile thought process, and it falls apart pretty easily."
Both Becker and Dobyns admitted that one can suffer from schizophrenia and still
have lucid moments. They admitted that if a person gives inconsistent answers
when asked the same question, the person might be manipulative. Poole said
appellant might feel justified in his conduct yet still understand the nature of
the consequences of his actions. Both Poole and Becker agreed that the mental
illness did not necessarily mean appellant could not control his actions.
Given the fact that there is no evidence linking the voices to the acts for
which appellant was adjudicated delinquent, the conflicting nature of the
evidence regarding the voices, and the evidence that appellant's delusional
focus could probably have been easily broken, we hold that appellant's lack of
capacity for the conduct for which he was adjudged delinquent was not
established as a matter of law. Also, evaluating the entire record and the
evidence of appellant's condition, we further hold that the court's refusal to
find that appellant lacked capacity was not so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or unjust. We overrule
appellant's first issue.
Terroristic Threat
In his second and third issues, appellant contends that the evidence is
factually insufficient to support his adjudication for the offense of
terroristic threat against S.F. and K.C. Appellant argues that he did not
threaten either girl with an offense involving violence and that the State
failed to establish that appellant had the specific intent to place either girl
in fear of imminent bodily injury because of his "impaired judgment and
confused thought on that date."
The portions of the State's petition involving each girl are identical and
charge that "the said child violated ... Section 22.07 of the Texas Penal
Code (Terroristic Threat), in that he did then and there threaten to commit an
offense involving violence to a person, namely [complainant], with intent to
place the said [complainant] in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, by
threatening to kill her." This language follows that of section 22
.07(a)(2). See Tex.Penal Code Ann. s 22.07(a)(2).
Appellant first contends that he made no threat directed towards S.F. or K.C. of
any offense involving violence. We disagree.
S.F. testified that appellant gave B.C. permission to tell S.F. and K.C. about
the gun. S.F. further testified that appellant said he had the gun because
"he was going to take the class hostage." The record clearly indicates
that both S.F. and K.C. were members of the class. A hostage is "[a]n
innocent person held captive by one who threatens to kill or harm him if demands
are not met." Black's Law Dictionary 738 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added).
Thus, appellant's threat to take the class hostage was a threat of violence
directed towards S.F. and K.C. as members of the class. In addition, K.C. and
B.C. both testified that appellant said he would shoot anyone who tried to stop
him. S.F. could not remember appellant's specific threats, but she remembered
being threatened and feeling afraid. Thus, the record indicates that a second,
albeit veiled, threat of violence was directed toward S.F. and K.C.
Section 22.07 provides that "[a] person commits an offense if he threatens
to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent
to: ... (2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury...."
Tex.Penal Code Ann. s 22.07(a). When a statute is unambiguous, we must give
effect to the plain meaning of its words unless doing so would lead to an absurd
result. See Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205, 217 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Boykin v.
State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-86 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Uribe v. State, 7 S.W.3d 294,
296 (Tex.App.--Austin 1999, pet. ref'd). We presume that when the legislature
does not include certain words in a statute, it excludes them for a reason. See
Uribe, 7 S.W.3d at 296. The statute makes no distinction between direct and
indirect threats. We therefore conclude that appellant's indirect threats were
sufficient.
Appellant further argues that the State adduced insufficient evidence to prove
that appellant intended to put S.F. or K.C. in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury.
The State is not required to prove that the accused made an actual admission of
his own specific intent. See Hadnot v. State, 884 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex.App.--Beaumont
1994, no pet.). The requisite intent for terroristic threat can be inferred from
appellant's acts, words, and conduct. See Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689
(Tex.Crim.App.1980); Poteet v. State, 957 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth
1997, no pet.). The record establishes that appellant knew that S.F. and K.C.
were aware he had a gun at the time he threatened to take the class hostage and
to shoot anyone who tried to interfere. From appellant's words and conduct, the
trier of fact could infer that appellant intended to place S.F. and K.C. in fear
of imminent serious bodily injury.
We hold that the finding that appellant made terroristic threats is not so
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly
unjust. We therefore overrule appellant's second and third issues.
Aggravated Assault
In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the State "must present legally
and factually sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[appellant] had the specific intent to violate the law in question despite his
impaired judgment and confused thought on that date."
Intent and knowledge are questions for the trier of fact and are almost always
proven through evidence of the circumstances surrounding a crime. See Manrique
v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing Robles v. State, 664
S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)). The fact finder may infer intent from any
facts which tend to prove its existence, including the accused's acts, words,
and conduct. See id. (citing Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810
(Tex.Crim.App.1991)). To determine legal sufficiency in a juvenile case, we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See C.C., 13 S.W.3d at 858 (quoting In re M.S., 940 S.W.2d
789, 791-92 (Tex.App.--Austin 1997, no writ)). For factual sufficiency, we
determine whether the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See id. at 859.
The petition alleged that "the said child violated ... Section 22.02 of the
Texas Penal Code (Aggravated Assault), in that he did then and there by using a
firearm, a deadly weapon, knowingly and intentionally threaten imminent bodily
injury to [complainant]." This language follows that of sections 22.01 and
22.02. See Tex.Penal Code Ann. ss 22.01(a)(2), .02(a)(2) (West 1994 &
Supp.2000).
B.C. testified that appellant had shown him the gun and told him he would shoot
B.C. when B.C. said he was going to tell the teacher appellant had a gun. B.C.
also testified that appellant began to remove the gun from his backpack when
B.C. made an attempt to inform the teacher. Finally, B.C. testified that
appellant followed him around the room, pointing the gun at him. All of this
evidence indicates that appellant knowingly and intentionally used the gun to
threaten B.C. with imminent bodily injury. We hold that the evidence is legally
and factually sufficient to establish that appellant intentionally and knowingly
assaulted B.C. using a firearm, and we overrule appellant's final issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled all of appellant's issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of
the juvenile court.