By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Juvenile court’s rejection of
self-defense claim in revocation proceedings upheld [In re J.M.[ (00-3-28).
On August 3, 2000, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile
court was acting within its discretion when it rejected a claim of self-defense
in a probation revocation hearing.
00-3-28. In the Matter of J.M., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 2-99-309-CV, 2000 WL
1060549, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 8/3/00)[Texas Juvenile
Law 217 (4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: J.M., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's order modifying his prior
disposition and committing him to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). In his sole
point on appeal, he contends the trial court erred in rejecting his self-
defense theory to the State's allegation that he committed the offense of deadly
conduct while on probation.
J.M. was placed on juvenile probation for the offense of criminal trespass. The
trial court imposed a disposition of one year probation. As one of the
conditions of his probation, J.M. was not to violate any laws. Subsequently, the
State moved to modify the trial court's disposition, alleging that J.M. had
violated the conditions of his probation by committing the offenses of
aggravated assault and deadly conduct. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 22.02,
22.05 (Vernon 1994). Upon hearing on the motion, the trial court found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that J.M. violated the terms and conditions of
his probation by engaging in deadly
conduct. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05(f) (Vernon Supp.2000). J.M. argues the
evidence was sufficient to sustain his claim of self-defense to the alleged
offense.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Initially, the State argues appellant's self-defense theory was
not available to him at the hearing because he did not affirmatively plead the
defense pursuant to rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Tex.R. Civ.
P. 94. Although we agree with the State to the extent that juvenile proceedings
are generally governed by the rules of civil procedure, we do not agree with its
proposition that self-defense, in the context of a juvenile proceeding, is an
"avoidance or affirmative defense" that must be pleaded. See Tex.
Fam.Code Ann. § 51.17; compare Price v. Short, 931 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Tex.App.--Dallas
1996, no writ) (holding affirmative defense of self-defense must be timely pled
in response to civil battery claim). General rules of pleading in a purely civil
matter cannot be applied across the board in juvenile proceedings, which are
quasi-criminal in nature. See, e.g., In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765
(Tex.1999). In a criminal prosecution, a defendant's written pleadings are
limited, and a criminal defendant is certainly not required to provide notice to
the State of the defensive evidence or strategy he intends to rely on at trial.
See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 27.02, 27.10 (Vernon 1989). Moreover, the
rules of criminal procedure for discovery and the rules of evidence applicable
to criminal cases apply in juvenile proceedings. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §
51.17(b)-(c). In the criminal context, self-defense is not an affirmative
defense to a charged offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 2.03, 2.04, 9.31
(Vernon 1994 & Supp.2000); Green v. State, 891 S.W.2d 289, 296 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1 st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). It follows that the defense of self-defense is
not an affirmative defense in the context of a juvenile proceeding where a minor
is alleged to have violated a criminal statute. Because the cases cited by the
State are not dispositive of the issue, we conclude that rule 94 is inapplicable
to juvenile proceedings and a minor alleged to have engaged in delinquent
conduct may properly rely on the defense of self-defense without specially
pleading the defense. We, therefore, address the merits of J.M.'s complaint.
At the hearing on the State's motion, J.M.' s mother testified that on the
afternoon of May 9, 1999, J.M. and her older son Lonnie got into a fight. She
stated that the fight began because J.M. opened mail belonging to Lonnie and
because J.M. was behaving disrespectfully towards her. She stated that J.M. was
using a cigarette lighter to light the bottom of a soda can and she asked him to
stop, but he didn't. Lonnie interceded. J.M. cursed Lonnie, and asked Lonnie if
he thought he could "whip" him. Lonnie struck J.M. once on the head
and a scuffle ensued. She told them to "take it outside." At that
point, J.M. threatened to get a knife and stab Lonnie, and J.M. went into the
kitchen. J.M. grabbed an electric can opener, but she took it out of his hand.
Lonnie was trying to hold J.M., but J.M. somehow managed to get a kitchen knife
out of the dishwasher, and he lunged at Lonnie twice. The knife had about an
eight-inch blade. Lonnie held J.M. by the wrist and shook the knife from his
grasp. She went downstairs to call the police. Lonnie restrained J.M. until the
police arrived. She agreed that Lonnie outweighed J.M. by about fifty pounds,
but stated that J.M. was very strong.
Lonnie testified similarly to the events leading up to the incident. He stated
that J.M. "jumped in [his] face," and that he hit J.M. once on the
side of the head. They started wrestling. His mother told them to "take it
outside," but J.M. would not go outside. They continued to struggle, and
J.M. ran into the kitchen. J.M. said he was going to stab Lonnie. J.M. picked up
the electric can opener, but his mother took it from him. J.M. then went to the
dishwasher, opened it, and grabbed a knife. J.M. lunged at him twice. He grabbed
J.M.'s hand and pushed J.M. against the wall. J.M. dropped the knife. He held
J.M. until the police arrived. He testified that he weighs about 286 pounds and
that J.M. weighs about 225 pounds. He stated that if J.M. had wanted to stop the
fight, he would have stopped. He further testified that had J.M. run away, he
would not have followed him.
J.M. testified that before the fight began he was angry because his mother and
Lonnie had accused him of opening Lonnie's mail, but that he didn't do it. He
drank a soda and began using a lighter to light the bottom of the can. His
mother told him to stop three times, and he finally did. Nevertheless, Lonnie
sent his girlfriend outside and he knew there was "going to be a
problem." Lonnie cussed him and said he was "going to whip [his]
ass." Lonnie said, "let's take it outside," and J.M. "got up
in [Lonnie's] face." Lonnie then hit him repeatedly over fifteen times in
the head. He was mad and threatened to stab Lonnie if Lonnie didn't leave him
alone. Lonnie told him to go get the knife. J.M. went into the kitchen and
Lonnie followed him to the door of the kitchen. He got a knife out of the
dishwasher, but threw it down. Lonnie then grabbed him, slammed him to the wall,
and held him until the police came. He denied lunging or striking at Lonnie with
the knife.
Following testimony and argument, the trial court found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that J.M. violated the terms of his probation by committing the
offense of deadly conduct, and ordered J.M. committed to TYC. J.M. generally
contends the State failed to prove the elements of deadly conduct and that the
overwhelming evidence shows he acted in self-defense. Although it is unclear, we
interpret J.M.'s complaint as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court's implied finding against his self-defense
theory.
A trial court may modify its prior disposition in a juvenile case based on a
finding that the juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct so as to commit the
juvenile to TYC if the court, after a hearing, finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. See
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05(f). When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge
in a juvenile case, we consider the totality of the evidence to determine
whether the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence contrary
to the finding is so overwhelming that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See In re
H.G., 993 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); In re S.H., 846
S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). The trial court is the
exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve
any witness, and may resolve any inconsistencies or contradictions in the
testimony. See In re S.H., 846 S.W.2d at 107. Moreover, juvenile courts are
vested with a great amount of discretion in determining the suitable disposition
of children found to have engaged in delinquent conduct, and this is especially
so on hearings to modify disposition. See In re M.A.L., 995 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.App.--Waco
1999, no pet.); In re J.L., 664 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983,
no writ).
A person commits deadly conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct that places
another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
22.05. To justify deadly force in self-defense, the actor must show, among other
things, that (1) a reasonable person in the actor's situation would not have
retreated, and (2) he reasonably believed that the deadly force was immediately
necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of deadly
force. See id. § 9.32 (Vernon Supp.2000). Applying the factual sufficiency
standard, we review all the evidence to decide whether the evidence supporting
the trial court's implied finding against self-defense is so weak or the
evidence probative of self-defense is so overwhelming that the trial court's
finding is clearly wrong and unjust. The State has the burden of persuasion to
disprove self-defense but not a burden of production, which means that the State
must simply prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See Saxton v. State, 804
S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).
Viewing all the evidence, both for and against the trial court's finding, we
conclude the trial court's rejection of J.M.'s self-defense claim is not so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and
unjust under the facts of this case. We further conclude the evidence was
factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that J.M. engaged in
deadly conduct. Consequently, the trial court was justified in finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that J.M. violated a lawful court order by
violating the conditions of his probation. We overrule J.M.'s point on appeal.