By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Officer’s pushing key remote control
device to locate parked car not a search [In re J.R.C.] (00-3-30).
On August 10, 2000, the Austin Court of Appeals held that when a police
officer investigating a report of a runaway juvenile pressed the remote control
device on a key taken from a male juvenile companion in a frisk, that action was
not a search. The officer found cocaine in the car that beeped in response to
his action.
00-3-30. In the Matter of J.R.C., ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 03-99-00776-CV, 2000 WL
1125249, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Austin 8/10/00)[Texas Juvenile Law
296 (4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: The State charged that J.R.C., a juvenile, committed the offense of
possession of cocaine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d)
(West Supp.2000). After overruling his motion to suppress evidence, the district
court sitting as a juvenile court adjudicated J.R.C. to have engaged in
delinquent conduct and ordered that he be placed in the custody of the Texas
Youth Commission. Appellant argues that police conducted an illegal search when
they identified his car by pushing the remote control device attached to his
keys. We overrule the contention and affirm the juvenile court's adjudication
and disposition orders.
Austin Police Officers Scott Perry and Billy Hurst testified at the suppression
hearing. On July 24, 1999, at about 2:30 a.m., Officer Perry responded to a 911
call from the South Congress Motor Inn in Austin. A security guard suspected
that a female staying in one of the motel rooms was a juvenile runaway. Officer
Perry arrived and spoke with the suspected runaway. Officer Hurst arrived soon
after and spoke with appellant, allegedly the suspected runaway's boyfriend.
Both officers knew the motel was a high crime area from which the police receive
many calls regarding violence and drug incidents. Given the late hour, the
location, and appellant's nervous appearance, Officer Hurst frisked him for
weapons. While doing so, he noticed that appellant had keys shoved into his
shoe. The officer asked if he could hold the keys and appellant responded,
"No problem." Officer Hurst explained that for safety reasons he felt
more comfortable holding the keys because a key may be used to stab one in the
face. Officer Hurst asked if appellant had a car in the area and he said,
"No." Officer Hurst shoved the keys into his waistline behind his
utility belt and asked appellant for identification. Appellant said he had none
but gave his name and birthday first to Officer Hurst and again to Officer
Perry.
Appellant gave his correct name, said that his birthday was January 18, 1980,
and told Officer Perry that he was eighteen years old. Officer Perry informed
him that if he had given his correct birthday, he must not be eighteen years
old. Appellant insisted that was his birthday and that he was eighteen years
old. Officer Perry ran a check through the police computer which indicated that
appellant was born in 1983 and that he had had several dealings with the police.
Appellant denied having had any contact with the police and insisted that the
computer information must be wrong. Officer Perry handcuffed appellant, arrested
him for failure to identify himself, and placed him in the patrol car.
After appellant was arrested, Officer Hurst began pushing the buttons on the
remote device attached to appellant's keys. He heard the chirping sound of car
doors unlocking about four spaces away. He went to the chirping car and looked
inside. He saw that the steering column was "busted on the side," a
sign that the car was stolen, and he saw a plastic bag partially under the front
armrest that contained what looked like cocaine. Officer Hurst inquired about
the car and the drugs. Appellant denied knowing anything about the drugs and
said that the car belonged to his mother. The officers impounded the car.
Officer Perry drove appellant to the juvenile detention hall where he was
charged with possession of cocaine.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence contending that when Officer
Hurst pressed the buttons on the key remote he was conducting an illegal search.
The juvenile court overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant challenges this
ruling in a single issue on appeal.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: We conduct a bifurcated review of a suppression hearing, giving
almost total deference to the trial court's findings of fact but conducting a de
novo review of the court's application of law to those facts. See Carmouche v.
State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (citing Guzman v. State, 955
S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)). In reviewing the factual basis for the
trial court's ruling, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
ruling. See id. In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of
fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. See State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
We assume the trial court made reasonable factual inferences and made
"implicit findings of fact supported in the record that buttress its
conclusion." Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327. We then review de novo the trial
court's application of the law to the facts. See id.
The first issue is whether the act of pushing buttons on a car key remote
control in this instance was sufficiently intrusive to constitute a search. The
State contends that it was not. Not every act that results in the discovery of
evidence is a search. The detection of contraband by a trained dog is not a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); Hill v. State, 951
S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) A canine sniff is
much less intrusive than a typical search and the information obtained is
limited to the presence of contraband. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707. In this case,
pushing the button on the remote device allowed the officer to identify the
responding car but did not expose anything hidden from view. The only
information obtained was the presence and location of a car under appellant's
control. We hold that this detection and identification of appellant's car is
less intrusive than a search as defined by the Fourth Amendment.
Even if pushing the button on the car's remote control was sufficiently
intrusive to constitute a search, appellant has failed to show that the officers
invaded a protected privacy interest. The car was located in an open parking lot
and was not hidden from view. Activating the remote only led to the
identification of the car after appellant had denied having a car in the area.
Officer Hurst did not enter onto any property in which appellant had a protected
privacy interest until after he observed the cocaine in plain view through the
car window.
Even assuming that appellant had a privacy interest that was violated, the
officer's action in pressing the remote control buttons and identifying the
location of the car was reasonable in light of the circumstances: appellant
consented to the officer's taking possession of the keys; he lied about his age
and about not having had any previous run-ins with the police; he lied about
having a car in the area; and he was in the company of a female juvenile runaway
at 2:30 a.m. in a motel known to be a common site for drug transactions. The
juvenile court properly overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant's contention
is overruled, and the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition orders are
affirmed.