By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that respondent violated probation by being discharged from placement
[In re R.J.M.] (00-3-31).
On August 25, 2000, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held
that there was sufficient evidence through proof of disciplinary infractions
that respondent violated probation by failing to complete his placement and
being unsatisfactorily discharged from placement.
00-3-31. In the Matter of R.J.M., UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-99-01554-CV, 2000 WL
1207140, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 8/25/00)[Texas Juvenile Law
211 (4th Edition 1996)].
Facts: R.J.M. appeals the trial court's order modifying disposition and
committing him to the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). In three issues, appellant
argues the motion to modify disposition did not contain required Family Code
Section 51.03(a)(2) allegations and did not provide the requisite notice of the
State's intention to seek commitment to TYC; the motion to modify disposition
could not support a finding of a Section 51.03(a)(2) violation; and there was
insufficient evidence to show appellant violated a reasonable and lawful
condition of probation. We affirm the trial court's order modifying disposition.
In August 1997, the trial court signed an order of adjudication and judgment of
disposition with placement that found appellant R.J.M., a juvenile, engaged in
delinquent behavior and placed him on probation for twelve months at Vision
Quest, a placement facility. On November 3, 1997, the trial court signed an
order modifying disposition that placed appellant at a different treatment
facility, Brookhaven, and extended his probation to twenty-four months, or until
August, 1999. On December 5, 1997, the trial court signed an order modifying
disposition that placed appellant at another facility, High Frontier, and
extended his probation until October 20, 1999. When the State learned that
appellant was being discharged from High Frontier without successfully
completing the program, it filed a motion to modify disposition alleging
appellant violated a condition of probation by failing to be discharged
satisfactorily from his court-ordered placement. Following a hearing, the court
found appellant violated the condition of probation as alleged, sustained the
State's motion, and committed appellant to TYC.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his first point of error, appellant contends the motion to
modify disposition contained no Section 51.03(a)(2) allegations and did not
provide the requisite notice of the State's intention to seek commitment to TYC.
Appellant complains there was nothing in the allegations in the motion to modify
disposition that indicated the State sought to revoke appellant's probation.
Section 54.05(d) of the Texas Family Code provides that reasonable notice of a
hearing to modify disposition shall be given to all parties. See Tex. Fam.Code
Ann. § 54.05(d) (Vernon Supp.2000). Section 51.03(a)(2) explains that conduct
that violates a reasonable and lawful order of a juvenile court is delinquent
conduct. See id., § 51.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.2000). The violation of a court
order, i.e. rule of probation, allows the trial court to modify the prior
disposition without a new adjudication of delinquent conduct. See In the Matter
of J.K.A., 855 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex.App.--Hous. [14 th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
Appellant was ordered by the trial court to placement in High Frontier until
"satisfactorily released or discharged by the placement facility or ordered
released by the Court" as a condition of his probation. This court-ordered
placement was a "reasonable and lawful order of the court," and was
agreed to by appellant, the State, and the trial court. The State's motion to
modify disposition alleged "the prior disposition had become
unworkable," and that there had been a "change of circumstances"
due to appellant's unsatisfactory release from the placement program. We
conclude the State's motion to modify disposition contained a Section
51.03(a)(2) allegation in that it alleged appellant violated a reasonable and
lawful order of the court. Moreover, in reviewing the record in this case, we
note that the court recited that reasonable notice of the hearing had been
given, and no objection was raised by appellant's counsel to proceeding with the
hearing. Thus, we conclude the notice given appellant sufficiently complied with
§ 54.05(d). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant contends the motion to modify
disposition could not support a finding of a Section 51.03(a)(2) violation.
Appellant also complains the trial court erred in failing to conform its
judgment to the pleadings pursuant to rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure because the motion to modify disposition contained no allegation that
appellant violated a condition of probation.
As noted above, a Section 51.03(a)(2) violation is conduct that violates a
reasonable and lawful order of a juvenile court. We have concluded the motion to
modify disposition alleged appellant violated a reasonable and lawful order of
the court, i.e. that appellant was unsatisfactorily released from High Frontier
before completion of his term of probation.
We also conclude the trial court did not fail to conform its judgment to the
pleadings in this case. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure govern juvenile
delinquency proceedings, except when the rules conflict with a specific
provision of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.17 (Vernon
Supp.2000). Rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a trial
court's judgment shall conform to the pleadings. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 301. Here,
the order modifying disposition with TYC commitment stated appellant "did
violate the conditions of probation in the following manner: the prior
disposition be modified and alleges that the prior disposition has become
unworkable and/or there has been a change in circumstances, to wit: the
placement, High Frontier, has discharged respondent before the completion of his
term of probation." The motion to modify disposition also stated appellant
was discharged before completion of his probation term. Accordingly, we overrule
appellant's second point of error.
In his third point of error, appellant contends the evidence was legally and
factually insufficient to show he violated a reasonable and lawful condition of
probation. When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider
only that evidence and those inferences which tend to support the challenged
findings, and disregard any and all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See
In re H.G., a Juvenile, 993 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no
pet.). When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the
totality of the evidence to determine whether the evidence supporting the
finding is so weak, or the evidence contrary to the finding is so overwhelming,
that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See In the Matter of S.H., 846 S.W.2d 103,
106 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no writ). A disposition based on a finding
that the child engaged in delinquent conduct may be modified to commit the child
to TYC if the court, after a hearing to modify disposition, finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the
court. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05(f) (Vernon Supp.2000).
As noted above, a condition of appellant's probation was that he remain at High
Frontier "until satisfactorily released or discharged from the placement
facility or ordered released by the Court." Appellant argues the word
"discharged" is not modified by the word "satisfactorily"
and, therefore, appellant did not violate a condition of probation. We disagree.
Condition number 2 of appellant's "Terms and Conditions of
Probation/Placement Facility" is an unambiguous statement that requires
appellant to be satisfactorily released or discharged from High Frontier. During
the hearing, several staff members at High Frontier testified appellant remained
resistant to change, threatened and attacked other residents, had to be
physically restrained on more than one occasion, glorified drug usage by
kneeling on the floor and pretending to snort lines of cocaine, and had a total
of 270 serious incident reports during his eighteen-month stay at High Frontier.
The clinical director at High Frontier and appellant's probation officer
recommended removing appellant from High Frontier unsatisfactorily with a
recommendation to committing him to TYC.
Appellant denied he physically attacked other residents, but acknowledged he had
to be restrained on at least one occasion. Appellant admitted he bragged about
not making any changes while at High Frontier, resisted authority and had
problems dealing with "the system," and that his behavior declined
after he realized he would not be released by his birthday on March 15, 1999.
After reviewing all the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude
there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to affirm the trial court's
modification under Section 54.05(f). See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05(f) (Vernon
Supp.2000). Accordingly,
we overrule appellant's third point of error.
We affirm the trial court's order modifying disposition.