By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence is sufficient to support
adjudications for assault and criminal mischief [In re K.Z.G.] (00-4-01).
On September 8, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the evidence in
the hearing was factually and legally sufficient to support the juvenile
court’s adjudications for assault and criminal mischief by the juvenile
against his mother.
00-4-01. In the Matter of K.Z.G., UNPUBLISHED, No. 09-98-02044-CV, 2000 WL
1273624, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 9/8/00) [Texas Juvenile Law
(5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: K.Z.G., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's finding that he engaged in
delinquent conduct by committing assault and criminal mischief. See Tex.Pen.Code
Ann. §§ 22.01, 28.03 (Vernon 1994). In two points of error, appellant
challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the
finding.
The adjudication hearing was brief and consisted of the testimony of two
witnesses, appellant's mother, who was the complainant in both cases, and
appellant. The record reflects the criminal mischief allegation arose after
appellant, without his mother's permission, threw a rock and broke the back
window of his mother's truck, causing $200 in damages. The mother testified she
had just walked out of the house when it happened. Although she did not actually
see appellant throw the rock, appellant "was the only one outside she could
see" and she later heard him tell the investigating police officer that he
had done it.
The assault allegation arose after appellant grabbed his mother by the arms and
shoved her twice against a wall. The mother testified the two were arguing when
appellant "got mad" and grabbed her. Appellant then picked up a step
ladder, as if to throw it at her, but instead ran out the door. The mother
testified she was bruised as a result of appellant's actions but did not seek
medical treatment. On cross-examination, she admitted she "had some
physical contact with appellant as well" while the two were arguing.
Equivocal and unintelligible at times, appellant testified he did not understand
why he did what he did. When asked specifically about the assault, he replied
"[w]hat the deal is with me, I just, like, tried to, like, you know defend
myself. But it wasn't like that, you know. I didn't know what I was doing, you
know."
The trial court found the two allegations true and that appellant had engaged in
delinquent conduct. After a disposition hearing, the trial court placed
appellant on probation for one year.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his first point of error, appellant alleges the evidence was
legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant engaged
in delinquent conduct. Specifically, as to the criminal mischief allegation,
appellant maintains his mother's testimony was insufficient to prove the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt because someone else could have thrown the rock. As to
the assault allegation, appellant asserts the evidence established he was merely
defending himself against his mother's actions and that he could have, but did
not, "confront his mother through aggression," by throwing the step
ladder. We reject appellant's contentions.
Although juvenile proceedings are considered civil proceedings, the actual
adjudication of delinquency is based on the criminal standard of proof. See
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(f) (Vernon Supp.2000); In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d 107,
109 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, no writ). As such, when reviewing the legal
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of delinquency, we apply the
same standard used to review legal sufficiency claims in criminal cases. See
C.D.F. v. State, 852 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993, no writ). We view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The
fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and is the
exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and of the weight to give their
testimony. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App.1996);
Benavides v. State, 763 S.W.2d 587, 588-89 (Tex.App.-- Corpus Christi 1988, pet.
ref'd). We will not disturb the fact finder's decision unless it is irrational
or unsupported by more than a "mere modicum" of the evidence. Moreno
v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
Delinquent conduct is "conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates
a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or
by confinement in jail." Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 51.03(a)(1) (Vernon
Supp.2000). To establish appellant committed criminal mischief, the State needed
to prove appellant "intentionally or knowingly damage[d] or destroy[ed]"
the window of his mother's truck "without [her] effective consent" and
caused pecuniary loss in the amount of at least $50. See Tex.Pen.Code Ann. §§
12.22, 28.03(a), (b)(2) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.2000). To establish appellant
committed the assault, the State needed to prove appellant "intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury" to his mother. See id. §
22.01(a). Appellant could raise the issue of self-defense by showing he
reasonably believed the force he used against his mother was "immediately
necessary to protect himself" against her use or attempted use of unlawful
force. See id. § 9 .31(a); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex.App.--Dallas
1993, no pet.). If the evidence raised self- defense, the State then had the
burden of persuasion to disprove it. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913
(Tex.Crim.App.1991). The State could satisfy this burden by proving the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
the trial court's determination that appellant committed criminal mischief is
not irrational. Although the mother did not witness appellant throwing the rock,
she testified he was the only one outside she could see when the incident
occurred. Moreover, she testified she heard appellant admit to the investigating
officer that he threw the rock.
Similarly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
we conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court's
finding that appellant committed the assault, and, thus, did not act in
self-defense. While the mother admitted she "had some physical contact with
appellant" during the argument with appellant, she testified that the
precipitating factor leading to appellant grabbing her and shoving her against
the wall was his becoming mad. Although appellant may have established evidence
to the contrary, the trial court was the exclusive judge of the witnesses'
credibility and weight to give their testimony. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647.
Because the State presented legally sufficient evidence to prove appellant
committed the crimes of criminal mischief and assault, the trial court did not
err by finding appellant engaged in delinquent conduct. We overrule appellant's
first point of error.
In his second point, appellant asserts the evidence of his delinquency was
factually insufficient. To raise factual sufficiency on appeal, a juvenile, like
any other appellant in a civil case, must file a motion for new trial. See
Tex.R.Civ.P . 324(b)(2); In re M.R., 858 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Tex.1993); see also In
re C.F., 897 S.W.2d 464, 473 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1995, no writ). We have reviewed
the record and find no indication that appellant complied with this rule.
Accordingly, we conclude he waived his right to challenge the factual
sufficiency of the evidence and overrule his second point.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.