By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
No statutory right to a fitness hearing at
the release/transfer hearing under the determinate sentence act; appointment of
psychiatrist satisfied any constitutional requirement [In re J.A.H.] (00-4-03).
On September 13, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a transfer to
TDCJ under the determinate sentence against a claim that the juvenile was
entitled to a fitness hearing prior to the transfer hearing. The juvenile court
appointed a psychiatrist, which satisfied any constitutional claim that might
exist.
00-4-03. In the Matter of J.A.H., UNPUBLISHED, No. 04-99-00560-CV, 2000 WL
1283734, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—San Antonio 9/13/00) [Texas Juvenile
Law (5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: In January, 1996, a jury found that J.A.H. engaged in delinquent conduct
by committing capital murder and sentenced him to a forty-year determinate
sentence. J.A.H. was to spend the initial part of his sentence in the Texas
Youth Commission. Upon his eighteenth birthday, the trial court was to
reconsider his sentence at a release/transfer hearing to determine whether it
was appropriate to transfer J.A.H. to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division for the remainder of his sentence.
Before the release/transfer hearing, J.A.H. filed a Motion to Determine Fitness
to Proceed and a Motion for Psychiatric Evaluation. On May 11, 1999, the trial
court conducted the release/transfer hearing, where J.A.H. renewed his motions.
The trial court, however, denied his motions and transferred him from the TYC to
the TDCJ. J.A.H. appeals his transfer, claiming the trial court erred by denying
his request for a separate hearing to determine whether he was fit to proceed at
the release/transfer hearing. Specifically, he asserts the trial court erred in
denying his motions because he has both statutory and constitutional rights to
have such a hearing.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE
Texas Family Code, section 54.11 [FN1] governs the release/transfer hearing,
which is one component of the Texas determinate sentencing scheme. At a
release/transfer hearing, the trial judge must determine how the child/defendant
is to spend the remainder of his sentence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
trial court may order recommitment of the person to the TYC without a
determinate sentence, transfer the person to the custody of the TDCJ for the
completion of his or her sentence, or discharge the person. Act of June 17,
1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 385, § 13, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1891, 1896 (amended
1995) (current version at Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 54.11 (Vernon 1997)).
FN1. J.A.H. was committed to the TYC for acts committed on June 19, 1994. Therefore, the version of the Family Code that was applicable on that date applies here. See In the Matter of H.V.R., 974 S.W .2d 213, 214 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
The 1994 version of the Texas Family Code allows children in the juvenile system to postpone some proceedings during times when they lack the capacity to understand those proceedings or to assist in their own defense. Specifically, section 55.04 provides that:
[n]o child who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings in juvenile court or to assist in his own defense shall be subjected to discretionary transfer to criminal court, adjudication, disposition, or modification of disposition as long as such incapacity endures.
Act of 1973, 63rd Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 544, 1973
Tex.Gen.Laws 1460 (amended 1991) (current version Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 55.11
(Vernon 1996) (emphasis added).
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A COMPETENCY HEARING
In his first issue, J.A.H. asserts that the trial court erred in refusing him a
competency hearing because he has a constitutional right to such a hearing
before a release/transfer hearing. He premises his argument on principles of Due
Process of Law. We need not reach the issue of whether J.A.H. was entitled to
such a hearing, however, because we find he received due process during the
release/transfer hearing.
Before the release/transfer hearing, J.A.H. requested the trial court order a
"complete physical and psychiatric examination by competent qualified
psychiatric personnel to determine the extent of his mental disorder or disease
..." The trial court granted his motion and appointed Dr. John C. Sparks,
Sr. to conduct the exam. Dr. Sparks observed that J.A.H. was in good health, had
clear speech, and was coherent. He additionally found that J.A.H. understood
various court members' roles and the court's possible actions. Although Dr.
Sparks recognized that J.A.H. suffered from behavioral and authority problems
and had abused various illegal substances, Dr. Sparks concluded that J.A.H. was
not suffering from mental illness or retardation. In fact, Dr. Sparks determined
that J.A.H. appeared to have the capacity to understand the proceedings in
juvenile court, to assist in his own defense, and to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct.
J.A.H. attempted to present evidence at the release/transfer hearing of his
alleged incompetency. To substantiate his claims, J.A.H. offered some evidence
that he experienced behavior problems and suffered bouts of depression, thoughts
of suicide, and hallucinations. He did not, however, show how his behavioral and
emotional problems related to his alleged incompetency. J.A.H. was given the
opportunity to present evidence of his incompetency to the trial court. We,
therefore, overrule his first issue.
STATUTORY RIGHT TO HEARING TO DETERMINE COMPETENCY
In his second issue, J.A.H. argues that he has a statutory right to a
"fitness to proceed" hearing before a release/transfer hearing under
section 55.04 of the Family Code. He specifically asserts that because the
statute is mandatory, and because a release/transfer hearing is "akin"
to a disposition hearing, the trial court was required to conduct the hearing
before proceeding with that phase of J.A.H.'s sentencing. We disagree.
The issue of whether J.A.H. has a right to a hearing to determine competency
prior to the release/transfer hearing under section 55.04 of the Family Code
requires us to analyze those relevant provisions of the statute to assess their
meaning. J.A.H.'s issue raises a question of statutory interpretation, which is
a question of law. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928
(Tex.1998); Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.3d 436, 437 (Tex.1997);
Bandera Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Hamilton, 2 S.W.3d 367, 369 (Tex.App.--San Antonio
1999, pet. denied). A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a court
should first ascertain the legislature's intent in enacting the statute as
expressed in its plain language. See Schorp v. Baptist Memorial Health System, 5
S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.) (citing St. Luke's
Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.1997)).
The plain language of section 55.04 does not support J.A.H.'s assertions.
Section 55.04 of the Family Code explicitly mentions four proceedings that occur
at varying stages in the juvenile adjudication process. Specifically, 55.04
mentions discretionary transfer to criminal court, adjudication, disposition,
and modification of disposition. The titles of sections 54.02, 54.03, 54.04, and
54.05 of the Family Code correspond with those mentioned in section 55.04.
Section 54.02, entitled "Waiver of Jurisdiction and Discretionary Transfer
to Criminal Court," allows the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction
over a child and transfer him or her to the appropriate district court for
criminal proceedings. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.02 (Vernon 1997). Section 54.03
provides for an "Adjudication Hearing," where it is determined whether
the child engaged in delinquent conduct. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03 (Vernon
1997). Section 54.04 addresses the "Disposition Hearing," which is
similar to the punishment phase of a criminal trial. Tex .Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04
(Vernon 1997); see In the Matter of J.E.H., 972 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex.App.--Beaumont
1998, pet. denied). Section 54.05 allows for a "Hearing to Modify
Disposition." Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05 (Vernon 1997). We, therefore, find
that J.A.H. is not entitled to a competency hearing before the trial court
conducts a release/transfer hearing under section 55.04's plain language.
In making his argument that he is entitled to a competency hearing before his
release/transfer hearing under section 55.04, J.A .H. assumes that the
release/transfer hearing is one component of a juvenile disposition. This court
has recognized, however, that the determinate sentencing scheme provides
juveniles with a "second chance" to convince the trial court that he
or she should not be imprisoned for the remainder of his or her sentence. In the
Matter of H.V.R., 974 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
This decision neither adds to nor takes away from the sentence initially
assessed. Instead, the trial court is simply determining which entity is the
most suitable for the juvenile to serve the remainder of his or her sentence.
See In the Matter of J.E.H., 972 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1998, pet.
denied); In the Matter of J.G., 905 S.W.2d 676, 682 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1995,
writ denied). We are unpersuaded by J.A.H.'s argument that because the
release/transfer hearing is part of the disposition, section 54.11 should fall
within the parameters of section 55.04.
Accordingly, we find J.A.H. is not entitled to a competency hearing before his
release/transfer hearing under section 55.04 and overrule his issue. We,
therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment and uphold J.A.H.'s transfer to the
TDCJ.