By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Violation of program rules was violation of
probation; not unauthorized delegation of judicial power to program [In re F.J.R.]
(00-4-05).
On September 14, 2000, the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld a revocation of
probation over a claim that the juvenile court had improperly delegated
authority to an external program to set the conditions of probation.
00-4-05. In the Matter of F.J.R., UNPUBLISHED, No. 06-99-00174-CV, 2000 WL
1299558, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-Texarkana 9/14/00)[Texas Juvenile Law
(5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: F.J.R. appeals from a juvenile disposition order committing him to the
Texas Youth Commission (TYC). On December 13, 1996, the court found that F.J.R.
engaged in delinquent conduct and placed him on probation. On March 31, 1999,
the court modified F.J.R.'s probation; he was removed from the home and placed
in the custody of the Harrison County Juvenile Probation Office. Among the
conditions of F.J.R.'s modified probation was that he complete the Project GOALS
program.
On September 27, 1999, the State filed a Petition to Modify Disposition in which
it alleged that F.J.R. had been discharged from the Project GOALS program and
requested that he be committed to the custody of the TYC. In its petition, the
State alleged (1) that on August 16, 1999, F.J.R. disrupted classes by making
noises, talking, and laughing, and that he made a vulgar hand gesture at the
staff; (2) that on August 17, 1999, F.J.R. refused to obey staff instructions to
be quiet and stop talking; and (3) that on September 6, 1999, F.J.R. refused to
follow staff instructions to go to his room, refused to remove his shoes, and
tore his uniform. The State also alleged that F.J.R. was discharged from the
GOALS program for failing to make satisfactory progress toward completion.
The trial court held a hearing on the State's petition, found the allegations
true, and remanded F.J.R. to the custody of the TYC. In his sole point of error,
F.J.R. alleges that the trial court's March 31 order is void for vagueness and
impermissibly delegates authority to the probation department to determine the
conditions of his probation.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: F.J.R. contends that none of his alleged violations contravene the
facial provisions of the trial court's March 31 order modifying his probation.
The March 31 order contained the following written conditions, which F.J.R.
personally signed:
PROJECT GOALS PROGRAM RULES
(A) I will follow all school rules and attend each and every class every
school day. Removal from The Project GOALS Academic Program shall constitute a
violation of this agreement.
....
(C) I will follow all rules of the PROJECT GOALS PROGRAM.
F.J.R. contends that the order did not contain
any of the Project GOALS program rules, which would have put him on notice of
the terms of his probation.
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(f) (Vernon Supp.2000) provides, in part, "If
the child is placed on probation, the terms of probation shall be written in the
order." In K.K.B. v. State, 609 S.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana
1980, no writ), this Court stated:
[T]he probation order is not required to specify every minute detail of the conduct which is mandated or prohibited. Such a requirement would be impractical, if not impossible, and would hinder rather than assist the juvenile court in promoting the rehabilitation of juveniles. It is sufficient if the general conduct is spelled out in terms sufficiently clear for the juvenile to understand and be able to obey. This is particularly true where the juvenile is placed on probation in the care of a home or institution. The court can allow the custodian to implement the court prescribed conditions by specifying the detailed method of obedience to those conditions. Although a requirement that the juvenile obey the reasonable rules and regulations of such a custodian vests a certain amount of discretion in the custodian, such discretion is necessary if the home or facility is to be successful in its rehabilitative efforts.
That case involved a juvenile who was assigned to
a foster home and ordered to "[r]eside in the home of the person or persons
to whom you are released and obey all of their instructions." We did not
find that condition fatally vague; in fact, we found the condition quite
specific. Id. at 826.
We also held that "if the evidence revealed that those instructions [at the
foster home] were ambiguous, conflicting, or unreasonable, we would not affirm a
finding of delinquent conduct based on violations of them...." Id. As in
K.K.B., we find that the evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the
instructions of the Project GOALS program were ambiguous, conflicting, or
unreasonable. The evidence showed that F.J.R.'s specific conduct was either a
violation of school rules, the rules of Project GOALS, or both. These rules were
made known and available to F.J.R. The evidence also showed that F.J.R.
committed the violations alleged against him. Therefore, we find that the trial
court's March 31 order is not void for vagueness.
The order also does not impermissibly delegate the terms of F.J.R.'s probation
to the probation department. Faced with a similar order in K.K.B., we held that
there was no impermissible delegation of the trial court's powers. Id. at 826.
While the court in a juvenile proceeding cannot delegate its ultimate authority
to determine, set, and supervise the conditions of probation, some delegation is
appropriate to facilitate the rehabilitative purpose of probation. We overrule
F.J.R.'s contention.