By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
No requirement of a showing of material
change of circumstances to authorize a juvenile court to modify probation to
order placement in a secure, local facility [In re T.G.] (00-4-15).
On October 27, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion in modifying probation to provide for
placement in a secure facility on a plea of true to probation violation; no
showing of material change in circumstances is required.
¶ 00-4-15. In the Matter of T.G., UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-99-02136-CV, 2000 WL
1598933, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 10/27/00)[Texas Juvenile Law
(5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: After T.G., III (T.G.) pled true to violating the terms of his probation,
the trial court placed him in the custody of CSC Medlock, a secure correctional
facility. T.G. brings three points of error claiming: (1) the evidence is
factually insufficient to find T.G. violated his probation; (2) the evidence is
factually insufficient to find a material and substantial change of
circumstances necessitated modifying his placement; and (3) the trial court
abused its discretion by ordering T.G. placed at CSC Medlock.
On January 27, 1999, T.G. was declared a child engaged in delinquent conduct,
pursuant to section 54.03 of the Texas Family Code, for committing misdemeanor
theft. At the disposition hearing, the court found T.G. was a child in need of
rehabilitation and the child and the public were in need of protection. See
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(c) (Vernon Supp.2000). The trial court placed T.G. on
probation for six months in the custody of his father.
After T.G. committed further probation violations, the State filed a second
motion to modify disposition. On April 26, 1999, the trial court found that
T.G.'s home could not provide the quality of care, the level of support, and the
supervision needed for him to meet the conditions of his probation. See id. The
trial court modified the disposition by placing T.G. on probation for twelve
months in the custody of the Chief Probation Officer of the Dallas County
juvenile department, with placement at the Dallas County Youth Village.
After T.G. committed further probation violations, the State filed a second
motion to modify disposition. In that motion, the State alleged T.G. (1)
violated condition two of his probation by engaging in conduct causing him to be
discharged from his placement at the Youth Village; and (2) violated condition
three of his probation by failing to follow the rules of his placement. T.G.
pled true to both allegations. However, he then stated there was a
misunderstanding regarding the violation of condition two. T.G. claimed he did
not actually threaten his teacher as alleged by the State, but was only
"joking around." The trial court gave T.G. the "benefit of the
doubt" and found the violation of condition two not true. Nevertheless, the
trial court accepted T.G.'s plea of true to condition three and granted the
State's motion to modify disposition.
A representative of the juvenile department, Pam Degroff, testified and
recommended T.G. be placed on probation until his eighteenth birthday at CSC
Medlock, a secure correctional facility. She stated that T.G. had not progressed
appropriately at the Youth Village, was disruptive, and had received forty-one
negative incident reports during the four months he had been at the Youth
Village. T.G. also admitted that he had violated the rules at the Youth Village.
After considering the testimony and argument of counsel, the trial court
continued T.G. on probation until his eighteenth birthday in custody of the
Chief Probation Officer of the Dallas County juvenile department, with placement
at CSC Medlock. T .G. appeals this order placing him at CSC Medlock.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his first point of error, T.G. contends the evidence is
factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he violated
condition three of his probation. However, when a juvenile challenges a court's
modification order, the sole inquiry is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that the juvenile violated a reasonable and lawful order
of the court. In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1999, no
pet.). If some evidence supports the trial court's decision, there is no abuse
of discretion. Matter of T.D.H., 971 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex .App.-- Dallas 1998,
no pet.). The State must prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
See In re M.A.L., 995 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.App.--Waco 1999, no pet.). We must
examine the record to determine whether the evidence is sufficient for the trial
judge to have found T.G. violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court.
After being sworn in, the following exchange took place:
The Court: All right. Now, the second
accusation that they're bringing against you is that on or about the 8th day
of September in Dallas County that you violated Condition Three of your
conditions of probation and, on the aforesaid date, you did violate your
conditions of probation by failing to obey all rules of your placement,
specifically the Dallas County Youth Village, in violation of your conditions
of probation and lawful Orders of the Juvenile Court.
[T.G.]: Yes, sir.
The Court: True or not true?
[T.G.]: That is true.
The Court: That's true?
[T.G.]: Yes, sir.
The Court: All right. Well, I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll find Two is true
and One is not. Okay? We'll give you the benefit of the doubt on One.
[T.G.]: Okay. Thank you, sir.
The Court: We'll find true on Number Two, because you said you did it, right?
[T.G.]: Yes, sir.
T.G. pled true to failing to obey all the rules
of the Youth Village in violation of his probation and the lawful orders of the
court. However, T.G. now says he did not necessarily plead true to violating
condition three of his probation which required him to "obey all the
published rules and regulations of the placement facility." It is
meaningless for T.G. to argue that the State's allegation that he "failed
to obey all the rules" is somehow different than the terms of his
probation, which state T.G. must "obey all published rules and regulations
of the placement facility;" T.G. pled true under oath that he violated the
conditions of his placement and the lawful orders of the court.
A plea of true, given under oath, is tantamount to a judicial confession. See
Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim .App.1979). A judicial
confession justifies the court's finding that the violation of probation was
committed by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re M.A.L., 995 S.W.2d at
324.
Here, T.G.'s plea of true, given under oath in open court, that he failed to
obey the rules of his placement in violation of his probation and the lawful
orders of the court, constitutes a judicial confession and is therefore
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that T.G. violated the terms of
his probation. We overrule T.G.'s first point of error.
In his second point of error, T.G. argues the evidence is factually insufficient
to support the trial court's finding that a material and substantial change of
circumstances occurred which necessitated a modification of his placement. T.G.
cites no authority for his proposition and we find none. The family code does
not require a "material and substantial change of circumstances" to
modify disposition. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.05 (Vernon Supp.2000). Rather,
the family code requires the trial court find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the juvenile has violated a reasonable and lawful order of the
court. See id. We overrule T.G.'s second point of error.
In his third point of error, T.G. claims the trial court abused its discretion
by ordering him placed in CSC Medlock, a secure correctional facility. T.G.
argues that sending him to a secure correctional facility is inappropriate, and
that the juvenile department did not adequately research other appropriate
placements. T.G. appears to be challenging the suitability of his placement
under section 54.04(d)(1)(B) of the Texas Family Code, yet the authority he
cites does not support his contention.
Juvenile courts are vested with a great amount of discretion in determining the
suitable disposition of children found to have engaged in delinquent conduct,
and this is especially so regarding hearings to modify disposition. In the
Matter of J.L., 664 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
The controlling issue when a juvenile court modifies a disposition is whether
the record shows that the court abused its discretion in finding, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a violation of a condition of probation. See In
re M.A.L., 995 S.W.2d at 324.
Here, all the evidence supports the suitability of the placement for T.G. The
testimony was clear T.G. violated his probation by failing to follow the rules
at the Youth Village. Degroff testified that T.G. was not progressing
appropriately at the Youth Village and had received forty-one negative incident
reports during his four-month stay. T.G. confirmed he had difficulty following
the rules at the Youth Village. Degroff then made the recommendation that T.G.
be placed at CSC Medlock, which was the least restrictive placement available
for T.G. at that time. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by placing
T.G. at CSC Medlock. We overrule T.G.'s third point of error.