By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Judicial confession is sufficient
corroboration for plea of true, if the law requires corroboration; evidence
sufficient to support restitution order. (00-4-16).
On October 27, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that if the law
requires corroboration of a plea of true, which it did not decide, the
respondent’s judicial confession was sufficient corroboration; the court also
held there was sufficient evidence to support a restitution order of $3000 for
damages to stolen automobile.
¶ 00-4-16. In the Matter of R.A.H., UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-99-01226-CV, 2000 WL
1598767, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 10/27/00)[Texas Juvenile Law
(5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: After a plea of true, the trial court adjudicated R.A.H. a child engaged
in delinquent conduct, placed him on community supervision until his eighteenth
birthday, and ordered him to pay $3,000 in restitution. In four points of error,
appellant argues the trial court erred in adjudicating him delinquent solely on
the basis of his plea, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to
establish he committed the charged offenses, the court erred in ordering him to
pay restitution in an amount not supported by the evidence, and the evidence was
factually insufficient to establish the complainant suffered $3,000 in damages.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: In his first and second points of error, appellant contends that
section 54.03 of the family code is analogous to article 1.15 of the code of
criminal procedure and requires something more than a juvenile's plea of true to
support an adjudication of delinquency. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.03(a), (d),
(f) (Vernon Supp.2000); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. Art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp.2000).
Citing Professor Robert Dawson's text on juvenile law, appellant argues that the
family code requires a hearing and an evidentiary basis for adjudication, either
through a stipulation of evidence or the juvenile's sworn confession from the
witness stand. See Robert O. Dawson, Texas Juvenile Law 156 (4th ed.1996).
Appellant asserts there is no evidence in the record to support his adjudication
other than his plea of true and concludes the trial court erred in adjudicating
him delinquent. The State responds that article 1.15 does not apply to juvenile
proceedings and that it has no equivalent in the family code.
We conclude we need not determine whether section 54.03 of the family code
requires evidence in addition to appellant's plea of true to support his
adjudication order because, even assuming it does, appellant judicially
confessed to the allegations in the State's petition regarding a child engaged
in delinquent conduct.
At the beginning of the adjudication hearing, the trial court read the
allegations in the State's petition that appellant committed two thefts of
vehicles, one burglary of a vehicle, and one burglary of a coin-operated
machine. Appellant entered a plea of true to each allegation. The trial court
then asked appellant if he was pleading true to all four of the allegations
because they were true and for no other reason, and appellant answered
affirmatively. Appellant also stated no one had forced, coerced, or threatened
him into pleading true to the allegations. The trial court then found appellant
to be a child who had engaged in delinquent conduct.
A judicial confession standing alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon
a guilty plea even if the defendant does nothing more than affirm that the
allegations in the indictment are true and correct. See Dinnery v. State, 592
S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Lemons v. State, 953 S.W.2d
825, 828 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); Solis v. State, 945 S.W.2d
300, 302 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd). Because appellant
affirmed that the allegations in the State's petition were true, we conclude
that appellant judicially confessed to the allegations in the State's petition.
Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court's judgment adjudicating appellant a child engaged in
delinquent conduct. We overrule appellant's first and second points of error.
In his third and fourth points of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the award of $3,000 in restitution. The rules of
restitution for criminal cases apply to restitution ordered by a court in
conjunction with juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d 107,
109 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, no pet.). In a criminal proceeding, the amount of
restitution is required to be "just," that is, supported by sufficient
factual evidence in the record that the expense was incurred. Id. at 109. The
amount of expense incurred need not be supported by proof that it was
reasonable. Davis v. State, 757 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, no
pet.); In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d at 109. Whether to order restitution as a
condition of probation is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cartwright v. State, 605 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
At appellant's disposition hearing, the State introduced photographs of one of
the cars appellant stole showing extensive damage to the front end, along with a
$190.81 receipt for a vacuum cleaner that was in the car when it was stolen and
typewritten estimates for $550 for a new paint job and $2278 for repairs.
Appellant's counsel did not object to the admission of this evidence. The owner
of the stolen car testified she paid $7,800 for the car in 1993 and it cost
$11,000 after it was financed. The owner testified that, for $3,000, she could
restore the car to the condition it was in before it was stolen. Under these
circumstances, we conclude the restitution award was supported by sufficient
factual evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
restitution in the amount of $3,000. See In re J.R., 907 S.W.2d at 109;
Cartwright, 605 S.W.2d at 289. We overrule appellant's third and fourth points
of error.