By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Confession signed in processing office okay
although questioning was elsewhere; statement made to psychiatrist in
certification interview admissible to impeach [Nave v. State] (00-4-26).
On November 14, 2000, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a confession
that was signed in a juvenile processing office is admissible even though the
questioning occurred elsewhere. The court also held that a custodial statement
made to a psychiatrist is admissible to impeach the defendant’s trial
testimony.
00-4-26. Nave v. State, UNPUBLISHED, No. 05-99-01366-CR, 2000 WL 1711937, 2000
Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.—Dallas 11/14/00)[Texas Juvenile Law (5th Edition
2000)].
Facts: Following a trial before a jury, Terry Lynn Nave appeals his conviction
for capital murder. Nave, who was a minor at the time of the offense, contends
the juvenile court should not have certified him to stand trial as an adult.
Nave also contends the trial court erred in admitting various pieces of evidence
against him at trial.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Nave's first point of error concerns the juvenile court's waiver
of jurisdiction over him and its transfer of his case to criminal district
court. Nave's argument that the transfer was in error is two pronged. First,
Nave contends the evaluation and investigation required to be performed before
the transfer hearing was incomplete. Second, he contends the evidence overall
doesn't support the juvenile court's transfer of his case.
The Texas Family Code requires juvenile courts to obtain a complete diagnostic
study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child subject to
transfer. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.02(d) (Vernon Supp.2000). In this case, the
juvenile court ordered an investigation including "a social study and a
psychological [sic] of [Nave]." According to Nave, a psychological
evaluation was never performed. Nave argues the lack of psychological testing
renders the evidence insufficient to support the juvenile court's waiver of
jurisdiction over him.
The completeness of the investigation of a child is a matter to be determined by
the court that ordered the investigation. Turner v. State, 796 S.W.2d 492, 497 (Tex.App.--Dallas
1990, no writ). A court's finding that the investigation was sufficient will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. In re J.C.J., 900 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Tex.App.--Tyler
1995, no writ). The investigation about which Nave complains was set out in a
report prepared by the director of juvenile services in Grayson County. The
report included a discussion of the alleged offense and the evidence against
Nave, Nave's history of delinquent conduct, a summary of his behavior while in
detention, a description of his family and educational background, a discussion
of previous psychological testing and treatment, a statement about his use of
illegal substances, and an overall evaluation of Nave's attitude. Attached to
the report were various documents, including a report by a psychiatrist
specializing in children and adolescents. The psychiatrist interviewed both Nave
and his parents. The psychiatrist's report included a social history of Nave, a
summary of Nave's mental status, and a "diagnostic formulation"
describing Nave's emotional and intellectual condition.
Contrary to Nave's contention, the investigative report submitted to the
juvenile court was replete with information about Nave's psychological
condition. Many aspects of Nave's mental status were discussed by both the
reporting psychiatrist and the director of juvenile services. The juvenile court
did not err in concluding the report was sufficient to comply with the court's
order.
Nave next contends the evidence was insufficient overall to support the transfer
of his case to criminal district court. Nave does not dispute the seriousness of
the crime with which he was charged. Nave argues, however, that other factors
weighed in favor of the juvenile court retaining jurisdiction.
In deciding whether to certify a child to stand trial as an adult, the juvenile
court must consider, among other things, (1) whether the alleged offense was
against a person or property; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child,
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of
adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of
the child by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available
to the juvenile court. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 54.02(f). The court is not required
to give equal weight to each of the factors, so long as each is considered. In
re J.J., 916 S.W .2d 532, 535 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1995, no writ). The ultimate
question is whether the court abused its discretion in transferring the case.
Id.
The evidence presented to the juvenile court showed that Nave had a history of
delinquent conduct beginning when he was 11 years old. Although Nave had never
before committed a major offense, the seriousness of his earlier crimes
escalated from criminal mischief to burglary of a motor vehicle. Nave admitted
he used illegal substances on a regular basis, including marijuana and
methamphetamines.
Nave was sixteen years old when he allegedly committed the murder with which he
was charged. Nave's record while in detention demonstrated he was disruptive and
had trouble with authority. Nave was disrespectful and aggressive to the
detention center staff and, on one occasion, he defecated in his room and wrote
on the walls, floors, and door with his feces. Nave has an anarchy symbol
tattooed on his right calf and the director of juvenile services found that
anarchy was a theme in Nave's life. In the report submitted by the director, he
concluded Nave was significantly dysfunctional and the possibility of his being
rehabilitated in the juvenile system was negligible. The director testified at
the transfer hearing that, due to Nave's sophistication and the need to protect
the community, he was recommending Nave stand trial as an adult.
The evidence presented to the juvenile court also included the report and
testimony of the psychiatrist, who opined that Nave's judgment was greatly
impaired and that he demonstrated poor coping skills. The psychiatrist
additionally stated Nave did not suffer from any mental illnesses and he
understood the conduct with which he was charged was wrong. Although the
psychiatrist testified he believed Nave would benefit from the services provided
under the juvenile system, he further testified he was not making any
recommendation about whether Nave should remain under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court or be transferred to stand trial as an adult.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion
in waiving its jurisdiction and transferring Nave's case to criminal district
court. There is sufficient evidence to support a determination that criminal
proceedings were warranted. We overrule Nave's first point of error.
In his second point of error, Nave contends the trial court erred in refusing to
grant his motion to suppress his written confession. Nave argues the confession
was inadmissible because it was not obtained in a designated juvenile processing
office. Nave concedes he was initially taken to a designated juvenile processing
office. He also does not dispute that his statement was written and signed in a
designated processing office. His sole complaint is that the interview leading
up to his written statement was not conducted in a properly designated office
but instead in an office approximately thirty feet away belonging to one of the
investigating officers. The office was substantially similar to other offices
designated for processing juveniles.
When a child is taken into custody, he may be temporarily detained in a
designated juvenile processing office for limited purposes. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §
52.025. One of the approved purposes is "the receipt of a statement by the
child." Id. § 52.025(b)(5). Nave argues his statement was actually
"received" during his interview in the non-designated office and,
therefore, his confession was obtained illegally. See Anthony v. State, 954
S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.)(violation of family code
rendered statement inadmissible). We disagree.
The evidence shows that during his interview, Nave admitted his involvement in
the alleged homicide. Following this admission, Nave was asked whether he would
be willing to give a statement and he indicated that he would. Nave was then
taken to a designated juvenile processing office where he dictated and read the
written confession at issue. Nave also signed the confession in a designated
office in the presence of a magistrate. Based on this evidence we conclude
Nave's statement was "received" in a properly designated juvenile
processing office. We overrule Nave's second point of error. [FN1]
FN1. We also note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that obtaining a child's statement outside a juvenile processing office does not, by itself, constitute error. See Baptist Vie Le v. State, 993 S.W.2d 650, 655 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
[Third point of error omitted.]
In his fourth and final point of error, Nave contends the trial court erred in
allowing the State to question him about oral statements he made to the
psychiatrist who interviewed him as part of the diagnostic study and social
evaluation performed before the certification hearing. During his conversations
with the psychiatrist, Nave admitted his involvement in the homicide. Nave
concedes he was told his statements could be admitted at trial. He argues,
however, that he was never informed of his "Miranda rights" before
talking with the psychiatrist.
In making his argument, Nave relies on section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code
and article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.Fam.Code Ann.
§ 51.095 (Vernon Supp.2000); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979).
Both statutes require certain warnings to be given for custodial statements to
be admissible. Id. Both statutes also provide, however, that the warning
requirements do not apply to voluntary statements bearing on the credibility of
the witness. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095(b); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.22
§ 5. Before the State questioned Nave about his conversation with the
psychiatrist, Nave testified about the written confession he gave the police.
Nave stated he lied when he told the police he was the one who committed the
homicide and his written statement was false. Nave's subsequent confession to
the psychiatrist had a direct bearing on the credibility of Nave's testimony
about his first confession to the police. The questions, therefore, were proper.
In addition, the confession Nave made to the psychiatrist was, in substance,
identical to the one given to the police. Therefore, its admission could not
have harmed Nave. We overrule Nave's fourth point of error.