By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Youths carrying electronic equipment on the
streets at 3 am is ground for investigatory stop [In re A.T.] (01-1-10)
On December 20, 2000, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that when an
officer viewed three young men on the streets at 3 am carrying electronic
equipment he had reasonable suspicion to stop the youths to investigate for a
possible burglary. Handcuffing the suspects did not convert the stop into an
arrest. While the San Antonio curfew ordinance prohibits an arrest for the first
offense, the stop here was made independently of that ordinance.
¶ 01-1-10. In the Matter of A.T., UNPUBLISHED, No. 04-99-00218-CV, 2000 WL
1918880, 2000 Tex.App.Lexis ____ (Tex.App.--San Antonio 12/20/00)[Texas Juvenile
Law (5th Ed. 2000].
Facts: Appellant, A.T., was convicted by a jury of the offense of delinquent
conduct and committed to the custody of the Texas Youth Commission. On appeal,
A.T. argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
because (1) police officers took him into custody illegally, rendering the
subsequent search illegal; (2) he was improperly handcuffed absent a reasonable
belief he was armed and dangerous; and (3) police officers did not have probable
cause to conduct a search and seizure of A.T.'s person.
A.T. and two male companions were walking on a downtown street at approximately
3:00 in the morning. Off-duty police officer Richard Riojas observed A.T.
appeared to be a juvenile. When Officer Riojas also noticed two of the three
carrying what appeared to be electronic equipment, he contacted the San Antonio
Police dispatcher with a description of the young men, their current location,
and his suspicion they may have been involved in a burglary.
Officer Alfred Enriquez arrived in response to Officer Riojas' call and ordered
the three to place their property on the ground. After identifying the suspects
as one adult and two juveniles, Officer Enriquez asked where they got the
electronic equipment. Neither A.T. nor his companions offered an explanation for
the fax machine, walkie-talkies, and phone they were carrying. At that point,
Officer Riojas handcuffed all three suspects while Officer Enriquez contacted
police dispatch to determine whether any burglaries had been reported in the
area. Approximately thirty minutes later, dispatch confirmed a burglary at a
nearby construction site involving items that matched those recovered from the
suspects. A.T. and the other two young men were then arrested and transported to
the police station.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: Prior to trial, A.T. filed a motion to suppress evidence of the
stolen items recovered by Officer Enriquez. A.T. appeals the denial of that
motion to suppress.
Standard of Review
We apply an abuse of discretion standard on appeal from the denial of a motion
to suppress. Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). In
applying the standard, our review of the evidence is limited to a determination
of whether the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts. Romero v.
State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Flores v. State, 895 S.W.2d 435,
440 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1995, no pet.). We review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702,
704 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 885 (1986). "The trial court is
the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their
testimony." Romero, 800 S.W.2d at 543. The trial judge may accept or reject
any or all of the witnesses' testimony. Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 287
(Tex.Crim.App.1990). Outside the evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we
review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85,
89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
Discussion
(a) The Detention
An officer may temporarily detain an individual
to determine the person's identity or maintain the status quo while the officer
obtains additional information. Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656, 657
(Tex.Crim.App.1986). This investigative detention differs from an arrest in that
no probable cause is required. Rather, investigative detention requires only the
existence of specific, articulable facts creating reasonable suspicion.
Reasonable suspicion is considered in light of the officer's experience and
knowledge and other inferences from the facts, that (1) some activity out of the
ordinary is occurring or has occurred which warrants further investigation, (2)
the detained person is connected to the unusual activity, and (3) the activity
is related to a crime. Id.
In this case, Officers Riojas and Enriquez observed three young people carrying
what appeared to be electronic equipment in the middle of the night. Officer
Riojas testified the young men appeared to turn away when he passed and a jacket
had been pulled over part of the largest item in an apparent attempt to conceal
what the suspects were carrying. A.T. appeared to be a juvenile in violation of
the city curfew. Once the items were placed on the ground, the officers could
clearly identify them as electronic and communications equipment. Given these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the officers to stop and temporarily
detain the three to determine their identities, their ages, and the possibility
they were in possession of stolen items.
(b) The Handcuffs
A.T. claims the use of handcuffs elevated the
stop from an investigative detention to an arrest. An individual is arrested and
in custody when "to a reasonable person ... the individual has been
actually restricted or restrained." Hoag v. State, 728 S.W .2d 375, 379
(Tex.Crim.App.1987). In determining whether an arrest has occurred, we evaluate
all the circumstances, including "the length of detention, the nature of
the officer's questions, the use of handcuffs, drawn weapons, physical force or
threatening language, or a relocation of the individual to the scene or the
police station ." Dean v. State, 938 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex.App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref'd); Francis v. State, 896 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.).
The use of handcuffs is not determinative of an arrest. Rhodes v. State, 945
S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Although it is not usual to handcuff
suspects, if there are conditions where safety is a concern, the use of
handcuffs to restrain suspects does not automatically constitute an arrest. Id.;
Josey v. State, 981 S.W .2d 831, 841 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref'd). Officers "may use such force as is reasonably necessary to effect
the goal of the stop: investigation, maintenance of the status quo, or officer
safety." Rhodes, 945 S.W.2d at 117 (citing to United States v. Sokolow, 490
S.W.2d 1 (1989)).
Officer Enriquez testified the suspects were handcuffed for security reasons
although A.T. did not make any threatening moves. The encounter occurred late at
night, lighting was poor, and there were multiple suspects. Under the
circumstances, the use of handcuffs was reasonable for the safety of the
officers and to preserve the status quo while a possible burglary was
investigated. See id. at 116.
A.T. also complains of the length of time he was detained. The officers
testified it took approximately thirty minutes to verify a burglary in the area.
This was not an unreasonable amount of time for an investigative detention,
considering Officer Enriquez's description of the continuing investigation. See
Josey, 981 S.W .2d at 841 (ninety minutes not unreasonable detention if
investigation is ongoing). We hold neither the use of the handcuffs nor the
length of the time elevated A.T.'s detention to an arrest.
(c) Violation of Curfew
Finally, A.T. argues he could not be legally
arrested for violation of the juvenile curfew. A.T. is correct that the San
Antonio juvenile curfew ordinance does not allow an officer to arrest a minor
for the first violation of curfew. [FN1] However, the evidence does not support
A.T.'s contention he was arrested for a curfew violation.
FN1. On a first violation, the officer is required to send the minor home on the
most direct route and to send a warning notice to the City's Youth Services
Division. The Youth Services Division then sends a letter to the child's
parents. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX.CODE, art. V §§ 21-121 to 21-125.
Both officers testified they stopped the three young men primarily for suspicion
of burglary. The ages of the three were a secondary consideration. As noted, A.T.
was not automatically under arrest at the time he was handcuffed. This custody
was merely a precaution to facilitate a proper investigative detention. A.T. was
not arrested until the officers confirmed the items carried by the three young
men matched the description of items taken in a nearby burglary. At that time,
probable cause existed to arrest A.T. for burglary and the arrest was made.
Conclusion
The trial court correctly held the officers had reasonable suspicion of recent
criminal activity which allowed them to stop and temporarily detain A.T. A.T.
was not unreasonably detained while a brief burglary investigation was conducted
nor was he illegally arrested for violation of the city's juvenile curfew. We
overrule all three of A.T.'s issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.