By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law
2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries
Evidence was sufficient to support a TYC commitment in an assault on a teacher case [In re V.S.] (02-1-11).
On December 19, 2001, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the juvenile court's decision to commit the respondent to the TYC although he had no prior juvenile referrals and inflicted no bodily injury on the victim.
02-1-11. In the Matter of V.S., UNPUBLISHED, No. 08-00-00053-CV, 2001 WL 1634656, 2001 Tex.App.Lexis ____ (Tex.App.-El Paso 12/19/01) [Texas Juvenile Law (5th Edition 2000)].
Facts: This is an appeal from a trial court's order of commitment to the Texas Youth Commission. Appellant, V.S., is a juvenile who was adjudged delinquent for having threatened his teacher with a knife.
Held: Affirmed.
Opinion Text: I. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
In two issues on review, Appellant contends that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's order that Appellant be committed to the Texas Youth Commission.
A juvenile court's disposition order is reviewable both for sufficiency of the evidence supporting the necessary findings and an abuse of discretion. In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). It is well established that the juvenile court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support them by the same standards as are applied in reviewing the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's answers to a charge. Id.; In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.); In re J.P. O., 904 S.W.2d 695, 699-700 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
In reviewing for legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence, both the State's and defense, in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789-90, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 165 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Davila v. State, 930 S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, writ ref'd). We do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign credibility to the witnesses, as it was the function of the trier of fact to do so. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Davila, 930 S.W.2d at 644. Instead, an appellate court's only duty is to determine if both the explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in a light most favorable to the verdict. Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 422; Davila, 930 S.W.2d at 644. In so doing, any inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843; Adelman, 828 S.W.2d at 421. In addition, this appellate court will only consider the evidence which tends to support the findings of the trier of fact and disregards all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); see Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.). If any probative evidence supports the determination of the trier of fact, it must be upheld. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (Tex.1951); Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591; Neily v. Aaron, 724 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ).
On the other hand, when we review for factual sufficiency, we consider all of the evidence, but we do not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Levario v. State, 964 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.). We will set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Levario, 964 S.W.2d at 295. In conducting a factual sufficiency review, the reviewing court cannot substitute its conclusions for those of the fact finder. See id. It is not within the province of this Court to interfere with the fact finder's resolution of conflicts in the evidence or to pass on the weight or credibility of the witness's testimony. See id. Where there is conflicting evidence, the fact finder's verdict on such matters is generally regarded as conclusive. See id.
Further, we do not disturb the juvenile court's disposition order in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In re M.A. C., 999 S.W .2d at 446; In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 861; In re E. F., 535 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.App.- Corpus Christi 1976, no writ). In that regard, when conducting this review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis:
(1) Did the trial court have sufficient
information upon which to exercise its discretion; and
(2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion?
In re M.A. C., 999 S.W.2d at 446; Leibman v. Grand, 981 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.); Lindsey, 965 S .W.2d at 591. The traditional sufficiency of the evidence review comes into play when considering the first question. In re M.A. C ., 999 S.W.2d at 446; Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 429-30; Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591. We then proceed to determine whether, based on the elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision or whether it is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re M.A. C., 999 S.W.2d at 446; Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 430; Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591. The question is not whether, in the opinion of this appellate court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court's action, but whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed .2d 721 (1986); Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 430; Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 591. The mere fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different manner than a member of this appellate court in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. See In re M.A. C., 999 S.W.2d at 446; Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex.1965); Leibman, 981 S.W.2d at 430; Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 592.
B. Disposition Proceedings
The juvenile court's exercise of discretion in making an appropriate disposition is guided by the requirements of Section 54.04 of the Family Code. In re M.A. C., 999 S.W.2d at 446; In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 861. Section 54.04(c) provides that the trial court may not make a disposition placing a juvenile outside of his home unless the court finds that the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation. In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 861; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(c) (Vernon 1996). Further, in order to commit a child to the Texas Youth Commission, the court must additionally find and state in its disposition order that placement outside of the child's home is in the child's best interest and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home. In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 86; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 54.04(i) (Vernon 1996).
In a juvenile case, the trial court possesses broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition of a child who has been adjudicated to have engaged in delinquent conduct. In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 861; In re J. R., 907 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ). Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the juvenile court's findings. In re A. S., 954 S.W.2d at 861; In re J. J., 916 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, no writ); In re J.P. O., 904 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied).
Appellant, a fourteen-year-old male was accused of intentionally and knowingly threatening his teacher with imminent bodily harm by threatening her with a deadly weapon, i.e., a knife. In addition, Appellant used and exhibited the knife while fleeing. Appellant entered a plea of true to the offenses at his adjudication hearing on December 14, 1999, and waived his right to a jury trial, the appearance and confrontation of witnesses, and his right to cross- examine the State's witnesses. Further, Appellant stipulated to the evidence and admitted those accusations against him.
At the disposition hearing, the State called Ms. Raquel Austin, Appellant's juvenile probation officer, to testify. She recommended that Appellant be committed to the Texas Youth Commission. Ms. Austin testified that Appellant had no prior history with regard to delinquent behavior. She also stated that Appellant's father did not have the skills needed to care for his son. She further stated that Appellant had been a ward of the State of California since the age of six and since that age has received numerous services. The services provided by the State of California included "relative placements, foster homes, [and] residential treatment centers...."
Ms. Austin testified that it was not until 1998 that the State of California was able to locate Appellant's father. Subsequent to locating him, attempts at reunification between Appellant and his father were made. Appellant, during the reunification process, was first placed in the Rio Grande Residential Treatment Center in Canutillo, Texas. Appellant then moved in with his father in November of 1999 and committed the instant offense approximately one month later.
With respect to the potential prospects for rehabilitation, Ms. Austin stated that Appellant required long term placement as he suffered from a multitude of ailments to include: prenatal exposure to crack cocaine, mental health concerns, and a father unable to cope with these issues. Ms. Austin testified that she believed that the Texas Youth Commission could adequately address all of Appellant's needs and that any other type of placement would be a duplication of services. Finally, Ms. Austin testified that the evaluating psychologist, Dr. Barrientos, recommended a "structured facility that will address [Appellant's] behavior modification, [and] anger management." Ms. Austin stated that the Texas Youth Commission could provide Appellant with the services he needs.
On cross-examination, Ms. Austin testified that
it is rare to recommend commitment at the Texas Youth Commission after one
adjudication. Concerning Appellant's family, Ms. Austin stated that Appellant's
mother was a "junkie"
and his father had not been around to assist in Appellant's rearing. She also
stated that Appellant's father does not have the skills necessary to assist in
the rehabilitation of Appellant.
On redirect-examination, the State's attorney asked Ms. Austin whether possible placement with relatives had been sought. Initially, Ms. Austin stated that avenue had not been explored. However, the record shows that during the questioning, the trial court ordered a recess while attempts were made, then and there, to place Appellant with family members. Specifically, Ms. Austin made contact with two of Appellant's aunts, who reside in the State of Georgia. Ms. Austin testified that while the aunts expressed concern for Appellant, they were unable to take on the responsibility to care for him.
Ms. Austin admitted that Appellant had received no services from the Juvenile Probation Department and that all other prior services afforded to Appellant were unrelated to his delinquent conduct. Ms. Austin also stated that she felt Appellant would be a danger to himself or others if he were placed back in the community. Finally, Ms. Austin stated she did not consider placing Appellant in the Boot Camp Program because this was merely going to set him up for failure.
Appellant's father, James Edward Spates, testified regarding the troubles and problems he and his family have experienced and his ability to overcome those problems. He further testified to the problems he has encountered with his son and his inability to assist in Appellant's upbringing. He stated that in trying to reform his son's behavior, he has become "financially destitute." Mr. Spates admitted he had only seen his son three times during a nine-year span.
The State next called Appellant's sister, Octavia Spates, to testify. Ms. Spates stated she hopes her brother gets help and does not hurt anyone. She further testified to having normal sibling relations with Appellant but was not really sure how Appellant got along with their father. Finally, Ms. Spates testified that she wants her brother to get help, "like some help where he won't hurt everybody."
The last State's witness called to the stand was Terry Santesquilla, a caseworker with the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.
Ms. Santesquilla testified that the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services became involved with the family in November of 1999, after receiving a report of possible physical abuse by the father against Appellant. She stated that allegations with respect to violence or abuse were not validated, and there is no basis for the Department to become actively involved at this time, which further limited the options available to the trial court. She stated that she did not close her file on the family despite finding no validation of abuse because of Appellant's history, i.e., his "problems with his behavior and out lashes."
Appellant testified in his own defense. Appellant testified as to the number of times he was placed in foster homes during the course of his lifetime. He stated that he did not wish to live with his father, but would rather go to Dallas and live in a foster home there. When questioned about the adjudicated offense, Appellant simply stated that he was trying to "get his point across" when he was chasing his teacher with a knife and that it was a "spur of the moment thing." Finally, Appellant spoke of an instance when he placed metal plates under his shirt in an attempt to make a bullet proof vest. Appellant stated he was making the vest because he believed his counselor was going to shoot him.
We have reviewed all the evidence, both the State's and Appellant's, in the light most favorable to the trial court's order of commitment. Given the evidence detailed above, we find that the trial court could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and commitment of Appellant to the Texas Youth Commission in the best interest of the child. Further, we have considered all of the evidence in the instant case, and given the evidence, we find that the trial court's order of commitment is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering such commitment to the Texas Youth Commission, and consequently, will not disturb the trial court's findings. Appellant's Issue Nos. One and Two are overruled in their entirety.