Body

By
Robert O. Dawson
Bryant Smith Chair in Law
University of Texas School of Law

2003 Case Summaries 2002 Case Summaries 2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries

Capital murder statement was admissible because the juvenile was not in custody; the statement was not involuntary under the due process standard [Martinez v. State] (03-4-06).

On September 17, 2003, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile was not in custody when he was interrogated by police about a capital murder; after making the statement, he was returned home and arrested the next day.

03-4-06. Martinez v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04-02-00329-CR, 2003 WL 22134614, 2003 Tex.App.Lexis ___ (Tex.App.-San Antonio 9/17/03) Texas Juvenile Law (5th Ed. 2000).

Facts: Appellant John Gilbert Martinez was found guilty of the offense of capital murder. He was 15 years old at the time of the offense and was certified to stand trial as an adult. A jury found Martinez guilty, and due to his age, an automatic life sentence was imposed.

On the morning of October 24, 2000, Jae Kyung Lee ("Lee") and Hyeon Ju Lee, recent emigres from Korea, opened their Dollar Plus store on Bandera Road. Through an interpreter, Lee testified that Martinez and Paul Vara, two customers he saw on an almost daily basis, came into the store twice that morning. Martinez and Vara returned a third time and asked Lee where his wife was. Lee responded that she was sleeping on a sofa near the cash register. After asking about several other items, Martinez and Vara asked Lee to show them a decorative sword displayed near the register. As Lee turned to get the sword, he saw a gun in Martinez's hand. Martinez fired a shot that hit Lee in the mouth and the impact of that shot caused Lee to fall to the floor. Lee then heard several things: Vara said, "shoot the wife;" two explosions sounded; and Hyeon Ju Lee cried out. Before Lee lost consciousness, he saw Martinez and Vara attempt to open the cash register. When Lee regained consciousness, the men were gone and he crawled out of the store to call for help.

Ben Esquivel, a police officer with the San Antonio Police Department, answered a call for a shooting at the Lees' store. When Esquivel and his partner arrived, they saw Lee outside the store, bleeding profusely and motioning the officers inside the store. Esquivel found Hyeon Ju Lee's body behind the cash register. She had been shot twice as someone stood over her.

Jae Kyung Lee was taken to the hospital where his injuries were treated. Four days later, Detective Holguin interviewed Lee at the hospital and showed Lee a photo array. Lee identified Vara and Martinez in separate photo arrays. As soon as Lee saw Martinez's photograph, he said, "That was the boy who shot me."

Juan Mendoza, Vara's step father, testified at trial. Mr. Mendoza stated that approximately two weeks before the shooting, Vara asked to borrow $200 to pay a debt Martinez owed to someone. Mr. Mendoza denied Vara's request. On the afternoon of the robbery, Mr. Mendoza became suspicious of the boys because they were watching the news, which was unusual. He noted that they seemed especially interested in news reports of the shooting at the Dollar Plus store.

Sylvia Mendoza, Vara's mother, testified that her husband roused her from a nap on the day of the shooting. Mr. Mendoza appeared concerned about the boys and asked her to talk to them. Mrs. Mendoza testified that the boys seemed scared and would not answer her questions. She was so alarmed by the boys' behavior that she asked them to leave. Two days later, Mrs. Mendoza spoke with Viola Serrano, one of Vara's girlfriends. The State was unable to produce Serrano as a witness at trial, but Mrs. Mendoza testified that Serrano informed her that Vara admitted committing the shooting at the Dollar Plus store. Serrano also informed Mrs. Mendoza that she hid the gun and that her mother had taken the shells from the gun to work and thrown them away there. After this conversation, Mrs. Mendoza called Detective Holguin and reported that she had information about her son's involvement in the shooting.

Serrano's mother testified that she called Detective Holguin and informed him that her daughter had the gun used in the shooting at the Dollar Plus store. The detective went to the Serrano home and retrieved a revolver. Ed Wallace, a firearms examiner for the Bexar County Criminal Investigation Laboratory, tested the gun recovered from the Serrano home against the bullet recovered from the scene and the one recovered from Hyeon Ju Lee's body. Wallace determined that the gun recovered from the Serrano home was the one used in the shooting at the Dollar Plus store.

Held: Affirmed.

Opinion Text: ADMISSIBILITY OF MARTINEZ'S STATEMENT

A trial court's suppression rulings are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex .Crim.App.2000). We will afford almost total deference to the factual findings entered by the trial court. See id. However, we review the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure de novo. See id. This court will reverse the trial court's judgment if we find, based on the totality of the circumstances, that Martinez's statement was illegally obtained, and that admission of the statement harmed him. See Baptist Vie Le v. State, 993 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

In his second issue, Martinez argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the written statement he gave to Detective Holguin. He claims that the written statement was not voluntarily given and its admission violates section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002) because he was not taken before a magistrate and never received a warning that he could remain silent, have an attorney present, receive appointed counsel, or terminate the interview at any time. He also argues that admission of his statement violates articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as well as article 1, sections 10 and 19 of the Texas Constitution, and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The State responds that articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure only apply to adults accused of a crime, not to juveniles like Martinez. The State also claims that Martinez's right to counsel under the Texas and United States Constitutions had not yet attached.

Section 51.095 of the Texas Family Code sets forth admonishments which must be given to a juvenile before the juvenile makes any statement. See id. § 51.095(a). If the juvenile is not given the statutorily required admonishments, then the juvenile's statement is inadmissible. See id. However, a statement which is not the product of custodial interrogation is not required to be suppressed, even when the juvenile does not receive the statutory admonishments. Melendez v. State, 873 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1994, no pet.).

Custodial interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of their freedom in any significant way. Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 671 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). A child is in custody if, under the objective circumstances, a reasonable child of the same age would believe his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Jeffley v. State, 38 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet ref'd); In re E.P.C., No. 04 02 00086 CV, 2003 WL 1611415, at *2 (Tex.App. San Antonio March 31, 2003, pet. denied)(mem.op.). We apply a two step analysis to determine whether an individual is in custody. First, the court examines all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether there was a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U .S. 318, 322 (1994). This initial determination focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the individual being questioned. Id. at 323. Second, in light of those circumstances, the court considers whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). Courts traditionally consider four factors in making this determination: (1) whether probable cause to arrest existed at the time of questioning; (2) the subjective intent of the police; (3) the focus of the investigation; and (4) the subjective belief of the defendant. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). However, the subjective intent of both the police and the defendant is irrelevant except to the extent that the intent may be manifested in the words or actions of law enforcement officials. Id. The custody determination is based entirely upon objective circumstances. Id. Additionally, being the focus of a criminal investigation does not amount to being in custody. See Meek v. State, 790 S.W .2d 618, 620 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). When the circumstances show that the individual acts upon the invitation or request of the police and there are no threats, express or implied, that he will be forcibly taken, then that person is not in custody at that time. Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 778 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). It is also important to note that station house questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody. Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255.

Martinez cites In re S.A.R., 931 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1996, writ denied), as support for the argument that he was in custody at the time he confessed his involvement in the crime. In S.A.R., a juvenile was taken to the police station by four officers in a marked patrol car. Id. at 587. Once at the station, the juvenile was photographed, fingerprinted, informed that she was a suspect, and questioned by three officers in a small room. Id. The officers focused their investigation on S.A.R. and told her that she was a suspect for attempted capital murder and capital murder. These facts, combined with the fact that the investigation focused on the juvenile, led this court to find that a reasonable person would have believed that their freedom of movement had been significantly curtailed. Id. [FN1]

FN1. The S.A.R. opinion was handed down before this court adopted the "reasonable child of the same age" definition of juvenile custody.

The circumstances surrounding Martinez's statement are distinguishable from those in S.A.R. Martinez voluntarily agreed to accompany plain clothes officers to the police station. The officers informed Martinez that he could drive himself or be transported to the station. Rosalinda Cuevas, Martinez's mother, agreed that her son could give a statement, and she accompanied her son to the police station in an unmarked car. Detective Saidler advised Martinez that no matter what he said, he would not be arrested that day. Both Martinez and Cuevas testified that they were advised that they would be brought home after the interview. Martinez was specifically advised that he was not being arrested before he left home, and he was never handcuffed. Martinez was taken to an interview room with Detective Holguin and Cuevas was taken to another room with Detective Saidler. Detective Holguin advised Martinez that Vara had provided a statement. Martinez then agreed to tell the detective what he knew. Martinez cooperated with the detective and, after giving his statement, said that he felt relieved. Martinez read over his statement and made handwritten corrections. He complied with Detective Holguin's request to read the first paragraph out loud to prove that he could read. After signing the statement, he left the interview room, joined his mother, and explained to her what he had done. Curiously, Detective Owen overheard Cuevas tell her son that he would be grounded and could not go out anywhere all weekend. Martinez agreed to let the detectives take a photograph of him, and then he and Cuevas were taken home. A warrant issued and Martinez was arrested the next day.

The parties agree that Martinez was not formally arrested or handcuffed at the time he gave his statement and that he voluntarily went to the police station. The fact that Martinez acted upon the invitation of the police and was never threatened to be forcibly taken indicates that his movement was not restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Dancy, 728 S.W.2d at 778 79. Martinez testified that once he arrived at the police station, he was questioned in a small interview room. He stated that he was surrounded by uniformed and plain clothes officers, all of whom were armed. However, all of the detectives present that day testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and Detective Holguin was the only officer to testify that his weapon may have been visible. In fact, Detective Owen testified that she and the other plain clothes detectives had gone to great lengths to conceal their weapons, and that none of the plain clothes officers' weapons were visible. It is also important to note that Martinez had been arrested before and had been adjudicated delinquent after committing vandalism. He testified that he was familiar with the arrest process and had previously been detained, handcuffed, arrested, and processed through the juvenile justice system where he was provided with appointed counsel. This evidence indicates that Martinez's freedom of movement was curtailed less than if he had been formally arrested.

Turning to the second prong, we decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. In answering this question, we look to the objective factors of whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest Martinez at the time and whether he was the focus of the investigation. The State concedes that the police may have had probable cause to arrest Martinez because both Vara and Nicole Russo, one of Vara's girlfriends, implicated Martinez in the robbery. However, at the time, the officers had information that Paul Vara pulled the trigger. Detective Saidler testified that when the officers asked Martinez to come to the police station, they were acting on information from Russo that Vara was the shooter. Additionally, Lee did not identify Martinez as the one who shot him until the day after the police questioned Martinez. Detective Holguin testified that the investigation did not focus on Martinez and continued even after Martinez gave his statement. This evidence shows that although the police suspected Martinez's involvement in the crime, he was not the only suspect at the time the police questioned him. [FN2]

FN2. As an aside, Martinez complains that on cross examination, Detective Holguin admitted that he failed to tell Martinez that he was being investigated about a murder. Martinez and Cuevas testified that if they had been told he would be questioned about a murder, they would not have agreed to go to the police station without a lawyer. However, on redirect, Holguin stated that he did tell Martinez that he was being investigated in connection with a robbery and murder. The trial court is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses as well as the weight to be afforded their testimony. Barton v. State, 605 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Therefore, Martinez's complaint that he was not informed of the severity of the crime being investigated does not alter this court's analysis. See Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) ("[t]rickery or deception does not make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.").

The remaining factors require us to look to the outward manifestations of the subjective beliefs of Martinez and the officers. Cuevas testified that Detective Saidler told Martinez that no matter what he said, he would not be arrested that day, and he would be going home after providing a statement. Detective Holguin testified that he told Martinez that he was not under arrest. These statements are objective proof that the police officers lacked the subjective intent to place Martinez in custody. However, Martinez testified that he was never told he was free to go. He stated that he felt scared and did not feel free to leave. However, he did not express these fears until the hearing on the motion to suppress. Because the subjective intent of the defendant is irrelevant unless it is manifested in words or actions, we can not consider his testimony that he felt scared or free to leave. In evaluating his subjective beliefs, we can consider what Martinez did not do. He never asked for a break, never asked to go home, and never asked for his mother or an attorney. This is objective evidence that Martinez was not in custody at the time he gave his statement.

The State also elicited testimony from Martinez that he was independent and had chosen to live away from his mother and step father. Martinez had been employed as a construction worker where he worked full days. He also stated that he had experience with budgeting money and knew how to navigate the bus system. Although the court received evidence that Martinez had the reading, spelling, and math abilities of a second or third grader, the evidence showed Martinez to be more worldly than the average 15 year old. Martinez did not hesitate before telling his story to the detectives. His behavior did not indicate that he was afraid or felt intimidated. We believe a reasonable child of the same age would have had the ability to terminate the interrogation and leave. The record supports a finding that Martinez was not in custody when he gave his statement.

Even in the absence of custody, due process may be violated by admitting confessions that are not voluntarily given. Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). A statement is not voluntary if there was "official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). If raised by the defendant, the prosecution bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was given voluntarily. Id. The trial court is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and the trial court's finding on voluntariness may not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

Martinez argues that evidence of his low education level and poor performance on intelligence tests combined with his age prove that he did not understand the significance of waiving his rights. However, "[t]he mere fact that appellant is uneducated and illiterate does not mean that he does not understand the nature of the rights he is waiving and cannot voluntarily give a confession." Peacock v. State, 819 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.App. Austin 1991, no pet.). Likewise, the fact of a juvenile's minority does not require that any confession be found involuntary. See, e.g., In re V.M.D., 974 S.W.2d 332, 346 (Tex.App. San Antonio 1998, no pet .) (holding 12 year old's confession to capital murder voluntary even absent the admonishments provided by the Family Code).

Evidence of Martinez's worldly experiences shows that he was more sophisticated than an average 15 year old; in fact, the record demonstrates that Martinez's behavior was comparable to that of an adult. Additionally, the fact that he had been previously arrested, handcuffed, and provided with a lawyer militates toward a finding that he understood the value of his rights and the significance of waiving those rights. In the presence of his mother and also with her consent, Martinez voluntarily accompanied the officers to the station for the purpose of giving a statement. There is no allegation that any of the detectives threatened or otherwise coerced Martinez into making his confession. Likewise, there is no allegation that any of the officers suggested how the crime might have occurred or promised leniency in exchange for the confession.

Detective Owen testified that 90 minutes to two hours passed between the time Martinez arrived at the police station and the time he was returned home. In the interim, Martinez told his story to Detective Holguin, the detective typed the four page confession, Martinez read the first paragraph out loud, made corrections to the statement, and told his mother what he had done. Martinez was eager to tell his story and Detective Holguin testified that Martinez appeared relieved after signing the statement. Even if Martinez had created a fact issue on the voluntariness of his statement, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the State controverted that evidence and proved that the statement was voluntary. These facts support the trial court's conclusion that Martinez voluntarily gave his written statement. Because this finding is supported by the record, we overrule Martinez's second issue.

DENIED REQUEST FOR A VOLUNTARINESS CHARGE

In his fourth issue, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard Martinez's confession if it was unable to find that the confession was voluntarily given. However, because Martinez was not in custody when he made his statement, the question of whether the jury should have received an instruction on the voluntariness of that statement is moot. See Land v. State, 943 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.)(finding that the requirements of article 38.22 regarding instructing the jury on the voluntariness of a statement do not apply when the statement did not stem from custodial interrogation); Garza v. State, 915 S.W.2d 204, 210 (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1996, pet. ref'd). We therefore overrule Martinez's third issue.

2003 Case Summaries 2002 Case Summaries 2001 Case Summaries 2000 Case Summaries 1999 Case Summaries