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By
The Honorable
Pat Garza
Associate Judge
386th District Court
San Antonio, Texas
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
A school
district may adopt a policy authorizing corporal punishment without the
permission of the parents. [Texas Attorney General Opinion No.
GA-0374](05-4-27)
On November 7, 2005, the Attorney General opined that a professional
school district employee may utilize corporal punishment to the extent
permitted by other state law and school district policies.
A finding of
indigency for appeal can be predicated on either a hearing or an affidavit by
the child's parent in the trial court.[In the Matter of D.L.C.](05-4-26)
On November 8, 2005, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the
provisions of the Texas Family Code apply, allowing for a finding of
indigence for appeal on either a hearing or an affidavit by the child's
parent at the trial court.
Transfer of
determinate sentence probation to adult probation is not an appealable order.[In
the Matter of J.H.](05-4-25)
On November 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that a
trial court’s order transferring a determinate sentence probation to an
appropriate criminal district court is not an appealable order.
Judicial
confession, was sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant committed arson as alleged.[In the Matter of A.V.](05-4-24)
On July 20, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a judicial
confession standing alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon a
guilty plea even if the defendant does nothing more than affirm that the
allegations are true and correct.
Documents that
are correct copies of those upon which a clerk's office relies in accounting for
a juvenile's record constitutes extrinsic evidence that the records are what the
proponent claims them to be.[Hull v. State](05-4-23)
On August 16, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that
under Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(7), documents may be authenticated by showing
that they are from a public office authorized to keep such a records and
they contain a certification showing that they are from the public office.
A diagnostic
examination (for discretionary transfer to adult criminal court) which exceeded
its intended purpose and became a source of incriminating evidence constituted a
custodial interrogation to which Fifth Amendment protections apply.(05-4-22)
On October 31, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a court ordered
diagnostic examination was a "critical stage" of the adversarial proceedings
and warranted the right of the juvenile to have counsel present where the
examination served a "dual purpose" including being a source of
incriminating evidence introduced at the juvenile’s trial.
In juvenile
case, appellant’s notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the
judgment is signed.[In the Matter of C.G.](05-4-21)
On October 31, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that, although
Appellant filed a motion for new trial, because the motion was filed more
than thirty days after judgment, the motion was untimely, and the appellate
court had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
In UUMV
prosecution, evidence was sufficient where owner of vehicle did not
affirmatively communicate to the defendant that consent to operate the vehicle
was being withheld.[In the Matter of K.D.F.](05-4-20)
On November 3, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that, in
unauthorized use of motor vehicle prosecution, evidence was factually
sufficient to support the juvenile court's judgment that showed that
respondent knowingly exceeded the scope of his consent given by owner of
vehicle.
Evidence
was sufficient to support conviction for capital murder of a child where
respondent "knowingly" shot gun at a group of people where four year old
child was standing.[Rojas v. State](05-4-19)
On July 21, 2005, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals, held that
the evidence supported the inference that defendant knowingly killed a child
because he knew that shooting his gun at a group of people was reasonably
certain to result in a death and that any lack of specific intent to kill
the child did not render the evidence insufficient to support his capital
murder conviction.
Trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to allow respondent to withdraw stipulation
where State and defendant had a plea bargain regarding disposition. [In the
Matter of M.D.G.](05-4-18)
On October 27, 2005, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that trial court
did not follow plea bargain where plea bargain recited that child would be
placed on one year probation in the home of his grandmother, and trial court
ordered child detained in juvenile facility for a minimum of six months.
In Determinate
Sentence transfer hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
child transferred to TDCJ to complete sentence. [In the Matter of C.F.](05-4-17)
On October 28, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Cir.) held that
evidence about appellant's incidents of misconduct and TYC's recommendation
for transfer constituted enough evidence to supportive trial court's
decision to transfer child to TDCJ.
Trial court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence or in
denying respondent’s motion to recuse. [In the Matter of J.W.A.](05-4-16)
On October 13, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that neither
transcripts, evidence of rulings at trial, nor documents from
co-respondent’s trial, constituted evidence of deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism against respondent in motion to recuse.
A juvenile's adjudication for assault against a family
member can not be enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony based on a prior
adjudication for assault against a family member. [In the Matter of
J.G.](05-4-15)
On October 6, 2005, the Austin Court of
Appeals held that Penal Code Section 22.01, cannot be used to enhance a
juvenile's misdemeanor adjudication for assault against a family member from
a misdemeanor to a felony based on a prior misdemeanor adjudication for
assault against a family member.
In misdemeanor offense, state need
not plead former misdemeanor adjudications in order to commit a juvenile
offender to TYC.[In the Matter of J.D.L.Z.](05-4-14)
On September 29, 2005, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 53.04(d) (2002) did
not require the State to plead former misdemeanor adjudications in order to
commit a juvenile offender to TYC.
Evidence was sufficient to support jury's finding
that respondent engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of
fraudulent use of identifying information. [In the Matter of D.J.](05-4-13)
On September 30, 2005, the Tyler Court
of Appeals held that evidence was legally sufficient to support jury's
finding that respondent engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the
offense of fraudulent use of identifying information resulting in subsequent
commitment to TYC.
The issue of whether a child lacks responsibility for his
conduct as a result of mental illness must be tried to the court or jury at the
adjudication hearing, not during the hearing to modify disposition. [In the
Matter of D.B.](05-4-12)
On September 30, 2005, the Dallas Court
of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that testimony during the hearing to
modify disposition concerning appellant’s mental status failed because the
issue regarding lack of responsibility must be brought during the
adjudication hearing.
At transfer
hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony by
victim regarding the impact of crime on her and her life. [In the Matter of
L.C.H.](05-4-11)
On September 23, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals, held that testimony
by victim were not impermissible statements regarding her wishes as to what
type of punishment should be imposed, but were only statements concerning
the impact of the crime (sexual assault) on her and her life.
A trial court
lacks jurisdiction to commit a child to TYC when the child’s probation has
expired and there is no order in writing and signed by the trial court extending
the probation. [In the Matter of P.B.B.](05-4-10)
On September 15, 2005, the Eastland Court of Appeals reversed a TYC
commitment, holding that the trial court lost jurisdiction because a docket
sheet entry extending appellant’s probation was insufficient, the order
extending jurisdiction (probation) must be in writing and signed by the
judge.
In a
felony-murder prosecution, the culpable mental state for the act of murder is
supplied by the mental state of the accompanying felony. [In the Matter of
E.B.M.](05-4-09)
On August 31, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that, in a
felony-murder prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to establish the mens
rea to unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (the underlying felony), and did
not relate to the mens rea of the lesser included offenses of criminally
negligent homicide or manslaughter.
An appeal from
an order of a juvenile court is to a court of appeals, and the requirements
governing an appeal are as in civil cases generally. [In the Matter of
R.G.](05-4-08)
On August 31, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that, in juvenile
cases, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the disposition
is signed unless a party timely files a motion for new trial, motion to
modify the judgment, a motion to reinstate under Tex. R. Civ. P. 165a, or a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The procedures
established in Anders apply to juvenile appeals. [In the Matter of A.R.B.](
05-4-07)
On August 31, 2005, the El Paso Court held that the procedures
established in Anders apply to juvenile appeals.
A witness's
assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment rights and refusal to testify is not
evidence and the jury is not allowed to draw any inferences from such actions.
[McKaine v. State](05-4-06B)
On August 31, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that
evidence, could be properly excluded, if it was offered to allow the jury to
consider a witnesses' assertions of their Fifth Amendment rights, even if
trial court did not state that as the reason for exclusion.
During a
certification and transfer hearing, the juvenile court did not err in admitting
a psychological report into evidence without the state calling the doctor who
authored the report. [McKaine v. State](05-4-06A)
On August 31, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a trial
court did not abuse its discretion and conducted a "full investigation and
hearing" as required by the Texas Family Code without live testimony from
the author of a psychological report.
Fact that
incident occurred in a high crime area was but one of the relevant factors
considered in reviewing reasonable suspicion for stop and frisk. [In the Matter
of C.A.N.](05-4-05)
On June 15, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that utilizing the
totality of the circumstances presented, officers drew from specific and
reasonable inferences which gave them reasonable suspicion to immediately
conduct a pat-down search.
Traffic stop not
considered custody, therefore warning requirements of Miranda and TFC §51.095
were not required.[In the Matter of R.A.](05-4-04)
On June 15, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that this
(case-by-case) routine traffic stop was "presumptively temporary and brief"
and as a result, non-custodial, and questions asked by the officer were not
considered custodial interrogation.
Jeopardy
attaches in a juvenile proceeding when the jury has been empaneled and sworn.
[State v. C.J.F.](05-4-03)
On August 25, 2005, the Houston (1st Dist.) Court of Appeals held that
jeopardy attaching when a jury is empaneled and sworn, concerning adult
criminal defendants, applies equally to a juvenile proceedings.
In a disposition
hearing, the state’s offer of copies of two previous orders of adjudication, a
previous order granting probation, and a previous order modifying a disposition
were properly self-authenticated. [Hull v. State](05-4-02)
On August 16, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that
copies of orders of adjudication, granting probation and modifying
disposition were properly self-authenticated because they contained the seal
of the County Court and the signature of the County Juvenile Court Clerk.
Admonishments
required for adjudication pleas do not apply to modification hearings. [In the
Matter of K.L.S.](05-4-01)
On August 18, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that there
is no requirement that the admonishments required for acceptance of guilty
pleas be given at a hearing on a motion to modify, because the original
admonitions from the adjudication hearing carry over into the disposition.
In Motion to
Modify Hearing, mother’s instruction to respondent to go look for his brother
after curfew, did not raise the defense of necessity.[In the Matter of
A.D.](05-3-37B)
On May 25, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the evidence did
not show that obeying his mother's instructions was immediately necessary to
avoid imminent harm or that avoiding the harm clearly outweighed the harm
sought to be prevented by the condition of his court-ordered probation.
In Motion to
Modify Hearing, allegation that respondent violated condition 14, while evidence
established violation of condition 15, were not material or fatal. [In the
Matter of A.D.](05-3-37A)
On May 25, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that variance in proof
and allegations in Motion to Modify were not material or fatal since
respondent never complained of being misled by the motion or being surprised
by the State's proof at trial.
In a
Modification of Disposition service of process is not required, only reasonable
notice. [In the Matter of T.E.](05-3-36)
On July 7, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that in a Motion to
Modify, when a child's attorney appears, does not file a motion for
continuance, and the child and parents are present and fully advised by the
court as to the issues before the court, reasonable notice is presumed.
Double
jeopardy clause was neither implicated nor violated by TYC administrative
sanctions for escape. [In the Matter of J.M.](05-3-35B)
On August 11, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a
juvenile court commitment to TYC for escape was not double jeopardy, where
respondent had already received administrative sanctions by TYC for the same
escape.
Five month
delay in escape prosecution was not "presumptively prejudicial" in speedy trial
analysis. [In the Matter of J.M.](05-3-35A)
On August 11, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals concluded that a
five month delay was not "presumptively prejudicial" and as a result
respondent’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was not abridged.
Record was
sufficient to support orders against parents, who were served and given notice,
for juvenile court fees and cost. [In the Matter of J.A.G.](05-3-34).
On August 11, 2005, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that with respect
to fees and costs, a seperate evidentiary hearing was not necessary to show
that parents "have by wilful act or omission, contributed to, caused, or
encouraged [child’s] delinquent conduct."
Evidence
sufficient to support adjudication for burglary of a building. [In the Matter of
D.H.](05-3-33)
On June 24, 2005, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that the
evidence under the proper standards, was legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court's finding that respondent committed burglary of a
building.
In Motion to
Modify Hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant
to TYC.[In the Matter of I.R.](05-3-32)
On June 28, 2005, the Dallas Court (5th Dist.) of Appeals did not agree
that the trial court committed appellant to TYC because he refused to attend
church.
Neighbor's
statement to officer victim was nontestimonial and exempt from Confrontation
Clause scrutiny. [In the Matter of D.G.G.](05-3-31).
On August 4, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that a witness’s
statement to victim police officer was not "testimonial" in nature and as a
result did not violate Crawford v. Washington.
No evidence
that counsel's performance failed to constitute reasonably effective assistance
of counsel. [Marthiljohi v. State](05-3-30B)
On August 4, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that there
was no evidence that counsel's performance failed to constitute reasonably
effective assistance of counsel.
Court ordered
psychiatrist testifying that appellant had the capacity to commit murder and
knew the wrongfulness of his action, did not violate appellant’s rights.
[Marthiljohni v. State](05-3-30A)
On August 4, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that Court
ordered psychiatrist testifying that appellant had the capacity to commit
murder and knew the wrongfulness of his action did not violate his rights
under the Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and former article 46.02,
section 3(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Trial Court
abused its discretion in committing 11 year old to TYC for violating conditions
of probation. [In the Matter of S.G.](05-3-29)
On April 6, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a TYC
commitment finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conclusion that all resources had been expended on probation, or that child
posed a threat to the community.
Hearsay allowed
in Motion to Modify hearing regarding violations of probation. [In the Matter of
M.W.R.](05-3-28)
On April 13, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, in a
Motion to Modify hearing, the confrontation clause was not violated by a
probation officer testifing that appellant's mother informed her that
appellant was not at home during his curfew hours.
An
adjudication for the offense of Retaliation requires evidence that the actor was
retaliating against a witness to the crime alleged in the petition. [In the
Matter of K.H.](05-3-27B)
On June 6, 2005, the Texarkana Court held that, in a prosecution for
Retaliation, if there is no evidence of the crime alleged in the petition,
there cannot be a retaliation against a witness to that crime.
Retaliation
against a witness is retaliation against "one who has testified in an official
proceeding," not one who "may" testify. [In the Matter of K.H.](05-3-27A)
On July 26, 2005, the Texarkana Court held that if the state alleges the
offense of "Retaliation Against a Witness," the witness must be one who has
testified in an official proceeding, as apposed to being a prospective
witness, who is one who may testify in an official proceeding.
A TYC
commitment based on a second misdemeanor adjudication does not require that the
conduct (of the second adjudication) occur after the date of the previous
disposition. [In the Matter of M.A.](05-3-26)
On July 27, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a TYC commitment
based on a second misdemeanor adjudication requires that the conduct (of the
second adjudication) occur after the date of the previous adjudication, not
previous disposition.
Wisconsin Supreme Court
rules that all custodial interrogations of juveniles must be recorded. [In the
Interest of Jerrell C.J.](05-3-25)
On July 7, 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court exercised its supervisory
power to require that all custodial interrogation of juveniles be
electronically recorded where feasible, and without exception when
questioning occurred at a place of detention.
Evidence was
factually and legally sufficient to prove sexual intercourse [In the Matter of
A.B.] (05-3-24)
On February 3, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the evidence
was factually and legally sufficient to prove that respondent had sexual
intercourse with the child-victim.
Change in 2003
Motion to Modify statute requiring only one prior misdemeanor adjudication is
not ex post facto violation for juveniles placed on probation prior to effective
date of statute.[In the Matter of U.G.V.](05-3-23)
On July 14, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the 2003
amendment to Section 54.05(k) of the Texas Family Code did not increase
punishment for prior conduct, therefore, in this respect was not an ex post
facto violation for child placed on probation prior to act.
Violation not
alleged in first motion to modify may be used in subsequent motion to modify.
[In the Matter of J.L.E.](05-3-22)
On July 14, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a
violation of probation occurring prior to a previous motion to modify
hearing (placing child on probation) may be used for new (second) motion to
modify (committing child to TYC).
Trial court
properly ordered juvenile transferred from TYC to the TDCJ to complete
determinate sentence. [In the Matter of C.G.](05-3-21)
On Aril 1, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by transferring juvenile to the
TDCJ and that its decision was firmly rooted in defendant's identifiable
misconduct while at TYC.
In indecency
with a child, failure to conduct a reliability hearing (for outcry witness)
outside the presence of the jury was harmless error. [In the Matter of
C.E.B.](05-3-20)
On June 30, 2005, the Beaumont Court of Appeals used the civil rules in
their harmless error analysis (The trial court's error is reversible if it
probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment) in trial court’s
failure to conduct reliability hearing for outcry witness.
In a motion to
suppress a confession, the respondent has the burden to establish a causal
connection and the state has the burden to disprove it or establish an
attenuation-of-taint. [Pham/Gonzales v. State](05-3-19)
On June 29, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals released their corrected
opinion, holding that when a statement is obtained in violation of TFC
§52.02, it is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence demonstrating the
causal connection, the burden then shifts to the State to either disprove
the evidence produced, or establish that the causal chain asserted by the
defendant was in fact broken.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion by committing juvenile to the TYC. [In the Matter of
C.F.](05-3-18)
On June 23, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the record
included factually and legally sufficient evidence to justify the
disposition ordering juvenile committed to the TYC.
Evidence was
legally and factually insufficient to support the conclusion that respondent
made an abuse or harrassing phone call to 911 operator. [In the Matter of
M.C.](05-3-17)
On June 23, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that evidence was
legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that a
911 call was made to a "public safety answering point" employee.
Magistrate’s
confession warnings given in compliance with TFC 51.095. [In the Matter of
A.J.](05-3-16)
On June 23, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Motion to Suppress Confession
for failure to comply with TFC 51.095.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding drug test evidence under Rule 403.[In the
Matter of J.A.C.](05-3-15)
On June 14, 2005, the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding all evidence regarding the
drug test results on the bases of reliability and jury confusion.
Fact that
incident occurred in a high crime area was but one of the relevant factors
considered in reviewing reasonable suspicion for stop and frisk. [In the Matter
of C.A.N.](05-3-14)
On June 15, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that utilizing the
totality of the circumstances presented, officers drew from specific and
reasonable inferences which gave them reasonable suspicion to immediately
conduct a pat-down search.
Traffic stop
not considered custody, therefore warning requirements of Miranda and TFC
§51.095 were not required.[In the Matter of R.A.](05-3-13)
On June 15, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals held that this
(case-by-case) routine traffic stop was "presumptively temporary and brief"
and as a result, non-custodial, and questions asked by the officer were not
considered custodial interrogation.
Family Code
provision restricting right to jury trial at the disposition hearing does not
violate the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. [In the
Matter of F.V.B.](05-3-12)
On June 1, 2005, the Eastland Court of Appeals recognized that the United
States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have held that
trial courts can determine dispositions, so long as they do not increase the
penalty beyond the statutory maximum for the crime.
Trial court
abused its discretion by admitting extraneous offense in aggravated sexual
assault disposition hearing. [In the Matter of C.J.M.](05-3-11)
On June 16, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a trial court
abused its discretion, when during the disposition phase of an aggravated
sexual assault trial, it admitted evidence of an unadjudicated sexual
assault against another child.
In aggravated
sexual assault trial, outcry witness testimony was admissible. (In The Matter Of
V.B.)(05-3-10)
On February 23, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found no evidence
in the record that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
victims' statements reliable and that the testimony from the outcry witness
bore sufficient indicia of reliability with respect to the time, content,
and circumstances of the statements for the testimony to be admissible
pursuant to Texas Family Code § 54.031.
Respondent
waived his objection to Motion to Suppress ruling by offering evidence
establishing the same facts at trial. [In the Matter of R.J.R.](05-3-09)
On June 9, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that under the
principle known as curative admissibility, the admission of improper
evidence cannot be asserted as grounds for reversal on appeal where the
defendant, on direct examination, gives testimony establishing the same
facts as those to which an objection was raised.
In a motion to
suppress a confession, the respondent has the burden to establish a causal
connection and the state has the burden to disprove it or establish an
attenuation-of-taint. [Pham/Gonzales v. State](05-3-08)
On June 8, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that when a statement
is obtained in violation of TFC §52.02, it is the defendant’s burden to
produce evidence demonstrating the causal connection, the burden then shifts
to the State to either disprove the evidence produced, or establish that the
causal chain asserted by the defendant was in fact broken.
Trial court did
not abuse it’s discretion in transferring juvenile from TYC to the TDCJ to
complete the remainder of determinate sentence. [In The Matter of
J.L.C.](05-3-07)
On April 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that the
trial court did not abuse it’s discretion by entered an order transferring
juvenile from TYC to TDCJ to complete the remainder of his 7-year
determinate sentence for the offense of Aggravated Assault and Theft.
An
adjudication for the offense of retaliation requires evidence that the actor was
retaliating against a witness to the crime alleged in the petition. [In the
Matter of K.H.](05-3-06B)
On June 6, 2005, the Texarkana Court held that if there is no evidence of
the crime alleged in the petition, there cannot be a retaliation against a
witness to that crime.
Retaliation
against a witness is retaliation against "one who has testified in an official
proceeding," not one who "may" testify. [In the Matter of K.H.](05-3-06A)
On June 6, 2005, the Texarkana Court held that if the state alleges
retaliation against a witness, the witness must be one who has testified in
an official proceeding, as apposed to being a prospective witness, who is
one who may testify in an official proceeding.
Denial of
motion to sever six counts of aggravated sexual assault not error. [In the
Matter of D.L.](05-3-05B)
On February 23, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held motion to sever six
counts of aggravated sexual assault proper because legal elements of proof
were similar for each victim, the cases shared common witnesses and fact
patterns, and defendant made no showing that evidence of the extraneous
offenses would not have been admissible in severed cases.
Chapter 62
(sex offender registration statute) held constitutional as applied to juveniles.
[In the Matter of D.L.](05-3-05A)
On February 23, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that, as applied to
juveniles, the registration procedure was nonpunitive in both intent and
effect and therefore could not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering juvenile committed to TYC. [In the Matter
of K.W.](05-3-04)
On April 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals [5th Dist] held that
appellant’s physical aggressiveness, non-school attendance, association with
negative peers and lack of suitable placement was sufficient for commitment
to TYC.
Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in transferring juvenile from TYC to TDCJ. [In the
Matter of J.L.C.](05-3-03)
On April 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that trial court did
not abuse its discretion where TYC representative testified about numerous
incidents of misconduct by juvenile and recommended transfer to TDCJ.
Evidence during
assault trial regarding stolen items was not inadmissible extraneous offense
evidence. [In the Matter of R.M.](05-3-02)
On May 18, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that evidence of
juvenile’s behavior and threats at the time of arrest were admissible to
show his consciousness of guilt.
Failure to
raise jurisdictional objections prior to plea of guilty waives them for appeal.
[Mays v. State](05-3-01)
On May 19, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals [1st Dist.] held that when
appellant pleaded guilty without objecting to transfer of jurisdiction from
juvenile court to district court, he failed to preserve any complaint for
appeal.
Juvenile
petition is less stringent than the standard applicable to criminal indictments
in that it requires only that the juvenile be given notice of the offense
charged. [In the Matter of J.B.M.](05-2-36)
On February 3, 2005 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the
State's petition, which tracked the language of the criminal attempt statute
and stated the offense allegedly attempted, gave defendant fair notice of
the offense charged
Questioning of
respondent by trial court during disposition hearing was not reversible error.
[In the Matter of K.P.S.](05-2-35)
On April 28, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a trial
court's questioning of appellant during disposition hearing did not
constitute fundamental error, and appellant had to object in order to
preserve error for appeal.
Official who
provides accurate information to a neutral intermediary ( trial judge), cannot
"cause" subsequent Fifth Amendment violation arising out of involuntary
statement made while in custody.[Murry v. Earle](05-2-34)
On April 13, 2005, the US Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit held that
district attorneys, police detectives, and a child protective services
supervisor, had no liability under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action because state
judge who admitted the unlawful confession was a superseding cause of
plaintiff minor’s injury.
Strip searches
of high school students to find money unconstitutional. [Beard v.
Whitmore](05-2-33)
On April 4, 2005, the 6th Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals
ruled that strip searches of high school students to find money was
unreasonable, however, the teachers and officer were entitled to qualified
immunity.
State met its
burden of persuasion by proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt and did not
need to produce evidence directly refuting the evidence of the defense of fact.
[In The Matter of S.S.](05-2-32)
On April 20, 2005, the Waco Court of Appeals held that the State's burden
does not decrease once a mistake of fact defense is raised; rather, the
State must disprove the defense by proving its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Evidence was
both legally and factually sufficient to support aggravated assault conviction.
[Scott v. State](05-2-31)
On April 14, 2005, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that evidence in
murder trial was sufficient to support charge on law of parties and jury’s
verdict on lesser offense of aggravated assault.
Hearsay allowed
in Motion to Modify hearing regarding violations of probation. [In the Matter of
M.W.R.](05-2-30)
On April 13, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, in Motion
to Modify hearing, confrontation clause not violated by probation officer
testifing that appellant's mother informed her that appellant was not at
home during his curfew hours.
In determinate
sentence transfer hearing appellant waived his complaint as to the lack of the
twenty-four hour period and failed to properly preserve his issue for appeal.
[In The Mater of L.D.M.](05-2-29)
On April 21, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st Dist.), held that
Appellant's trial counsel waived error when she conceded she had had an
opportunity to review all of the TYC's reports and never objected to the
failure to receive them more than twenty-four hours before the beginning of
the hearing.
Trial court did
not abused its discretion in ordering appellant committed to TYC. [In the Matter
of K.W.](05-2-28)
On April 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing child to TYC in light
of aggressive behavior and no available placement facilities for the child.
Trial court did
not abuse it’s discretion in transferring juvenile from TYC to the TDCJ to
complete the remainder of determinate sentence. [In The Matter of
J.L.C.](05-2-27)
On April 14, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that the
trial court did not abuse it’s discretion by entered an order transferring
juvenile from TYC to TDCJ to complete the remainder of his 7-year
determinate sentence for the offense of Aggravated Assault and Theft.
Texas Attorney
General says that parent not excepted from Family Code confidentiality
restrictions.(05-2-26)
On March 31, 2005, the Texas Attorney General opined that section 58.007
of the Family Code does not allow the disclosure of juvenile records
involving allegations of delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for
supervision to juvenile’s parent.
Trial Court
abused its discretion in committing 11 year old to TYC for violating conditions
of probation. [In the Matter of S.G.](05-2-25)
On April 6, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a TYC
commitment finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conclusion that all resources had been expended on probation, or that child
posed a threat to the community.
Texas Attorney
General concludes Texas Department of Family and Protective Services cannot
access juvenile records under Family Code.](05-2-24)
On March 15, 2005, the Texas Attorney General opined that the Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services is neither a "juvenile justice
agency" or a "criminal justice agency" and can not receive reports
restricted under section 58.007 of the Family Code.
Jury
instructions considered proper in capital murder adjudication. [Vargas v.
State](05-2-23B)
On March 31, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st Dist.) held, in a
capital murder adjudication, that since the jury instruction was a correct
statement of the law, it was not a comment on the weight of the evidence.
The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant's statement admissible.
[Vargas v. State](05-2-23A)
On March 31, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st Dist.) held that
defendant’s statement "I don't want to do this," was ambiguous (regarding
termination of interview) and therefore his statement was admissible.
Trial court
properly ordered juvenile transferred from TYC to the TDCJ to complete
determinate sentence. [In the Matter of C.G.](05-2-22)
On Aril 1, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by transferring juvenile to the
TDCJ and that its decision was firmly rooted in defendant's identifiable
misconduct while at TYC.
Application for
personal bond pending determinate sentence appeal made to Court of Appeals,
denied. [In Re J.G.](05-2-21)
On December 22, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals, in denying
application for personal bond pending determinate sentence appeal, found
that the benefits that the defendant was receiving at TYC outweighed the
detriments of his continued commitment.
Determinate
Sentence transfer from custody of TYC to TDCJ s05-2-20.htmupported by the
evidence. [In the Matter of R.H.](05-2-20)
On December 15, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals could not say that
the trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant transferred from
TYC to TDCJ to serve the remainder of his determinate sentence.
Placement on
probation outside of home is not abuse of discretion in contempt adjudication.
[In the Matter of E.T.](05-2-19)
On November 10, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in placing juvenile on probation outside
of home on contempt of JP court order.
In determinate
sentence transfer hearing failure to raise complaints in trial court waived
contentions. [In the Matter of R.M.](05-2-18)
On November 3, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that because
defendant did not raise his complaints in the trial court regarding
inadequate notice and that the conditions of his confinement were cruel and
unusual, the appellate court held that defendant waived these contentions.
Trial Court did
not abuse its discretion in placing juvenile on probation outside his home even
though both he and his parents wanted him to be placed in his home. [In the
Matter of T.G.](05-2-17)
On November 10, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals denied defendant’s
request for rehearing holding appellant has not demonstrated the trial court
abused its discretion in placing juvenile on probation outside his home.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion in placing juvenile on probation outside his home after
an open plea to burglary. [In the Matter of M.J.A.](05-2-16)
On December 8, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals, en banc, (on
rehearing) withdrew their previous opinion and affirmed trial courts
decision to place juvenile outside the home on a charge of burglary.
Driver
considered in joint possession of marijuana found on front passenger floorboard
(in plain view), with a noticeable odor in the car. [In the Matter of
N.B.](05-2-15)
On February 3, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that an affirmative
link existed when a baggie of marijuana was found in plain view, with a
noticeable odor in the car, and the substance is conveniently accessible to
the driver.
Juvenile’s
request for his mother to get a lawyer considered unequivocal request for
counsel during magistrate admonishments. [In the Matter of H.V.](05-2-14)
On March 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a juvenile’s
request to call his mother to be an unambiguous request for an attorney when
request was followed by statement that he wanted his mother to ask for an
attorney.
Grandparents
could not substitute counsel for child after mother was removed and they were
replaced as conservator for the child. [Greene v. Ellis] (05-2-12)
On March 1, 2005, the U.S. District Court (S.D.Tex.) refused to
substitute counsel hired by grandparents for counsel hired by mother, after
mother had been removed as conservator for the child.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion in committing respondent to TYC for assault on a public
servant [In The Matter of J.F.S.](05-2-11)
On February 17,2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in a per curiam
opinion held that a juvenile court had broad discretion in determining a
suitable disposition and will not reverse the juvenile court's decision
absent a clear abuse of discretion
Decision to
transfer determinate sentence probation from juvenile court to adult court is
not appealable. [In The Matter of C.M.W.](05-2-10)
On February 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
Family Code does not permit juvenile defendants to appeal from section
54.051 (determinate sentence probation) transfers from juvenile court to
district court.
Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 59.014 does not permit a juvenile to bring an appeal which is based upon
the failure of the trial court to make a disposition pursuant to the sanction
level guidelines. [In The Matter of C.E.F.](05-2-09)
On February 17, 2005, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the Trial
Court did not abuse its discretion in committing child to TYC and Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 59.014 does not permit a juvenile to bring an appeal which is
based upon the failure of the trial court to make a disposition pursuant to
the sanction level guidelines.
Baggie of
marijuana and rolling papers found on front passenger floorboard was sufficient
to establish affirmative link to driver of vehicle. [In the Matter of N.B.]
(05-2-08)
On February 3, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals held (on stipulated
evidence) that the smell of marijuana coming from vehicle, a baggie of
marijuana ("later found to be approximately 3.26 grams") and rolling papers
on the front passenger floorboard affirmatively linked respondent driver and
establishes that the marijuana was a "usable quantity."
Appeal abated
and remanded for failure to file brief or respond to notice from appellate
court. [In the Matter of Tony Gibbs] (05-2-07)
On November 29, 2004, in a per curiam opinion, the Amarillo Court of
Appeals abated and remanded appeal because notice had been sent to
appellant's counsel that the brief had not been filed and counsel did not
respond.
Evidence
sufficient to support the trial court's adjudication on aggravated sexual
assault and indecency with a child. [In the Matter of M.D.T.](05-2-06)
On December 23, 2004 the El Paso Court of Appeals did not view
defendant's evidence as being so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to have been clearly wrong or unjust.
Evidence was
sufficient to commit child to TYC on 3rd misdemeanor adjudication. [In the
Matter of H.R.C.] (05-2-05)
On December 23, 2004, the El Paso Court of Appeals did not find that the
evidence was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be
clearly wrong and unjust and further that the evidence was factually
sufficient to support the judgment.
Hearsay
testimony permissible by TYC representative at transfer hearing. [In the Matter
of R.M.](05-2-04)
On November 3, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals, held that the
juvenile’s constitutional rights were not violated when the trial court
permitted a TYC representative (Cucolo) to testify based on a report
summarizing the child’s behavior while at TYC.
Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure governs consolidation of offenses in juvenile court. [In the
Matter of D.L.] (05-2-03B)
On February 23, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that six acts of
aggravated sexual assault involving five different victims, could be
consolidated into one juvenile trial under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41.
Sex offender
registration statute does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. [In the
Matter of D.L.] (05-2-03A)
On February 23, 2005, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the sex
offender registration statute does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment when applied to juveniles because it is nonpunitive in both
intent and effect.
In aggravated
sexual assault trial, outcry witness testimony was admissible. (In The Matter Of
V.B.) (05-2-02)
On February 23, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found no evidence
in the record that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
victims' statements reliable and that the testimony from the outcry witness
bore sufficient indicia of reliability with respect to the time, content,
and circumstances of the statements for the testimony to be admissible
pursuant to Texas Family Code § 54.031.
Evidence of
fingerprints alone sufficient to support adjudication for burglary of a
habitation. (In the Matter of M.A.L.) (05-2-01)
On February 24, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the evidence
was legally sufficient even though the only evidence linking appellant to
the crime were two fingerprints on a surge protector that the stolen
electronics were plugged into.
Admission of
prior adjudication and testimony by parole officer sufficient proof defendant
was previously adjudicated in juvenile court [Mackey v. State] (05-1-21)
On February 9, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that an
admission by the criminal defendant and testimony by a parole officer were
sufficient proof of identity.
Evidence was
factually and legally sufficient to prove sexual intercourse [In the Matter of
A.B.] (05-1-20)
On February 3, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the evidence
was factually and legally sufficient to prove that respondent had sexual
intercourse with the child-victim.
Despite dissent
and concurrence, Fort Worth Court of Appeals says that a motion for new trial is
required for factual sufficiency claim [In re J.B.M.] (05-1-19)
On February 3, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held en banc that a
motion for new trial is required to preserve error for factual
insufficiency.
Juvenile felony
adjudication admissible in adult penalty proceedings [Parrish v. State]
(05-1-18)
On the February 2, 2005, the Waco Court of Appeals held that evidence of
a felony juvenile adjudication is admissible in adult criminal proceedings.
On the day of
trial, the State provided the defense with notice it intended to introduce a
prior juvenile adjudication during the punishment phase of the criminal trial,
which the Court of Appeals held was sufficient notice (Robinson v. State)
(05-1-17)
On January 31, 2005, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that notice by the
State on the day trial began of the State’s intent to introduce evidence of
a prior felony adjudication by the criminal defendant was sufficient.
Stipulation of
value of damages in criminal mischief case was sufficient proof of that element
[In re M.H.] (05-1-16)
On January 20, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
juvenile’s stipulation in a motor vehicle "keying" case as to the value of
the damage was sufficient proof of that element of the offense of criminal
mischief.
On an evidence
sufficiency claim, a 13-year-old did not and could not legally consent to
unlawful restrain offense [In re J.N.S.] (05-1-15)
On January 13, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a
13-year-old child cannot legally consent to the commission of the offense of
unlawful restraint upon her, nor factually did she consent.
Appeal
challenging sufficiency of the evidence for disposition decision was untimely
when filed after probation was later revoked [In re R.L.] (05-1-14)
On January 13, 2005, the El Paso Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a disposition order
because notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the juvenile was
placed on probation.
Failure of
juvenile court to admonish not reversible without contemporaneous objection [In
re M.D.T.] (05-1-13)
On December 23, 2004, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the failure
of the juvenile court judge to admonish the respondent as to his rights is
not reversible error in the absence of an contemporaneous objection by
defense counsel.
Evidence of
defendant’s juvenile court prior disposition is admissible at criminal
sentencing upon a finding of relevancy to sentencing [Millican v. State]
(05-1-12)
On December 22, 2004, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that evidence of a
defendant’s prior juvenile disposition is admissible at criminal sentencing
if the criminal court finds that it is relevant to sentencing.
Evidence was
factually sufficient to support TYC commitments for misdemeanors [In re H.R.C.]
(05-1-11)
On December 23, 2004, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the factors
relied upon by the juvenile court to justify the commitment of a repeat
misdemeanant to TYC and found factual support for each.
Delay in
notifying parent of arrest was justified; confession admissible [Ray v. State]
(05-1-10)
On December 23, 2004, the Houston First District Court of Appeals, on
appellant’s motion for rehearing, held that delays in notifying a parent of
the appellant’s arrest were justified, making the confession admissible.
Court of
Appeals denies personal bond pending appeal because of the benefits to the
juvenile of TYC treatment program [In re J.G.] (05-1-09)
On December 22, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals denied personal
bond on appeal because of the benefits the juvenile was receiving from the
TYC treatment programs.
Plea of true to
motion to revoke probation made appeal frivolous [In re L.J.G.] (05-1-08).
On December 16, 2004, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that appellate
counsel’s assessment that the appeal from probation revocation was frivolous
was supported by the record that the juvenile plead true to probation
violations.
Juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in transferring a juvenile from TYC to TDCJ under
the determinate sentence act [In re R.H.] (05-1-07).
On December 15, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring a juvenile from
TYC to TDCJ following multiple disciplinary violations, including assaults.
Juvenile
required to file timely notice of appeal to initiate review; waiver standard of
Section 51.09 does not apply [In re C.W.] (05-1-06).
On December 13, 2004, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a juvenile
must take the affirmative step of filing a timely notice of appeal to obtain
appellate review. The standard of Section 51.09—that a right exists unless
waived in a specified fashion—does not apply to notices of appeal.
The 14-year-old
juvenile certified for murder waived objection to being convicted of second
degree felony aggravated assault [Adams v. State] (05-1-05).
On December 9, 2004, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
held that because he failed to make a timely complaint under Code of
Criminal Procedure article 4.18 the juvenile waived any underage claim that
the criminal court lacked jurisdiction.
An en banc San
Antonio Court of Appeals reverses itself to uphold an out-of-home probation
placement for burglary [In re M.J.A.] )05-1-04).
On December 8, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed a May 2004 decision that the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it placed a child on probation outside his home; the en banc court held
there was no abuse of discretion because there was inadequate supervision in
the home.
A noncustodial
statement by a juvenile in a capital murder case was voluntary and admissible
[Avila v. State] (05-1-03).
On December 8, 2004, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a written
statement given by a juvenile to police was admissible without following
Family Code procedures since the juvenile was not in custody at the time the
statement was given.
Search incident
to taking a juvenile into custody on a felony warrant was lawful despite
post-detention questioning of juvenile [In re R.E.A.] (05-1-02).
On December 2, 2004, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a police
officer’s discovery of marijuana on the person of a juvenile for whom there
was an outstanding felony arrest warrant was lawful without regard to the
lawfulness of the officer’s question of the juvenile whether he had anything
illegal on him.
Failure to
object to no finding of due diligence by the State in a post-18 year old
probation revocation waives error for appeal [In re A.M.] (05-1-01).
On December 2, 2004, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the juvenile
did not preserve error in the failure of the juvenile court to find that the
State exercised due diligence in the post-18 year old revocation of the
juvenile’s probation.
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