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By
The Honorable
Pat Garza
Associate Judge
386th District Court
San Antonio, Texas
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
In Motion to
Modify, statutory language supplemented by the court describing the
conditions of the child’s probation and how that child violated those
conditions was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Family Code for
commitment.[In the Matter of O.M.](06-4-09)
On October 25, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the inclusion
of the offense and its surrounding circumstances in an order consisting of
mainly statutory language was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
section 54.05(i) of the Family Code for a commitment to TYC.
Crawford v.
Washington does not apply to determinate sentence transfer hearings.[In the
Matter of S.M.](06-4-08)
On October 19, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that since a
determinate sentence transfer hearing was not considered a stage of a
criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Washington
did not apply.
Statement by
respondent given to arson investigators was considered voluntary.[In the Matter
of F.C.W.](06-4-07B)
On September 26, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals held that conduct by
arson investigators was not so coercive to have caused respondent’s
statements to be derived from "official, coercive conduct of such a nature
that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker."
Section 51.095
of the Family Code does not apply where child’s freedom of movement is not
restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.[In the Matter of
F.C.W.](06-4-07A)
On September 26, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals held that although
respondent was the focus of the investigation and his freedom of movement
was restricted, he was not in custody when he spoke to arson investigators,
rendering his statement admissible.
Failure to file
a motion for new trial waives factual sufficiency challenge on appeal.[In the
Matter of F.F.G.](06-4-06)
On October 12, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that because
respondent failed to file a motion for new trial, he failed to preserve the
issue of factual sufficiency for review.
Evidence was
sufficient to establish knife as a deadly weapon. [In the Matter of
R.S.](06-4-5)
On September 6, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that to
establish a knife as deadly weapon, State is required to show some evidence
of the knife's size, sharpness, brandishing motion by the accused, or
testimony regarding the victim's fear of serious bodily injury or death.
Trial court's
findings were supported by some evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in committing appellant to TYC.[In the Matter of D.R.](06-4-4)
On June 20, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals concluded that
the trial court's findings were supported by evidence, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in committing appellant to TYC on violations of
probation.
Four year old
competent to testify in sexual assault allegation.[In the Matter of
M.M.L.](06-4-3)
On July 31, 2006, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling four year old complainant competent, in
that potential that she would testify falsely was an issue of the weight to
be afforded the testimony at trial rather than evidence of her incompetence
as a witness.
Failure to
present certain due process complaints at trial waives them.[In the Matter of
C.S.](06-4-2)
On August 4, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that
appellant did not show that the errors complained of were either "waivable
only" or "absolute systemic requirements," as a result, failure to raise at
trial waived them.
In assault of
public servant, teacher in lawfully discharge of "an official duty" when
physically restraining student. [In the Matter of P.N.](06-4-1B)
On August 4, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that, in assault on
public servant, teacher was considered to be lawfully discharging "an
official duty" when physically restraining student whose behavior was unruly
and potentially threatening.
Assault of
public servant may occur in child’s attempt to break free from disciplinary
restraint by teacher. [In the Matter of P.N.](06-4-1A)
On August 4, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the evidence was
sufficient to determine that student had assaulted public servant, where
student caused bodily injury when attempting to break free from disciplinary
restraint.
Retained
appellate counsel allowed to withdraw once trial court makes a determination
of whether appellate is indigent.[In the Matter of A.G.](06-3-20)
On July 26, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to
determine if child is indigent in allowing retained appellate counsel to
withdraw. If indigent, appoint counsel, if not advise appellate of options.
Denial of court
appointed attorney to file a motion for DNA testing is not appealable.[In the
Matter of R.J.M.](06-3-19)
On July 28, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a juvenile
court's order denying a motion to appoint counsel to assist in filing a
motion for DNA testing under chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure is not appealable.
The required
findings of T.F.C. Section 54.04 (Disposition Hearing) do not apply to T.F.C.
Section 54.05 (Hearing to Modify Disposition).[In the Matter of E.G.](06-3-18)
On July 28, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the requirements
for secure placement of a status offender under T.F.C. Section 54.04(n)
applies to the disposition of a status offender adjudicated for violating a
preexisting court order not a Motion to Modify of a status offenders
probation.
Evidence was
factually sufficient to sustain conviction for arson and murder.[Brewer v.
State](06-3-17)
On July 28, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the State's
evidence of guilt was not so weak and the evidence of self defense was not
so strong that a rational jury would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant's use of deadly force was justified.
Trial court
abused its discretion in disqualifying respondent’s attorney. [In re
T.E.D.](06-3-16)
On July 31, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the trial court
abused its discretion in disqualifying respondent’s attorney where attorney
represented state’s witness’s daughter in unrelated matters.
Trial court
abused its discretion in allowing juvenile statement against him in
trial.[Mavoides v. State](06-3-15)
On July 13, 2006, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that there was
an unjustifiable delay in notifying juvenile’s parents two days after
arrest, even though child’s information about parent’s whereabouts were not
specific.
Possession of
certain stolen property was sufficient to support an adjudication for theft of
other stolen property.[In the Interest of J.R.F.](06-3-14)
On July 13, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals, held that
since various items of property were stolen at the same time, the recent,
unexplained, personal possession of any one item was sufficient to support
the conviction for theft of all the stolen items.
Discretionary
transfer to criminal court does not violate the principles established by U.S.
Supreme Court Apprendi decision. [State v. Lopez](06-3-13)
On June 27, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a discretionary
transfer to criminal court does not in itself involve any increase in
penalty, and as a result, the decision that is made by the juvenile court to
transfer to criminal court does not violate the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Apprendi.
Appellant
failed to preserve error with respect to suppression of marijuana. [In the
Interest of R.A.](06-3-12)
On June 27, 2006, the Houston Court of Appeals [14th Dist.], held that
respondent failed to preserve error by failing to obtain a timely ruling on
his motion to suppress or to properly and timely object to the admission of
the evidence made the subject of the motion.
In Motion to
Modify, State exercised due diligence in attempting to complete the proceeding
before respondent turned eighteen.[In the Matter of C.B.](06-3-11)
On June 29, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, held that the burden
imposed by due diligence requires the State to attempt to move ahead, or to
be able to reasonably explain delays.
Trial court
did not abuse it’s discretion in committing child to TYC after hearings to
modify a disposition. [In the Matter of J.V.M.](06-3-10)
On June 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court held that in hearings to modify a
disposition, absent an abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not
disturb trial court's findings in determining the suitable disposition of
children.
In Motion to
Modify, trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant would
not receive the quality of care and level of support and supervision needed to
meet the conditions of his probation. [In the Matter of J.E.Z.](06-3-9)
On June 15, 2006, the Houston (1st Dist.) Court of Appeals
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
appellant would not receive the quality of care and level of support and
supervision in his home that he would need to meet the conditions of his
probation.
Trial court did
not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in modifying its disposition. [In the Matter
of I.P.](06-3-8)
On June 15, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a modification
order was sufficient, where the statutory language was supplemented by
additional reasons (for the modification) given by the court and supported
by the record.
Trial court
abused its discretion in restricting the length of closing argument to 20
minutes, and such abuse was not harmless. [Dang v. State](06-3-7)
On June 8, 2006, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of Appeals
found that, in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in
restricting the length of argument, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that
the abuse was not harmless.
Although officer
testified that respondent was not free to leave, under the totality of the
circumstances, court concluded appellant was not in custody during questioning.
[In the Matter of J.W.](06-3-6).
On June 12, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that, although
officer testified that child was not free to leave, a reasonable
sixteen-year-old in these circumstances would have felt able to end the
questioning, particularly since the officers did nothing to restrain or
restrict appellant's movement.
CPS
investigator was considered the outcry witness where statements to father were
general in nature and failed to describe offense in some discernible manner.[In
the Matter of J.R.](06-3-5B)
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although
the complainant communicated to his father that he had been sexually abused,
he did not describe the details of the alleged abuse until interviewed by
the CPS worker, who then became the outcry witness.
Miranda
warnings were not required where CPS investigator was not acting with, or on
behalf of, police, when he obtained a statement from juvenile. [In the Matter of
J.R.](06-3-5A)
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that Miranda
warnings were not required where a statement was taken by a CPS investigator
because the CPS investigator was not acting in tandem with police to
investigate and gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.
Evidence is
sufficient to establish venue if, from the evidence, the trier of fact may
reasonably conclude that the offense was committed in the county alleged.[In
the Matter of E.H.](06-3-4)
On May 18, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that when deciding
the issue of venue, the trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from
the evidence, including taking judicial notice that the location of a
particular town or city is the county seat of such county.
The State may
regulate a minors' conduct at the border, but it may not regulate international
border crossings.[Texas Attorney General Opinion No. GA-0425](06-3-3)
On May 1, 2006, the Attorney General opined that the State or its
political subdivisions may not regulate international border crossings by
persons under 18, however, it may restrict them from being in Texas areas
near the Texas-Mexico border by creating a narrowly tailored law that
furthers a compelling governmental interest.
A defendant may
not appeal an order certifying him to adult court until after a conviction or an
order of deferred adjudication for the offense for which the defendant was
transferred to criminal court. [Rodriguez v. State](06-3-2)
On May 15, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant may
not appeal an order certifying him to stand trial as an adult and transfer
him to criminal court, until the appeal of the conviction or the order of
deferred adjudication for the offense for which the defendant was
transferred to criminal court.
Mother’s
testimony was admissible as an excited utterance notwithstanding noncompliance
with the requirements of the outcry witness statute.[In the Matter of
M.A.M.](06-3-1)
On May 5, 2006, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an excited
utterance is an independent exception to the hearsay rule, so the outcry
statute--whether the juvenile version or the adult version--is not needed
for its admission.
Drug test
lab reports considered non-testimonial evidence in motion to modify.[In the
Matter of J.R.L.G.](06-2-18)
On April 27, 2006, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that lab reports
from drug tests were non-testimonial evidence and did not implicate the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.
Adjudication
for fraud (class A misdemeanor) was proper where respondent shoplifted property
valued under $50.00.[In the Matter of E.P.](06-2-17)
On February 2, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals found that evidence that
defendant took price tags off items, threw the tags away, concealed the
items in her pocket, and left the store, was attempt to take items by
trickery, justifying fraud adjudication.
From
California, victim's excited statement at scene, were the product of police
interrogation and therefore considered testimonial under Crawford v. Washington.
(06-2-16)
On March 1, 2006, the California Court of Appeals (6th Dist.), in a
juvenile case, interpreted "testimonial" (under Crawford) as "made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial," and as a
result were inadmissable through third party.
In Florida,
court denial of closing argument in juvenile case violated child’s due process
rights. [J.M.S. v. Florida](06-2-15)
On March 3, 2006 the Florida Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held that a
child has the right to be represented by counsel and, to have effective
counsel, counsel must be allowed to participate in all essential stages of
the case, including closing argument.
A petition
which fails to allege an express reference to the Penal Code section number of
the offense is not fatal.[In the Matter of B.S.A.](06-2-14)
On April 13, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that although the
Family Code says that the petition must state "the penal law or standard of
conduct allegedly violated by the acts," if the petition alleges all of the
elements of an offense, omission of an express reference to the Penal Code
section is not fatal.
In
dismissal of charges for failure to file failure to attend school within 7
days, new complaint may include absences listed in dismissed
complaint.[Attorney General Opinion No. GA-0417](06-2-13)
If a complaint or referral for a child’s failure to attend school is
dismissed for failure to timely file (within 7 day of last absence), any
subsequent refiling may be filed within seven school days of the latest
absence and may list the latest absence as well as some or all of the
absences listed in the original complaint.
In TYC
commitment, disposition was not completed until trial court resolved issue of
restitution at later hearing.[In the Matter of S.G.](06-2-12)
On April 4, 2006, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals concluded that
an Order of Restitution after the trial court had committed the child to TYC
completed the child’s disposition with respect to the unresolved issue of
restitution.
In determining
the suitable disposition of children, particularly in hearings to modify a
disposition, appellate courts will not disturb trial court’s findings absent an
abuse of discretion. [In the Matter of D.G.](06-2-11)
On April 5, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that evidence was
sufficient to support a commitment to the TYC pursuant to Family Code
section 54.05(f) and (k), the court was authorized and within its discretion
to modify its previous disposition order and commit appellant to the TYC.
A violation of
any one condition of probation is sufficient to support a trial court's order
modifying a juvenile's disposition.[In the Matter of S.G.V.](06-2-10)
On April 5, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, while
evidence may have been improperly excluded on one violation of probation, it
had no barring on the other violation, and any one violation of a condition
of probation is sufficient to support an order modifying a juvenile's
disposition.
To avoid
restitution, parents must establish that their child’s delinquent behavior
occurred despite their good faith efforts to prevent it.[In the Matter of
D.M.](06-2-9)
On March 30. 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the burden of
proof is on the parents to establish good faith efforts to prevent
delinquent behavior as a defense to liability regarding restitution orders
against them.
Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish affirmative link in
marijuana adjudication.[In the Matter of J.M.C.D.](06-2-8)
On March 23, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that while none of
the evidence was directly conclusive, when taken together it was sufficient
to determine that respondent was either an individual actor or assisted in
the commission of the offense of Possession of Marijuana.
A determinate
sentence transfer hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, and as a
result, Crawford's holding under the Sixth Amendment does not apply to it.[In
the Matter of D.L.](06-2-7)
On March 8, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
determinate sentence transfer hearings is not considered a stage of
"criminal prosecution," and as such, the holdings in Crawford v. Washington
and the Sixth Amendment does not apply to them.
Juvenile’s
removal of items from his pocket at officer’s request was consensual and not a
product of force, threat, or coercion. [In the Matter of R.S.W.](06-2-6)
On March 9, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a request by a
law enforcement officer that a juvenile remove items from his pockets was
considered consensual and not an acquiescence to official authority.
In a case out of
Michigan, a minor defendant's inculpatory statement induced by a promise of
leniency was not considered inadmissible "per se." [Michigan v.
Osantowski](06-2-5)
On February 29, 2006, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that because any
alleged promises of leniency by law enforcement did not induce the minor’s
confession, the confession was freely and voluntarily made.
In an
adjudication for theft, an owner may testify either in terms of purchase
price or replacement cost, and is presumed to be testifying to an estimate
of fair market value.[In the Matter of B.S.S.](06-2-4)
On March2, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that fair market value
can be proven by evidence of the retail price or sale price, by testimony of
an owner's opinion of value, or by an expert opinion of value.
The record
supported the trial court's finding that the procedure for taking a juvenile's
statement required by § 51.095(a) was complied with by the officers and the
magistrate. [Ramos v. State](06-2-3)
On February 22, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by believing the testimony of the
magistrate and the detective with respect to the time the warnings were
given and the time the statement was taken, as they differed from the times
on the statement itself.
Evidence was
both legally and factually sufficient to show child’s mental culpability under
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 in capital murder adjudication.[In the Matter of
C.M.G.](06-2-2)
On November 22, 2005, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court will look at events
occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, and may
rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding of the criminal
acts that occurred.
Neither Sixth
Amendment or Crawford confrontation rights apply at the juvenile certification
hearing.[Milligan v. State](06-2-1)
On February 16, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals held that neither the
Sixth Amendment nor the hearsay rule applies to a juvenile certification
hearing.
Only when
a DPRS investigator (or other non-law enforcement state agent) is acting in
tandem with police to investigate and gather evidence for a criminal
prosecution are [Miranda] warnings required. [In the Matter of
K.H.](06-1-21B)
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that DPRS
investigator did not act in tandem with police to investigate and gather
evidence and as a result no custodial interrogation occurred.
Service of a
later amended petition is not required for the trial court to have jurisdiction
when a juvenile has been properly served with the original petition. [In the
Matter of K.H.](06-1-21A)
On December 14, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that service
of a later amended petition is not required for the trial court to have
jurisdiction when a juvenile has been properly served with the original
petition.
In determinate
sentence transfer hearing, Confrontation Clause was not violated by trial court
admitting State's exhibits offered by Texas Youth Commission's court liaison,
Leonard Cucolo. [In the Matter of L.D.T.](06-1-20)
On February 8, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals held that when an exhibit
contains both admissible and inadmissible evidence, the party objecting must
apprise the trial court which material or documents contained within each
exhibit is objectionable.
When the oral
pronouncement of a sentence in open court conflicts with the written judgment,
the oral pronouncement controls.[In the Matter of C.L.W.](06-1-19B)
On February 13, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that while
the adjudication order conflicted with the oral pronouncement, the
disposition order accurately reflects the trial court's pronouncement of
commitment to TYC and upheld commitment.
Evidence was
legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant committed
the theft.[In the Matter of C.L.W.](06-1-19A)
On February 13, 2006, the Dallas Court of Appeals concluded that a theft
was complete once the actor had exercised control over the property and that
there is no requirement that the property actually be removed from the
premises or kept for a specific length of time.
Evidence
was factually sufficient to support adjudication for aggravated sexual
assault of a child. [In the Matter of J.G.](06-1-18)
On February 1, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that in
aggravated sexual assault, with two eye-witness accounts, expert testimony,
and the victim's outcry statement, the evidence was factually sufficient to
support adjudication.
In a Motion to
Modify Disposition the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness is
sufficient to authorize a modification.[In the Matter of L.T.III](06-1-17)
On January 31, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals concluded that neither
article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure nor section 54.03(e)
of the Texas Family Code applies to the modification hearing of a juvenile's
disposition, and as a result, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
witness is sufficient to authorize a modification of a juvenile's
disposition.
Twenty
minutes not considered reasonable amount of time for closing argument in
capital trial. [Dang v. State](06-1-16)
On January 24, 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals, on remand for harm
analysis, held that error could not be deemed harmless, and the court was
correct to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new
trial. See original opinion Juvenile Law Reporter Vol. 19, No. 2, ¶ 05-2-13.
Evidence was
legally and factually sufficient to support juries finding of indecency with a
child.[In the Matter of S.W.](06-1-15)
On January 26, 2006, the Houston 1st Court of Appeals held that evidence
was both legally and factually sufficient to support the finding of guilt
and affirmed the judgment of the trial court for indecency with a child.
Trial court did
not abuse it’s discretion in committing child to TYC for violating conditions of
probation by leaving home without permission.[In the Matter of A.G.](06-1-14)
Trial court did not abuse it’s discretion in committing child to TYC
where child left his residence without permission in violation of his
probation and child had left because he was concerned about his and his
family’s safety, due to threats on his life.
Probation
officer’s testimony and report was sufficient to establish prior misdemeanor
adjudications.[In the Matter of C.J.M.](06-1-13)
On January 12, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that testimony
from probation officer along with his report describing respondent’s
previous involvement with the juvenile justice system satisfied the
statutory criteria for prior misdemeanor adjudications.
Jeopardy
attaches in a juvenile proceeding when the jury has been empaneled and sworn.
[State v. C.J.F.](06-1-12)
On August 25, 2005, the Houston (1st Dist.) Court of Appeals held that
jeopardy attaching when a jury is empaneled and sworn, concerning adult
criminal defendants, applies equally to a juvenile proceedings.
Motion for new
trial prerequisite to factual sufficiency challenge on appeal. [In the Matter of
D.J.H.](06-1-11)
On January 12, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that as a
prerequisite to raising a factual sufficiency challenge on appeal from a
juvenile adjudication hearing, an appellant must first file a motion for new
trial challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence.
A defendant may
not be cross-examined regarding prior juvenile adjudications for general
impeachment purposes. [Reynosa v. State](06-1-10)
On July 6, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not err in denying Respondent’s motion for mistrial where the
trial court admonished jury to disregard question and answer regarding prior
juvenile adjudication.
Motion to
Suppress fails for failure to establish a causal connection between stated
unlawful police conduct and evidence sought to suppress.[Adams v.
State](06-1-9)
On December 8, 2005, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed denial
of Motion to Suppress because the record did not demonstrate a causal
connection between a section 52.02(a) violation and respondent’s statement
nor did the respondent show a causal connection between the complained of
unnecessary delay and evidence sought to be suppress.
Reaching a hand
across the threshold of a house to seize a plastic wrap from respondent’s neck,
was a warrantless search, but was justified by probable cause and exigent
circumstances. [In the Matter of L.J.](06-1-8)
On December 9, 2005, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
court did not error in finding that the State established probable cause and
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of respondent’s home.
Evidence was
legally and factually sufficient to support jury’s verdict of capital murder in
death of respondent’s new born baby. [In the Matter of C.M.G.](06-1-7)
On November 30, 2005, the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the
evidence was sufficient to show respondent’s mental culpability and as a
result, that she engaged in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of
capital murder in causing the death of her new born baby.
Evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict of two
counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, two counts of indecency with
a child.[In the Matter of D.C.G.](06-1-6)
On November 23, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dist.), held
that evidence was factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict of two
counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency
with a child, and respondent did receive effective assistance of a counsel.
Failure to charge on eligibility for community supervision was not error where
no evidence was offered by defendant that he was eligible for community
supervision. [Morris v. State](06-1-5)
On November 23, 2005, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dist.) held that
trial court's refusal to submit requested instruction to the jury on
eligibility of probation, was not error, where appellant properly filed a
sworn motion that he had not previously been convicted of a felony (juvenile
adjudication only), but did not offer any evidence at trial in support of
this motion.
Evidence was legally and factually sufficient to establish the elements of
aggravated sexual assault.[In the Matter of C.E.F.W.](06-1-4)
On November 23, 2005, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that
considering the totality of the circumstances, evidence was legally and
factually sufficient to establish the aggravating element of the offense of
aggravated sexual assault.
Juvenile’s request for his mother to get a lawyer considered unequivocal request
for counsel during magistrate admonishments, invoking his 5th Amendment rights.
[In the Matter of H.V.](06-1-3)
On November 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, on rehearing,
affirmed prior holding suppressing confession, and held that a juvenile’s
request to call his mother was an unambiguous request for an attorney when
request was followed by the statement that he wanted his mother to get an
attorney, and subsequent confession and evidence found as a result of said
confession must be suppressed.
In
determinate sentence transfer hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering respondent transferred to TDCJ.[In the Mater of J.M.](06-1-2)
On November 17, 2005, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that there
was ample evidence to support the trial court's order transferring
respondent to TDCJ.
In
writ of habeas corpus, applicant did not prove prejudice or that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.[Ex Parte Rodney Keith Cash](06-1-1B)
On November 16, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that in an
ineffective assistance claim where counsel failed to properly file a motion
for probation, applicant's allegations of prejudice did not establish that
there was a reasonable probability that the applicant's sentencing jury
would have recommended probation had the issue been submitted to it.
(Dissent included)
A
juvenile adjudication for delinquent conduct that constitutes a felony offense
is not a final felony conviction with respect to illegibility for probation in
adult court.[Ex Parte Rodney Keith Cash](06-1-1A)
On November 16, 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the Texas
Family Code § 51.13(d) provides, in relevant part, that a juvenile
adjudication for delinquent conduct that constitutes a felony offense is a
final felony conviction only for habitual offender sentencing purposes.
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