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By
The Honorable
Pat Garza
Associate Judge
386th District Court
San Antonio, Texas
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
Vicarious-consent part of consent exception to Texas wiretap law.[Alameda v.
State](07-4-19)
On June 27, 2007, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a parent
may give vicarious-consent to record a child's telephone conversations if
the parent has a good-faith basis for believing that recording is in the
best interest of the child.
Alien residence
status does not effect a TYC commitment if the child’s home does not provide the
quality of care and level of support and supervision that is needed to meet the
conditions of probation. [In the Matter of J.M.L.](07-4-18)
On October 25, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that alien
residence status does not effect a TYC commitment when the juvenile court
finds that it is in appellant's best interest that he be removed from the
home and that his home did not provide him the quality of care and level of
support and supervision that he needed to meet the conditions of probation.
Trial court
lacked jurisdiction to reduce determinate sentence term after court’s plenary
power had expired.[In the Matter of F.M.](07-4-17)
On October 11, 2207, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the juvenile
trial court lacked jurisdiction to reduce a determinate sentence term and
that the plenary power of the court had expired thirteen years earlier.
In a
failure to attend school, a school district may use some of the same
absences listed in the complaint or referral that is dismissed for failure
to comply with the Education Code.[Texas Attorney General Opinion No. GA–
0574](07-4-16)
On October 2, 2007, the Attorney General opined that a school district
may file a new failure to attend school complaint, listing some of the same
absences as well as a subsequent tenth unexcused absence, as long as it is
filed within ten school days of the tenth absence listed in the complaint or
referral.
In a Motion to
Modify, the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion by committing the juvenile
to TYC rather than residential placement.[In the Matter of J.R.C.](07-4-15)
On October 11, 2007, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the a trial
court is not required to exhaust all possible alternatives before sending a
juvenile to the TYC and that the Family Code permits a trial court to
decline third and fourth chances to a juvenile who has abused a second
chance.
A juvenile
referee’s order takes effect when he or she signs it.[In the Matter of
S.G.](07-4-14)
On September 27, 2007, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the orders
of referees are effective immediately if they recommend that the juvenile be
released and are otherwise enforceable until the juvenile court judge
adopts, modifies, or rejects them or until they are altered by operation of
law.
A juvenile has
a right to appellate counsel, even if the parents are capable of retaining them
but elect not to do so.[In the Matter of A.G.N.](07-4-13)
On September 28, 2007, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that if a
juvenile's parents are capable of retaining an attorney on appeal, but elect
not to do so, the trial court can order them to pay for the juvenile’s
counsel on appeal.
Any one
probation violation will support a juvenile court's order to revoke
probation.[In the Matter of E.B.R.](07-4-12)
On October 4, 2007, the Houston (1st Dist) Court of Appeals held that one
probation violation (even a "technical" condition) will support a juvenile
court’s order to revoke probation.
Trial judge
mandamused to rule on writ of habeas corpus.[In re Altschul](07-4-11)
On September 26, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief
because given relator's predicament, i.e., that his juvenile record is
affecting his ability to re-open his federal sentences, and the fact that he
can file his application only in the court of his juvenile adjudication, he
has no other available legal remedy, technically or otherwise.
Juvenile
TYC felony convictions committed prior to January 1, 1996, cannot be
considered for enhancement purposes in adult court.[Jackson v.
State](07-4-10)
On September 19, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that while
TYC juvenile felony convictions cannot be considered for enhancement
purposes in adult court if the offense was committed prior to January 1,
1996, here, the trial court’s error did not cause "egregious harm."
For a
commitment to TYC, reciting the necessary statutory language and specifically
stating the reasons for modifying the disposition will be sufficient.[In the
Matter of L.T.H.](07-4-9)
On September 6, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the
commitment order satisfied the statutory requirements because in addition to
reciting the necessary statutory language provided for in section 54.05(m),
the order complied with section 54.05(i) by specifically stating the reasons
for modifying the disposition.
Prima facie
showing of prior conviction (from juvenile C & T) makes evidence legally
sufficient to support trial court finding for enhancement.[Terrell v.
State](07-4-8)
On May 23, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals held that, while the pen
packet affirmatively showed on its face that defendant was sixteen, once the
State establishes a prima facie showing of his prior conviction, it was
defendant’s burden to make an affirmative showing of any defect in the
judgment, whether that is to show no waiver of indictment or no transfer
order.
A passenger of
a car stopped by police has standing to challenge the legality of the
stop.[Brendlin v. California](07-4-7)
On June 18, 2007, the United States Supreme Court held that when police
make a traffic stop, a passenger in the car, like the driver, is seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes and as a result may challenge the
constitutionality of the stop.
No
expectation of privacy is a juvenile processing office.[Cortez v.
State](07-4-6B)
On August 21, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals found that appellant did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the juvenile processing
office, and the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by listening to
the statements appellant made to his mother during their telephone
conversation in the JPO.
Statements by
appellant are admissible where there is no causal connection between statements
and the officers' alleged failure to promptly notify appellant's parents of his
arrest.[Cortez v. State](07-4-6A)
On August 21, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that appellant was
not denied the right to have his parents with him while he was being held in
the juvenile processing office, moreover, there was no showing of a causal
connection between the alleged violations and the spontaneous statements
made, and finally, any error in the admission of these statements were
harmless.
Once a trial
court's plenary power ends, it has no authority to rule on motions filed after
that time.[In the Matter of A.M.](07-4-5)
On August 22, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a trial
court's plenary power ended thirty days after the first filed motion for new
trial was overruled, and any motions filed after that date were of no
effect.
Failing to
object to conditions of probation when they’re imposed waives any complaint
about their content.[In the Matter of J.B.](07-4-4)
On August 16, 2007, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that because
Respondent did not object to the conditions of probation when they were
imposed, he waived his complaint that they were "so defective, deficient and
uncertain" that the they failed to put him on notice of what his obligations
were
Inadmissable
testimony by therapist was considered harmless were juvenile probation
department’s predisposition investigation report contained the same information.
[In the Matter of C.E.](07-4-3)
On August 9, 2007, the Austin Court of Appeals held that inadmissable
testimony by a therapist regarding previous sexual assaults (admitted by
respondent to therapist) was considered harmless were the juvenile probation
department’s predisposition investigation report contained the same
admissions.
Terry stop was
proper where juveniles appeared to be underage, out after the city's curfew, and
in a stalled vehicle. [Macias v. State](07-4-2)
On August 9, 2007, the Corpus Christi – Edinburg, Court of Appeals held
that teen arrest was proper where teen had not only violated the city's
curfew, but was engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision --
running away from home.
Violations of
the Juvenile Code can be permitted, where the Family Code’s underlying purposes
and the child’s constitutional rights are upheld.[Vega v. State](07-4-1)
On August 9, 2007, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that a
statement taken in Illinois, in violation of the Texas Family Code, was
admissible because both parties were assured a fair hearing and while not
precise, the process was impartial, honest, and free from prejudice, undue
favoritism, and self-interest.
The value
of stolen property may be shown by the fair market value, or, if that cannot
be ascertained, by showing the cost of replacing the property.[In the Matter
of D.L.](07-3-18)
On July 31, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that if the fair market
value cannot be ascertained, the replacement cost of stolen property is the
appropriate measure of it’s value, not necessarily what the complainant
actually paid to replace it.
Failure to
raise the constitutionality of statute at trial, waived the issue.[In the Matter
of E.V.](07-3-17)
On February 2, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals found that because
appellant failed to preserve the issue of whether the determinate sentence
transfer statute was unconstitutional at trial, he waived the issue.
Restitution
amount which exceeded "blue book" value for damaged car, was considered
proper.[In the Matter of R.M.](07-3-16)
On July 24, 2007, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals held that a
restitution amount, which exceeded the "blue book" value for a damaged car,
was (based on the evidence) not arbitrary nor unjustly enriching the
recipients.
Confession
plus circumstantial and corroborative evidence was legally and factually
sufficient to adjudicate for burglary.[In the Matter of M.G.G.](07-3-15)
On July 18, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found that when the
child’s confession is combined with the cumulative force of all the
circumstantial and corroborative evidence, it is both legally and factually
sufficient to support the child’s adjudication for burglary.
A missing
element in a court’s findings of fact will be presumed without a request of a
finding or clarification on the element.[In the Matter of J.O.T.](07-3-14B)
On July 19, 2007, the Corpus Christi - Edinburg Court of Appeals held
that, in an attempted burglary, the missing element of specific intent in
the court’s findings of fact were presumed to be inadvertently omitted,
where no request of a finding or of a clarification on the element was made.
Evidence was
sufficient to establish specific intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault in
adjudication for attempted burglary.[In the Matter of J.O.T.](07-3-14A)
On July 19, 2007, the Corpus Christi - Edinburg Court of Appeals held
that, in attempted burglary, evidence was sufficient to establish intent to
commit felony, theft, or assault, where child was seen attempting to enter
the habitation, without permission, by wiggling a knife against the deadbolt
lock, and not leaving the premises on his own.
Evidence that
assault was on teacher’s aide was sufficient to establish assault on teacher.[In
the Matter of S.C.](07-3-13)
On July 5, 2007, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that in Assault on a
Public Servant, evidence that complainant was a teacher’s aid was sufficient
to establish the element of public servant, even where petition alleged
complainant was "a teacher."
Once probation
terminated, appeal of disposition becomes moot.[In the Matter of G.E.](07-3-12)
On June 14, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that when a judgment
of an Appellate Court can have no effect on an existing controversy any
appeal on that disposition becomes moot.
Recitation in
judgment that notice to all parties was proper is sufficient, without a record
controverting same.[In the Matter of E.V.](07-3-11)
On February 2, 2006, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that recitations
in judgments regarding notice may be presumed regular where the record is
absent any controverting material.
In
determinate sentence transfer to TDCJ, trial court may assign different
weights to factors it considers.[In the Matter of C.R.](07-3-10)
In making a determination regarding transfer of a juvenile offender to
TDCJ, a trial court may assign different weights to the factors it
considers, and it may consider other unlisted but relevant factors.
Failure of
trial court to list findings for TYC commitment does not warrant reversal, but
abatement of appeal and remand for submission of proper disposition order.[In
the Matter of S.J.F.](07-3-9)
When a juvenile court order fails to list findings required by the Family
Code, the appellate court will abate the appeal and remand with instructions
for the trial court to render a proper disposition order specifically
stating the reasons for such disposition.
The State is
not authorized to appeal an adverse ruling in a motion to suppress, other than
one for habitual or violent juvenile offenders.[In the Matter of F.G.](07-3-8)
The Tex.Fam.Cod Ann. §§53.045, 56.03(b) expressly authorizes the State to
appeal an order of a court in a juvenile case that grants a motion to
suppress evidence in cases involving violent or habitual juvenile offenders
only.
Trial court did
not abuse its discretion by ordering appellant transferred to TDJC.[In the
Matter of D.T.](07-3-7)
On March 20, 2007, the Dallas [5th Dist.] Court of Appeals held that
although the record shows appellant was behaviorally compliant while in TYC,
testimony about appellant's conduct while on parole and about his high risk
for reoffending, supported the trial court's decision to transfer child to
TDJC.
Once a trial
court accepts a plea bargain, it has a mandatory duty to make a disposition in
accordance with the terms of the pleas bargain.[In re J.H.](07-3-6)
On May 23, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals granted a writ of
mandamus compelling a trial court to follow plea agreement which it had
accepted, but then rescinded days later.
In order for a
child to waive his rights under TFC §51.09, both the child and the attorney for
the child must waive the right.[In the Matter of A.G.P.](07-3-5)
On May 24, 2007, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that where the record
does not show that the juvenile himself waived his right to jury on
disposition, and understood his right, waiver by the child's attorney alone
is insufficient.
Failure to
enter a plea at the modification hearing does not render the juvenile
proceedings a nullity.[In the Matter of T.J.H.T.](07-3-4)
On May 16, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that except for
discovery and evidentiary matters, the trial of a juvenile case is governed
by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and neither the Rules of Civil
Procedure nor the Family Code require a plea to be entered in a juvenile
modification hearing.
[Out of
Delaware] In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the lack of guidance
from an interested adult is a factor in the "totality of circumstances." [Smith
v. Delaware](07-3-3)
On February 16, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the lack of
guidance from an interested adult was a major factor, especially if the
juvenile suffers from diminished mental capacity, in concluding that a
child’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not knowingly made.
A challenge to
a certification and transfer order can only be raised in an appeal from the
conviction in criminal court.[Silva v. State](07-3-2)
On May 10, 2007, the Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals reiterated that
the Texas Family Code, did not permit a juvenile defendant to appeal from
certification proceedings prior to being finally convicted as an adult.
[From the 9th
U.S. Circuit] A child in federal custody, prior to being interrogated, is
entitled to due process rights which require that reasonable efforts be made to
notify the parents, and that the notification "have substantive content." [U.S.
v. C.M.](07-3-1)
The 9th U.S. Circuit held that Title 18 U.S.C. § 5033 of the Juvenile
Delinquency Act, prescribes that an arresting officer must advise the
parents of their child's Miranda rights contemporaneously with advising them
of their child's custody, advise the parents that they are permitted to
speak with their child before the child is interrogated, and an arresting
officer may not unreasonably refuse a request by either the juvenile or the
parent to communicate with one another before the juvenile is interrogated.
Once child
turns eighteen, appeal from disposition order placing child on probation
becomes moot.[In the Matter of A.M.L.](07-2-20)
On May 3, 2007, the Houston Court of Appeals held that an appeal from the
disposition order placing appellant on probation is rendered moot by the
termination of appellant's probation.
Out of
Illinois: In suppressing confession, court held that presence of adult for
immature 17-year-old with average intelligence was a factor in determining
whether confession was voluntary.[Illinois v. Westmorland](07-2-19)
On March 30, 2007, the Illinois Appellate Court (2nd Dist.) held that a
confession was not voluntary, where police officers made no attempt to
locate defendant's parents and denied his two requests to speak to his
mother, even though defendant was not a juvenile under the statute.
The authority
of the juvenile court to commit a child to TYC is not limited by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act.[In the Matter of L.A.M.](07-2-18)
On September 13, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
IDEA applies only to state or local school authorities and has no
application to state court proceedings involving a juvenile who has been
adjudicated delinquent.
Statements made
by complainant to witness were not hearsay where respondant’s counsel suggested
complainant's testimony was fabricated or the subject of improper influence. [In
the Matterof F.E.C.](07-2-17)
On September 13, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
prior consistent statement by complainant was not hearsay because it was
consistent with her testimony and was offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against her of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
In a commitment
to TYC, a Motion to Modify may be based on a violation of a second misdemeanor,
if the conduct that violated the second misdemeanor occurred on or after
September 1, 2003 (the effective date of the act).[In the Matter of
E.C.](07-2-16)
On September 27, 2007 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
violation of probation which occurred in 2004, occurred after September 1,
2003, which is the effective date of the new statute, even though the child
was placed on probation for an offense which occurred prior to September 1,
2003.
Courts of
appeals does not have original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus for child who has been transferred to TDCJ..[In the Matter of
C.G.](07-2-15)
On March 30, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that once a child is
transferred to the institutional division, she is no longer restrained by
the juvenile court order returning her to TYC, and the Court of Appeals has
no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus.
In Motion to
Modify, an appeal can become moot if the probation has been terminated.[In the
Matter of R.M.](07-2-14)
On March 22, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded that an appeal
from an order modifying a disposition can become moot, if the probation has
been terminated.
Trial court did
not abuse it’s discretion in committing child to TYC, even in light of the
purposes provision of the Juvenile Justice Code. [In the Matter of
S.A.G.](07-2-13)
On March 14, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that because
respondent violated a condition of her probation in trying to escape, the
trial court did not abused its discretion in committing her to TYC and was
justified in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Code.
When a
juvenile court gives an incorrect reason for its decision, it does not abuse
its discretion if it reaches the right result.[In the Matter of
L.D.](07-2-12)
On March 7, 2007, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in committing respondent to TYC even though the
court based its decision to commit, at least in part, on a lack of available
county funds.
In determinate
sentence transfer hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
request to appoint an expert.[In the Matter of A.A.L.](07-2-11)
On March 8, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of Appeals concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly concluding
that Respondent failed to show he had a particularized need for an expert at
the transfer hearing.
Lack of grand
jury certification in clerk's record did not warrant dismissal of State’s appeal
of Motion to Reduce Determinate Sentence thirteen years later.[In the Matter of
F.M.](07-2-10)
On February 28, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that in appeal by
the state of Respondent’s Motion to Reduce Determinate Sentence thirteen
years after transfer to TDCJ, was not affected by the fact that the grand
jury certification was not included in the clerk's record.
[Out of North
Carolina] A generalized suspicion that a [juvenile] is engaged in criminal
activity is inadequate to create a reasonable suspicion to justify stop.[In the
Matter of J.L.B.M.](07-2-9)
On March 21, 2006, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
generalized suspicion that [juvenile] engaged in criminal activity was
inadequate to create reasonable suspicion to justify stop and was therefore
an unreasonable intrusion upon the juvenile's Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.
Failure to
properly explain the potential use of a juvenile record by the trial court was
considered harmless.[In the Matter of E.C.D.,Jr.](07-2-8)
On February 21, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that failure
to properly admonish a child on how the adjudication would effect him in
adult court, was harmless, absence a showing of how he was harmed by the
error.
Section 54.04(i)
of the Family Code , is inapplicable to Motion’s to Modify.[In the Matter of
G.O.](07-2-7)
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that in a modification order, a
trial court can provide for a commitment to TYC if (1) the original
disposition was for conduct constituting a felony or multiple misdemeanors,
and (2) the court finds the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of
the court.
South Dakota adopts totality of the circumstances test
for voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession.[In the Interest of
J.M.J.](07-2-6)
On January 3, 2007, the South Dakota Supreme Court held
that notice to a parent, guardian, or custodian and a child's opportunity to
confer with such persons are significant factors in evaluating the
voluntariness of a statement or confession under the totality of the
circumstances.
Delaware Court held that the totality of the circumstances,
compels the conclusion that the child’s waiver of his Miranda rights was not
knowing. [Smith V. Delaware](07-2-5)
On February 16, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court found
that, in a juvenile confession, the lack of guidance from a parent or interested
adult is a factor in determining whether waiver of Miranda was knowing.
The record evidence did not establish robbery as a valid,
rational alternative to aggravated robbery.[In the Matter of L.J.,Jr.,](07-2-4)
On July 12, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that the record evidence in this case did not raise the possibility that the
offense committed was the lesser included offense of robbery by threats rather
than robbery with a deadly weapon.
Length of time child can be placed on probation may be a
factor in court’s decision to commit child to TYC.[In the Matter of B.R.](07-2-3)
On July 12, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed
a TYC commitment were the trial court found that the child’s eighteenth birthday
was just over two months from the disposition hearing, and that this was not
enough time for rehabilitation to occur and that it was too short a probation
period for a felony conviction.
The "stay-put" provision of Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act applies only to school authorities during administrative
proceedings and has no application to delinquency proceedings. [In the Matter of
P.E.C.](07-2-2)
On February 2, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1400
et seq., did not limit the juvenile court's authority to modify the juvenile's
disposition.
Jury finding that the juvenile, in the juvenile’s home,
could be provided with the quality of care and level of support and supervision
to meet the conditions of probation, did not preclude commitment to TYC.[In the
Matter of T.A.W.](07-2-1)
On February 13, 2007, the Houston [14th] Court of Appeals
held that the jury’s answer of “We do not” to the question, “Do you find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Juvenile Respondent, [T.A.W.], in the
Juvenile Respondent's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of
support and supervision that the Juvenile Respondent needs to meet the
conditions of probation?”
To determine the admissibility of a probation
officer’s report at disposition, in light of Crawford, the trial court must
balance the defendant's interest in confronting and cross-examining an
adverse witness against the State's interest in not having to produce that
witness. [In the Matter of M.P.](07-1-14)
On February 7, 2007, the Waco Court of Appeals concluded
that a juvenile has no Sixth Amendment or Article I, Section 10 of the Texas
Constitution right of confrontation during the disposition phase of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding, however, he does have a limited right of
confrontation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which requires a balancing test.
Shooting weapon into crowd made juvenile a party to offense of murder where
someone is killed by second shooter, even where juvenile did not intend to
injure.[Gamboa v. State](07-1-13B)
On January 3, 2007, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of
Appeals held that juvenile was acting in concert with the others in a
vehicle and that the individuals in the vehicle were acting together to
intentionally and knowingly caused the death of someone, or that they
intended serious bodily injury and caused death by an act clearly dangerous
to human life, namely shooting into a crowd of people
Under section 52.02(a), if a child is taken to a juvenile processing office
within the meaning of the statute, it is not necessary that the child also be
taken to an official designated by the juvenile board. [Gamboa v.
State](07-1-13A)
On January 3, 2006, the Houston (14th Dist.) Court of
Appeals held that if the option to take a child to the juvenile processing
office is exercised, the child need not also be taken to an official
designated by the juvenile board.
In determinate sentence transfer hearing, trial court
did not abuse its discretion in juvenile to TDCJ for the remainder of his
sentence.[In the Matter of C.R.](07-1-12)
On January 10, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that in a determinate sentence transfer hearing, the trial court may assign
different weights to the factors listed in TFC §54.11(k), and it may
consider other unlisted but relevant factors as well.
Trial court’s judgment was reversed because the jury’s finding was against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence.[Lancon v. State](07-1-11)
On December 27, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict and
reverse the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial.
Court of Appeals does not have original habeas corpus
jurisdiction of a person confined pursuant to an adjudication and
disposition in juvenile court.[In re Hall](07-1-10)
On December 13, 2006, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
dismissed original habeas corpus petition for a child confined pursuant to
an adjudication and disposition in juvenile court because Court of Appeals
lacks jurisdiction for such action.
In
determinate sentence transfer hearing, trial court did not abuse its discretion
by failing to continue hearing where counsel for juvenile had sufficient time to
prepare. [In the Matter of C.E.C.](07-1-9)
On December 14, 2006, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate appellant's
right to due process by failing to continue the transfer hearing, because
the trial court gave Respondent more time and opportunity to prepare for the
hearing than the family code requires.
Failure to file a motion for new trial waives factual sufficiency challenge on
appeal in jury trial only.[In the Matter of F.F.G.](07-1-8)
On November 29, 2006, the Austin Court of Appeals corrected
a prior opinion (in rehearing) holding that failure to file a motion for new
trial does not waive factual sufficiency challenges in a bench trial, only
in a jury trial.
Chain of custody goes to weight not admissibility.[In the Matter of
J.M.A.B.](07-1-7)
On November 30, 2006, the Eastland Court of Appeals held
that when the proponent of evidence shows the beginning and the end of the
chain of custody, any gaps in between go to the weight and credibility of
the evidence rather than the admissibility of the evidence.
In terroristic threats charge, State was not required
to prove that respondent had the capability or the intention to actually
carry out his threat.[In the Matter of T.T.](07-1-6)
On November 15, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that
in terroristic threats charge, State was not required to prove that
respondent had the capability or the intention to actually carry out his
threat, only that he acted with the specific intent to "threaten" imminent
harm.
A
trial court may revoke a juvenile’s probation based on uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice witness.[In the Matter of D.G.III](07-1-5)
On November 16, 2006, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held
that 54.03(e) of the Family Code does not apply to the modification of a
juvenile's disposition, and as a result, testimony of an accomplice witness
does not require corroboration.
In
Motion to Modify, the Family Code does not require that the trial court order
that reports be generated and then have to consider them for disposition.[In the
Matter of V.J.](07-1-4)
On July 12, 2006, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that in a
Motion to Modify, the Code does not require the trial court to do anything
in particular and certainly does not require it to order that reports be
generated in order to consider them.
Handcuffing of suspect during temporary investigative detention was reasonable
under the circumstances and did not amount to an arrest.[In the Matter of
J.D.B.](07-1-3B)
On November 7, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of
Appeals held that an investigative detention continued and an arrest did not
occur even after officer handcuffed respondent.
Act of switching of license plates considered a factor in determining reasonable
suspicion for an investigative stop.[In the Matter of J.D.B.](07-1-3A)
On November 7, 2006, the Houston [14th Dist.] Court of
Appeals held that when viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances,
the existence of possible innocent explanations of a person’s actions, does
not necessarily deprive a police officer of the ability to also possess
reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop.
Court of Appeals lacks original jurisdiction in collateral attack of possibly
void juvenile adjudication through a habeas corpus proceeding.[In Re Todd-Warren
Altschul](07-1-2)
On November 8, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals found that,
as an intermediate court of appeals, they have no jurisdiction over
post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony cases and no original
jurisdiction to address a collateral attach on a juvenile adjudication.
The phrase "Oh, come on!" is not a sufficient objection stating the specific
grounds for complaint.[In the Matter of D.O.](07-1-1B)
On November 9, 2006, the Houston (1st. Dist.) Court of
Appeals held that to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must
have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion
stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.
In
self defense of third person, Appellant stands in shoes of third person for
purposes of evaluating appellant’s defense of a third person defense.[In the
Matter of D.O.](07-1-1A)
On November 9, 2006, the Houston (1st. Dist.) Court of
Appeals held that because third person provoked the use of force by others,
Appellant was not justified in using force against them, as a defense of
that third person.
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