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By
The Honorable
Pat Garza
Associate Judge
386th District Court
San Antonio, Texas
2008
Summaries
2007
Summaries
2006
Summaries
2005
Summaries
2004
Summaries 2003
Summaries 2002
Summaries 2001
Summaries 2000
Summaries 1999
Summaries
When there is a material variance between the
allegation and the findings of the juvenile court, the evidence will be
deamed insufficient and will result in an acquittal.[In the Matter of
C.E.S.C.](08-2-16)
On April 23, 2008, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that when the trial court adjudicates on a manner of committing an offense
not alleged in the petition, the respondent has no notice to defend himself
on the manner not alleged, and as a result, the variance requires an
acquittal of that charge.
Evidence deemed legally insufficient to support jury’s finding that school in
arson adjudication was "within the limits of an incorporated city."[In the
Matter of V.V.C.](08-2-15)
On April 23, 2008, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
concluded that in light of the State’s judicial admission that the School
(in arson prosecution) was not "within the limits of an incorporated city,"
no rational fact finder could find that element, beyond a reasonable doubt,
as required by the petition, jury charge, and arson statute.
In
a determinate sentence case, an incorrect admonishment as to punishment,
warrants reversal, if plea shown to be involuntary.[In the Matter of
T.W.C.](08-2-14)
On April 24, 2008, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st Dist.)
when an incorrect admonishment is made, but substantially complies (falls
within the actual range of punishment), the burden shifts to appellant to
show his plea was involuntary.
Initial inadmissible oral statement may taint later written statement.[In the
Matter of J.A.B.](08-2-13)
On April 17, 2008, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that
when a written statement is given after an inadmissible oral statement, the
magistrate should explain to the juvenile that his prior oral statements may
not be used against him.
In
adult aggravated sexual assault trial, defendant was not required to file
motions objecting to jury charge which did not restrict convictions to actions
occurring after defendant’s 17th birthday.[Alberty v. State](08-2-12)
On April 9, 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held
that defendant was not required to file a motion objecting to the jury
charge and therefore reverse and remand for consideration of whether a jury
charge was erroneous because it did not limit the "on or about" language to
any date prior to the date of the filing of the indictment, and on or after
the appellant's seventeenth birthday, thus permitting the jury to convict
him on the basis of testimony about numerous offenses alleged to have been
committed while appellant was a juvenile.
A violation of Miranda Warnings does not justify the
exclusion of physical evidence resulting therefrom.[In the Matter of
H.V.](08-2-11)
On April 11, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court held that
physical evidence that does not compel a defendant to testify against
himself cannot be a violation of the Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda
protects against, and if obtaining the evidence did not violate the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure the evidence is
admissible.
Lack of causal connection nullifies failure to notify parent of juvenile’s
arrest.[Hartmangruber v. State](08-2-10)
On March 19, 2008, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that because there was no causal connection between the failure to notify
juvenile's father of arrest in accordance with section 52.02(b) of the
Family Code and juvenile's decision to give his statement to police, no
error was shown
Restitution can be ordered for rehabilitative purposes.[In the Matter of
D.K.](08-2-9)
On March 19, 2008, the Dallas (5th Dist.) Court of Appeals
concluded that restitution can be an effective means to impress upon a
juvenile the serious consequences of delinquent behavior, including
financial consequences.
Habeas relief granted where trial counsel’s performance considered deficient
because counsel failed to know the law concerning use of a prior juvenile
conviction for enhancement.[Ex Parte Hall](08-2-8)
On March 19, 2008, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
accepted the recommendation of the trial court to grant a new punishment
proceeding because counsel's performance was deficient in failing to know
the law concerning the use of a prior juvenile conviction and that
deficiency prejudiced Applicant.
Trial court need not make a finding that the public safety requires a commitment
to TYC.[In the Matter of E.F.Z.R.](08-2-7)
On March 13, 2008, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that
since the trial court found that the child was in need of rehabilitation, it
was irrelevant whether the protection of the child or the public required a
disposition for commitment to TYC.
Defense of duress was not raised where evidence did not show that juvenile was
compelled to participate in altercation by threat of imminent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or another.[In the Matter of V.M.H.](08-2-6)
On October 10, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that evidence that juvenile was taking orders or was instructed by his
brother to remove victim's shoes and pants was not sufficient to raise the
defense of duress.
Trial Court did not abuse it’s discretion by
committing child to TYC for misdemeanor offense prior to September 1,
2007.[In the Matter of S.J.F.](08-2-5)
On October 10, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found
that the trial court did not abuse it’s discretion by committing child to
TYC for misdemeanor offense prior to statute changing disallowing TYC
commitments for misdemeanor offenses.
Failure to pay required appellate filing fee or establish
indigence warrants dismissal of appeal.[In the Matter of M.A.F.](08-2-4)
On February 15, 2008, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held
that since appellant’s counsel did not pay required filing fee or
establishing indigence, after being notified to do so, his appeal is
dismissed.
On July 31, 2006, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 38.37, applies to juvenile sexual
assault adjudications where evidence bears on the state of mind of
respondent or child complainant.
Evidence factually sufficient to prove Appellant's guilt as the primary actor or
as a party in robbery.[In the Matter of F.J.S.](08-2-2)
On August 16, 2007, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that
evidence was factually sufficient to support adjudication where the State
offered evidence that Appellant either robbed victim at knife-point while an
accomplish held a bat, or he held the bat while accomplish held the knife.
In a determinate sentence transfer hearing, report admitted into evidence by TYC
psychologist did not violate child’s Fifth Amendment rights.[In the Matter of
M.M.](08-2-1B)
On February 6, 2008, the Austin Court of Appeals held that
written reports from TYC psychologists (professionals) are admissible in a
determinate sentence transfer hearings because TFC §54.11(d) specifically
provides for it.
In determinate sentence transfer hearing, where psychological evaluation was
admitted earlier in trial, later objection did not preserve error.[In the Matter
of M.M.](08-2-1A)
On February 6, 2008, the Austin Court of Appeals held that
in a determinate sentence transfer hearing, since the complained-of
psychological evaluation objected to by respondent was admitted at the
beginning of the trial, error was not preserved for appeal.
Stated reason in trial court’s disposition order was
sufficient to commit child to TYC in Motion to Modify prosecution.[In the
Matter of J.A.A.](08-1-15)
On February 6, 2008, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that trial court's stated reasons, as well as the statement in the
disposition order that the child "is in need of a structured and therapeutic
correctional environment" was sufficient to commit child to TYC.
In assault prosecution, the trial court is not required to appoint guardian ad
litem for the child, where the parent is the victim of the assault.[In the
Matter of L.A.P.](08-1-14B)
On February 6, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that, if the parent is present, the trial court has the discretion to
appoint a guardian ad litem only if the parent is not capable or willing to
make a decision in the best interest of the child.
Conflict of Interest did not exist where attorney for the child was hired by
parent in assault prosecution where parent was victim of the assault.[In the
Matter of L.A.P.](08-1-14A)
On February 6, 2007, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that, until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented
conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate
for his claim of ineffective assistance.
Respondent not entitled to blood test of victim in sexual assault case to
determine sexually transmitted disease.[In the Matter of C.B.](08-1-13)
On February 7, 2008, the Dallas (5th Dist) Court of Appeals
held that Brady and its progeny do not require prosecuting authorities to
disclose exculpatory information to defendants that the State does not have
in its possession and that is not known to exist.
Trial court did not violate appeallant’s (adult) due process rights by
appointing counsel for minor witness who's about to take responsibility for
committing the offense in question.[Garza v. State](08-1-12)
On January 31, 2008, the Houston (1st Dist) Court of Appeals
held that trial court did not violate appeallant’s due process rights by
appointing counsel for minor witness who was facing juvenile charges, so the
child may make an informed and voluntary decision to testify.
A
juvenile has no right of confrontation at a transfer hearing because it is
dispositional rather than adjudicative in nature.[In the Matter of
F.D.](08-1-11)
On January 31, 2008, the Dallas (5th Dist) Court of Appeals
held that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's
motion for continuance to allow confrontation of psychologist in TYC report,
when court in jeopardy of not holding transfer hearing before child’s
twenty-first birthday.
No
record of object to the trial court's failure to give statutory admonishments,
does not properly preserved complaint for appellate review. [In the Matter of
R.R.F.](08-1-10)
On January 10, 2008, the Corpus Christi-Edenburg Court of
Appeals held that in a bench trial, if the record reflects no objection to
the trial court's failure to give statutory admonishments, the complaint was
not properly preserved for appellate review.
Witness with extensive experience and knowledge in the area of body shop
estimation was able to testify as an expert.[In the Matter of C.D.S.](08-1-9)
On January 30, 2008, the Waco Court of Appeals held that it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow witness who had
extensive experience and knowledge in the area of body shop estimation to
testify as an expert.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution in the amount
of $ 9,336.10, even where affidavit of indigency filed by child's father.[In the
Matter of E.K.](08-1-8)
On December 14, the Dallas Court of Appeals (5th Dist.) held
that the amount of restitution awarded by the trial court was designed to
compensate the victim and there was no evidence in the record to show that
it would not be possible for the family to jointly pay the restitution as
ordered.
For a drug screen to be admissible, evidence must meet Daubert criteria.[In the
Matter of D.W.P.](08-1-7)
On January 4, 2008, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that
for a drug screen to be considered reliable, evidence of its underlying
scientific theory and the technique applying that theory must be valid.
Juvenile does not have the right to testify and the trial court is not required
to admonish him of said right.[In the Matter of J.W.P.](08-1-6)
On December 20, 2007, the Eastland Court of Appeals held
that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Ann. Art. 1.05, granting an
accused adult the right to be heard, does not apply to juveniles.
A
school police officer may conduct a pat-down search of a student on school
grounds for the sole purpose of finding the student's identification card if he
fails to produce it when asked to do so.[D.L. vs. Indiana](08-1-5)
On December 7, 2007, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that
under the T.L.O., it was not unreasonable, in searching D.L. for his
identification, to pat down his pant leg, and, following his attempt to
place something down his pants, for a male police officer to shake his pant
legs and to collect the green, leafy vegetation which fell out as a result.
Evidence did not show that juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda rights after
being physically abused while in police custody.[Illinois v. Richardson](08-1-4)
On September 25, 2007, the Illinois Court of Appeals held
that the State failed to meet its burden to show that juvenile’s injury,
while in police custody, was unrelated to his confession, because appellate
court was not convinced juvenile could separate the fear associated from
being punched by the police from any subsequent interactions with other
police officers or while in lockup.
Jury finding that the juvenile, in the juvenile’s home, could be provided with
the quality of care and level of support and supervision to meet the conditions
of probation, did not preclude commitment to TYC.[In the Matter of
T.A.W.](08-1-3)
On August 9, 2007, the Houston [14th] Court of Appeals held
that the jury’s answer of "We do not" to whether the jury believed that the
Respondent, in his home, could not be provided the quality of care and level
of support and supervision to meet the conditions of probation, did not
effect jury’s commitment to TYC.
Certification and Transfer statute is not unconstitutional even though it
exposes juvenile to adult punishments.[Rivera v. State](08-1-2)
Findings by juvenile judge to transfer juvenile to adult
court does not expose juvenile to a greater punishment even though the
potential sentence in the adult criminal system is greater than that in the
juvenile system.
Not every right set out by the magistrate need be waived by the juvenile to
validate a confession.[In the Matter of J.L.](08-1-1)
Section 51.095(a)(5)(A) does not require that every right be
individually waived either in writing or verbally, but only that the
juvenile knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive each right.
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