2010 Case Summaries

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Family Code does not require that a respondent give prior notice of intent to assert the defense of lack of responsibility due to mental illness or mental retardation.[In the Matter of A.W.B.](10-1-8B)

On February 2, 2010, the Amarillo Court concluded that the Family Code does not require that a respondent give notice of intent to assert the defense of lack of responsibility due to mental illness or mental retardation, and as a result, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the State's objection to doctor’s report regarding juvenile’s mental condition.

An unnoticed outcry statement may still be admissible if the statement is admissible under a hearsay exception.[In the Matter of A.W.B.](10-1-8A)

On February 2, 2010, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that failure to meet the statutory requisites for an outcry statement was not error where witness’s statement was admissible as an excited utterance.

Hearsay by (unnoticed) outcry witness was admissible to rubut an express or implied charge of fabrication or improper influence.[In the Matter of A.C.T.](10-1-7B)

On February 3, 2010, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that hearsay testimony from an outcry witness, which the state failed to properly notify juvenile’s counsel of, was admissible as a hearsay exception where the testimony was offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.

In aggravated sexual assault adjudication, evidence was sufficient to establish that the juvenile committed the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.[In the Matter of A.C.T.](10-1-7A)

On February 3, 2010, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that, the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's finding, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found that the elements of aggravated sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Granting of deferred prosecution by prosecutor must be in writing, signed and filed in the record of the cause to be enforceable.[In the Matter of R.C.](10-1-6)

On February 4, 2010, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that while a prosecutor has the discretion to defer prosecution of a juvenile without court approval in certain circumstances, the agreement must comply with Tex.R. Civ. P. 11, to be enforceable.

Denial of parent’s access to juvenile during confession not grounds for reversal on appeal.[Grant v. State](10-1-5C)

On January 27, 2010, the Waco Court of Appeals found that, section 61.103 of the Texas Family Code provides that parents have a right of access to their child, however, however, if the parent is denied the right of access, the child may not raise that complaint on appeal.

In court’s denial of juvenile’s motion to suppress his confession, no error was shown where no causal connection was established.[Grant v. State](10-1-5B)

On January 27, 2010, the Waco Court of Appeals held that trial court did not err in denying juvenile's motion to suppress since juvenile had the burden of proving a causal connection between the alleged violation of section 52.02(b) and his statement and no evidence of a causal connection was presented.

In discretionary transfer proceeding, probable cause was established of the juvenile as a party, by acting with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense of murder.[Grant v. State](10-1-5A)

On January 27, 2010, the Waco Court of Appeals held that in a discretionary transfer preceding the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the suspect committed the offense of murder as a party acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense.

By failing to argue Confrontation Clause in trial, juvenile waived those objections on appeal.[Robinson v. State](10-1-4)

In January 28, 2010, the Houston Court of Appeals (14th Dist.), stated that when a party's argument for admitting evidence could refer to either the Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause, he must specifically articulate that the Confrontation Clause demands admission of the evidence to preserve error on this ground.

Evidence was insufficient to support finding that mother contributed to delinquency of the juvenile in graffiti adjudication.[In the Matter of S.J.C.](10-1-3)

In January 6, 2010, the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a portion of a judgment finding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the juvenile's mother by willful act or omission, contributed to, caused, or encouraged the child's delinquent conduct.

Restitution allowed where damage of vehicle occurred while child engaged in offense of evading arrest.[In the Matter of E.A.R., IV](10-1-2)

On November 20, 2009, the Austin Court of Appeals held that damage caused by juvenile committing the offense of evading arrest was damage for which the juvenile was criminally responsible.

In a Motion to Suppress, a trial judge can base his pre-trial ruling on the contents of an unsworn police report.[Ford v. State](10-1-01)

On October 21, 2009, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment concluding that art. 28.01, § 1(6), does not mandate that all information considered by a trial judge must be accompanied by affidavit or testimony.